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Summary
This thesis was motivated by the author’s professional engagement and observations with
extended producer responsibility (EPR) as a policy approach to promote sustainable materials
management. The argument for EPR is that policy mechanisms that engage producers in the
financing and management of collection activities for products at End of Life, not only create
market drivers for improvements in product design but the engagement of producers results in
greater economic-efficiency than is often attained through other financial mechanisms. As
constraints on global resources become more acute and the life-cycle impacts of materials are
more transparent, the need strategies, policy and otherwise, for reducing those environmental
impacts of products becomes more acute.
The objective of the thesis was to identify and analyze key patterns of EPR policy with the intent
of developing recommendations to optimize its implementation and expand the research base of
EPR.
The initial chapter of the thesis framed the four research questions as well as specified the
research methodology that emphasized the use of case studies of EPR programs and comparative
policy analysis to identify the characteristics of EPR policy and structure comparisons between
EPR policies and programs.
Chapter 2 followed with a discourse on Ecological Modernization (EM), the theoretical
framework that which serves as the theoretical framework for the subsequent chapters.
Ecological modernization emphasized the integration of environmental and economic objectives
and particularly pertinent to EPR, recognized the importance of market-based policy approaches
and new models of environmental governance. The chapter identified prominent critiques of EM
and concluded with the intersection of the theoretical framework and research questions.
Chapter 3 presented the context and rationale for EPR followed by a brief history of its
origination and application in the European Union. The chapter then transitioned to a profile of
EPR in the U.S.
The subsequent chapter provided an overview of primary policy choices associated with
development of EPR policy. Chapter 4 also examined the critiques associated with EPR. The
introduction to the topic is followed by Chapters 5-8 that investigate each of the research
questions. These four chapters investigated the relevant themes for EPR and each chapter builds
on the previous chapter.
Through a comparative case study between EPR in the United States and Canada contained in
Chapter 5, the author identified key components of EPR policy and illustrated the similarities and
differences between two jurisdictions in North America.
Based on the analysis conducted for Chapter 6 regarding the potential lack of consistency of EPR
policy in the United States, the author examined three strategies for potential achievement of
greater consistency of EPR policy between jurisdictions in the United States.
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Following the two previous chapters, Chapter 7 evaluated the governance of EPR policy regimes 
and, specifically, the allocation of responsibilities between government and the producers. The 
author examined different governance structures for EPR with a particular emphasis on the 
degree of decision-making authority and flexibility accorded to producers for program 
implementation.  
Based on the notion that, in some cases, the practice of EPR is demonstrative of characteristics 
associated with private environmental governance, Chapter 8 investigated the integration and 
characterization of EPR within individual company corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives.  
The thesis concludes with an identification of findings from Chapters 4-8. In the concluding 
chapter, the author offered recommendations to enhance the policy and practice of EPR including 
how EPR may contribute to fulfilling the objectives of a circular economy. Finally, this chapter 
contained a suite of suggestions for future research on the topic.  
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Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift komt voort uit de professionele betrokkenheid van de onderzoeker en zijn
waarnemingen van producentverantwoordelijkheid (EPR) als een beleidsbenadering voor het
bevorderen van duurzaam materialenbeheer. Het argument voor EPR is dat beleidsmechanismen
die producenten betrekken in het bekostigen en het management van inzameling van gebruikte
consumentenartikelen niet alleen marktkrachten creëren voor een beter productontwerp, maar ook
een hogere efficiency dan andere beleidsmechanismen. De restricties op mondiale hulpbronnen
worden sterker, en de milieu-effecten van producten over hun hele levenscyclus worden
transparanter. Daardoor groeit de behoefte aan strategieën en beleidsopties om de milieu-effecten
van producten terug te dringen.
De doelstelling van dit proefschrift was het identificeren en analyseren van de belangrijkste
patronen in beleid dat gebaseerd is op EPR, om zo tot aanbevelingen te komen om de toepassing
van EPR te optimaliseren en te verbreden.
In het openingshoofdstuk worden de vier onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd, en de
onderzoeksmethoden geïntroduceerd. Het onderzoek behelsde de uitvoering van case studies van
EPR programma’s en vergelijkende beleidsanalyse. Daarmee konden de karakteristieken van
beleid gebaseerd op EPR bepaald worden, en een structurele vergelijking gemaakt worden van
EPR-beleid en -programma’s.
Daarna volgt hoofdstuk 2, met een bespreking van de theorie van Ecologische Modernisering
(EM), die een theoretisch raamwerk verschaft voor de latere hoofdstukken. Ecologische
Modernisering benadrukt de integratie van milieu- en economische doelstellingen. De theorie
erkent ook het belang van marktgerichte beleidsbenaderingen en nieuwe modellen van milieu-
governance. In dit hoofdstuk komen vooraanstaande kritieken op Ecologische Modernisering aan
de orde, waarna het laat zien hoe het theoretisch raamwerk toepasselijk is bij het adresseren van
de onderzoeksvragen.
Hoofdstuk 3 bespreekt de context en de rationale voor EPR, en verschaft een korte geschiednis
van ontstaan en toepassing van EPR in de Europese Unie. Vervolgens bespreekt het de
ontwikkelingen van EPR in de Verenigde Staten.
Hoofdstuk 4 geeft een overzicht van de belangrijkste beleidskeuzes bij het vormgeven van beleid
dat gebaseerd is op EPR. Het bespreekt en onderzoekt de kritieken op EPR. Daarna komen de
hoofdstukken 5-8, die elk één van de onderzoeksvragen behandelen. Elk van deze vier
hoofdstukken bouwt voort op het voorgaande. Hoofdstuk 5 bevat een vergelijkende analyse van
EPR in de Verenigde Staten en Canada. Daarin worden de belangrijkste componenten van EPR
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Voor hoofdstuk 6 voerde de onderzoeker een analyse uit van het gebrek aan consistentie in EPR-
beleid in de Verenigde Staten. Drie mogelijke strategieën werden onderzocht om tot grotere 
consistentie in EPR-beleid te komen tussen jurisdicties in de Verenigde Staten.  
Als vervolg op de hoofdstukken 5 en 6 wordt in hoofdstuk 7 de governance van EPR-
beleidsregimes geëvalueerd. Daarbij wordt met name aandacht besteed aan de toekenning van 
verantwoordelijkheid aan overheid en bedrijven. Verschillende structuren voor EPR werden 
onderzocht met bijzondere aandacht voor beslissingsbevoegdheid en flexibiliteit bij producenten 
tijdens de implementatie van beleidsprogramma’s.   
Hoofdstuk 8 richt zich op de integratie en karakterisering van EPR bij bedrijven die actief zijn op 
het gebied van maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen (MVO, in het engels CSR). Dit is 
gedaan op de overweging dat de praktijk van EPR kenmerken vertoont van private environmental 
governance.  
Het proefschrift wordt afgesloten met bevindingen van de hoofdstukken 4-8. In het laatste 
hoofdstuk doet de auteur aanbevelingen ter versterking van beleid en praktijk op het gebied van 
EPR. Daarbij gaat hij ook in op de vraag hoe EPR kan bijdragen tot het realiseren van de doelen 
van een circulaire economie. Tevens bevat het laatste hoofdstuk een aantal aanbevelingen voor 
toekomstig onderzoek op het gebied van producentverantwoordelijkheid.  
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1. Chapter One: Introduction
As the implementation of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) expands globally as an
environmental policy principle to address the environmental impacts of products and materials,
the motivations and policy choices that drive this expansion demonstrate significant variability
across jurisdictions. The policy context offers a rich landscape for analysis that aims to improve
the application EPR and its contributions to a more materials efficient society. Now, in its third
decade, as a strategy to reduce the environmental impact of products, the OECD estimated that
nearly 400 EPR programs are active globally (OECD 2014). This thesis author built upon
analyses of existing and evolving EPR initiatives globally and especially focused upon its
evolution in Europe, Canada and the United States.
While individual companies as well as industrial sectors are implementing corporate social
responsibility (CSR) strategies intended to reduce the environmental impacts of their products, in
some cases, by instituting product take-back programs for their products or packaging, this thesis
author focused upon the public policy context that is necessary to create the conditions for a
broad, systematic approach to promoting improved materials management that supports
sustainable production and consumption practices. Through its emphasis on reordering the
financing of the End-of-Life (EOL) management of products, EPR was designed to create the
policy framework that incentivizes companies to develop sustainable products or sustainable
product-service combinations.
Despite its typical characterization as a tool to finance and increase the collection of products at
the EOL, EPR is more appropriately framed as a policy mechanism to promote life-cycle thinking
to incentivize environmental impact reduction strategies throughout the product’s life-cycle
(Dalhammer 2015). The lofty expectations for EPR as well as the documented benefits
contributed to its emergence as a central policy strategy to promote sustainable consumption and
production (Kronenberg 2007; Maxwell and Sheate 2006), sustainable materials management
(OECD 2012) and the circular economy in order to reduce the challenges of waste management
as well as some of the constraints on natural resources.
To underscore the imperative for a robust public policy approach to promoting sustainable
materials management, The World Bank estimated that 1.3 billion tons of solid waste were
generated in 2012 and projected that quantity to increase to 2.2 billion tons by 2025 (World Bank
2012). This increase in solid waste generation is linked to the expansion of the global middle
class and to increases in consumption (Guaría and Knorringa 2014). The use and availability of
materials is also impacting supply chain management as illustrated in a recent survey of large
corporations; the findings documented that resource scarcity is expected to demonstrably impact
global commerce (KPMG 2012).
This thesis researcher assessed several aspects of EPR and developed policy and programmatic
recommendations that, if implemented, may be more effective in accomplishing the objectives
sought by advocates of EPR programs. This research was designed to build upon the observations
and assessments of EPR implementation internationally and the insights from analyses will be of
x
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particular importance for those nations that are initiating new EPR policies and programs. While 
the U.S. has embraced EPR for a broader suite of materials and products than many other nations 
and has instituted a variety of different EPR policy mechanisms, there remains the opportunity for 
integrating themes and conclusions gathered from global experiences with EPR to further shape 
and enhance the evolving product policies in the U.S.  This analysis and synthesis of policies can 
contribute to the fulfillment of the more robust objectives of EPR such as the achievement of 
greater design for environment activities and ultimately, to more transformative product service 
systems and other strategies that are embodied within the emerging circular economy discourse. 
The objectives of the research were to produce an academic exploration of the rationale and 
history of EPR and to investigate the principal themes, including the challenges facing EPR 
policy and practice that have emerged as it has matured as an environmental policy principle. The 
researcher also sought to develop policy recommendations to expand the scope of EPR as a 
policy principle and increase its effectiveness. 
The recognition of EPR as a crucial policy strategy has accelerated in the past decade due to the 
growing global commodity supply challenges for a wide range of materials and due to the 
recognition that ensuring supply and price stability is necessary. The constrained materials supply 
is creating a significant opportunity for EPR to serve as a transformative approach that can assist 
society to transition beyond the focus upon addressing individual products to dramatically 
increasing material recovery rates and a more holistic and integrated materials strategy that 
progresses toward a circular economy.   
1.2 Motivations for Developing this Thesis 
The selection of this thesis topic was inspired by the author’s twenty years of being enmeshed in 
the policy development and program implementation of materials management policy, including 
EPR, at the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), the state environmental regulatory 
authority. In the United States in the 1990s the conceptual framework of sustainable development 
and market-based approaches to achieving environmental outcomes was emerging in the 
environmental policy dialogue. At that time, EPR was embraced as a strategy to address the 
challenges associated with the products entering the waste management system and recognition of 
the limits of the capacity of government to manage them in an effective manner. Following the 
enactment of EPR in many U.S. states, a broader evaluative perspective of the policy approach 
and exploration of key thematic elements had not been undertaken comprehensively from a 
scholarly perspective.  
This thesis author conducted a comprehensive review of the implementation of EPR globally to 
identify the policy attributes that are central to the goals and functioning of EPR. This review 
emphasized an analysis of the available policy structures and mechanisms that can be utilized to 
promote greater consistency of the application of EPR to reduce transaction costs associated with 
a myriad of requirements. The review also investigated the governance of EPR programs and 
finally, the characterization and integration of EPR within the CSR programs of companies. Each 
of this thesis’ topics was selected to identify and address gaps in the existing scholarly literature 
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and to contribute to the dialogue to improve the design, scope and implementation of EPR
policies and programs throughout the U.S. and globally.
Building upon the geographical focus of the thesis, this thesis researcher sought to contribute to
and to inform the unfolding and evolving public policy dialogue regarding the design and
implementation of EPR in the United States. This objective was of particular relevance given the
emergence of EPR as a prevalent public policy response globally for assisting in the transition
from an emphasis on recycling to that of an emerging, broader materials management strategy
and more recently to that of the circular economy (EPA 2009).
1.3 Problem Statement
Despite a growing body of literature on EPR, there was a lack of research on EPR in the United
States that identified key structural elements and policy trends of its application in the U.S.
Illustrating the expansion of EPR in the U.S. during the past decade, U.S. states have enacted
more than 70 programs in more than 35 states. However, the existing literature and knowledge
base of EPR were dominated by analyses of its application in the European Union and with a
focus on product categories such as Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive
(WEEE) and packaging (Nash and Bosso 2013). Nash and Bosso 2013; Wagner 2012; Atasu
2013 and others authored important assessments of the application of EPR in the U.S. Their
research findings provided a valuable context for this thesis author’s research, not only in terms
of isolating the predominant policy themes of EPR, but also for identifying and characterizing the
elements of EPR policy, which may be improved to enhance their overall functioning.
EPR in the U.S. emerged as a state-level environmental policy approach to address a range of
products including selected categories of WEEE, architectural paint, batteries, and mattresses,
carpet and other product categories. Because the implementation of EPR in the U.S. was initiated
at the state level, there was policy experimentation and differentiation among the states and
therefore, a demonstrable variability of program implementation for certain product categories
most notably WEEE. The subnational policy context in the U.S. impeded not only the broader
adoption of EPR but also inhibited the delivery of cohesive policy signals to producers to engage
in ‘Design-for-Environment’ (DfE) practices as well as potentially restraining the development of
closed-loop product collection and management strategies that could be deployed nationally.
Given the state-led EPR policy context in the U.S., the challenges posed by the lack of
consistency among state policy efforts for several product categories elicited the question “How
can governance mechanisms for EPR programs be enhanced to improve the efficiency and to
enhance achievement of the broader objectives of EPR?” This policy context in the U.S. also
underscored the need for research to learn how EPR specifically, but EOL management for
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1.4 Research Questions 
Despite the predominance of EPR policy internationally as an environmental policy strategy, 
several premises and outcomes of EPR had not received sufficient research attention. This was 
particularly the case regarding the application of EPR in the United States. Through the 
identification and exploration of research questions, this thesis author decided to build upon and to 
deepen the literature review to develop recommendations designed to enhance and strengthen EPR 
policy development and implementation systems throughout the U.S.  
This thesis research was designed to answer the following four questions: 
Research Question 1) How and to what extent is EPR policymaking in the U.S. being influenced 
by the global policy landscape, and in particular that of Canada, for EPR policy development 
and program implementation?  
With EPR as an environmental policy approach that is embraced widely, there is significant 
opportunity to identify the common policy themes and programmatic elements in different 
countries. The previous comparative research largely focused on analyses of how differing 
jurisdictions implemented EPR for similar product categories such as WEEE or packaging. Two 
case studies profiling the WEEE programs in the State of Minnesota and the Province of Ontario 
were selected to illustrate the differing approaches to the implementation of EPR policy adopted in 
each jurisdiction. Several other EPR programs were examined in both countries to more fully 
characterize and distinguish the prevailing practice of EPR in each country.  
Research Question 2) What are the strategies and opportunities to achieve a greater degree of 
consistency for EPR programs in the United States given the prevailing diversity of state-based 
regulatory approaches?   
The lack of consistency of EPR regulations among jurisdictions was frequently cited by many 
parties including producers, recyclers/processors of products and regulatory authorities as a feature 
of the EPR policy context for several product categories. While most often communicated from 
producers as contributing to increased producer compliance costs, the lack of policy consistency 
inhibits the communication of clear and consistent signals to producers to engage in DfE activities 
and fulfill the objective of EPR to function as a life-cycle oriented policy approach. This lack of 
policy cohesion may also detract from producers engaging in more transformative innovation such 
as product service systems and other strategies necessary for the transition to the circular economy. 
From the perspective of regulatory authorities, greater consistency may lead to more effective 
strategies, such a cooperation on program oversight and compliance activities, to address ‘free-
riders’ in a coordinated and comprehensive fashion given that program parameters would 
demonstrate less variability.  
Because of the predominantly state-led policy-making mechanisms for solid waste management 
activities in the U.S., EPR programs demonstrate a significant variability of implementation 
approaches for some product categories by individual states. To address this research question and 
the context for greater consistency of EPR programs in the U.S. this thesis researcher investigated 
three policy strategies that were identified based upon historical antecedents in the 
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U.S. as well as the EPR regulatory approaches that are being implemented in the Canadian 
provinces. 
Research Question 3) What are the existing models of governance of EPR programs that are
functioning and how might these models be optimized to improve performance of programs?
Because the question of environmental governance is increasingly viewed as central to achieving 
sustainable development, governance within the context of EPR is receiving more attention in 
academic scholarship. In the case of EPR, governance is generally characterized as the 
apportionment of responsibilities among the actors along the product chain. The question of 
governance is particularly relevant if EPR is implemented to achieve objectives beyond simply 
transferring the costs of managing products at EOL from government to other actors along the 
product chain. To address this question, this researcher developed a typology for models of 
governance of EPR programs with a particular emphasis on the allocation of responsibilities 
between the producers and governmental actors.  
Research Question 4) How do individual firms view EPR as a component of their CSR 
strategy? 
While EPR is a public policy tool that engages producers of products in the financing and 
management of products at the EOL, the question of how individual firms have integrated EPR 
and EOL management activities, more broadly, for products and materials into individual 
company CSR profiles had not been addressed in the scholarly literature. This researcher sought 
to contribute to the understanding as to whether, and if so how, EPR contributes to a company’s 
CSR activities such as encouraging broader product recovery strategies to recover materials or for 
providing a service to customers in the management of the used products. 
To answer this research question, 121 corporate social responsibility reports were evaluated for 
specific corporate EPR compliance activities and, more broadly, for firm-level activities to 
arrange for collection and management of discarded products. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
This thesis author investigated the research questions through the use of a predominantly 
qualitative research methodology.
In part, this thesis author relied on case studies and comparative analyses of existing EPR 
programs, as this approach best matched the structure and intent of the research questions. 
Another determining factor for the selection of the research methods was the author’s 
professional position within a regulatory authority that oversees three EPR programs. As a result, 
for example, it was likely that the participation in survey instruments by some of the firms 
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6Finally, the findings of each of the papers that addressed one research question suggested policy 
recommendations to strengthen the functioning of EPR programs and identified topics for further 
research.  The recommendations centered on how the policy construction of EPR regulatory 
mechanisms and programs can be enhanced to achieve greater efficiencies and environmental 
benefits, throughout the product’s lifecycle.  
Literature Review 
The thesis author undertook an extensive review of the scholarly literature regarding the 
theoretical framework and application of EPR policy globally. That review served as the 
foundational context for this thesis and was essential for the identification of gaps in the research 
base and existing literature. The relevant literature for the thesis was derived from several 
categories including academic journals, PhD theses, governmental analyses and evaluations and 
finally, EPR program-specific information released by producer responsibility organizations 
(PROs) and individual companies. This thesis author built upon articles published in the Journal 
of Cleaner Production, the Journal of Industrial Ecology, the Journal of Waste Management and 
Research and Resources Conservation and Recycling, among others, which provided a broad, 
multidisciplinary perspective on the origins, history, visions, applications and gaps in EPR 
globally and especially with in-depth focus upon EPR within the U.S.  
The theses authored by Thomas Lindhqvist, Naoko Tojo and Chris van Rossem were invaluable 
for providing the historical perspective, articulation of the principles of EPR and analyses of 
policy choices regarding the application of EPR in several countries.  
This thesis author also relied extensively on reports issued by governments, particularly those of 
an evaluative perspective. Of these, the literature on the topic issued by the OECD was 
particularly valuable because of the breadth of programs it analyzed and due to the emphasis on 
the economic features of EPR. Planning documents and progress reports issued by producer 
responsibility organizations and others associated with the implementation of EPR regimes were 
also systematically analyzed. These sources were of particular relevance for the comparative case 
studies of the WEEE programs in Minnesota and Ontario, the results of which are presented in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
For the investigation of research question 3, the author examined the literature of environmental 
governance, and in particular the conceptualization and implementation of private governance 
mechanisms. The investigation of research question 4 was based upon a review of the 
foundational literature for corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainable supply chain 
management that was published in journals such as Business Strategy and the Environment, 
Journal of Business Ethics and Business and Society. The primary methodology for addressing 
research question 4 was based upon in-depth analyses of corporate social responsibility reports or 
sustainability reports and assessments of sustainability activities described on company websites. 
Case Studies
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As noted by Andolini and Blake, the internationalization of public policy is accelerating, in part
due to economic globalization (Andolini and Blake 2010). EPR policy development and
evaluation are demonstrative of this dynamic particularly given the global reach of many
producers who seek to implement a consistent response to the expanding EPR policy footprint.
Given this context, the relevance of comparative policy analysis for EPR based research is crucial
for evaluating the dynamics and effectiveness of EPR programs and ultimately assisting in the
identification and crafting of potential improvements to the policy instruments.
Case studies, included in Chapters 5 and 6, were essential to document the application of the
primary EPR policy choices articulated in Chapter 4. In the case of Chapter 7, in which this thesis
author examined the governance of EPR, the use of case studies enabled the development of the
typology of common governance models for EPR. The use of case studies supported the
comparison and contextual understanding not only to illustrate the differences regarding the
policy choices and implementation aspects of EPR programs but also to identify and document
the similarities and differences among programs, which was a particularly important research
exercise for the examination of policy consistency that was addressed in Chapter 6.
While the use of case studies served as the vehicle for studying EPR program implementation, it
was important to recognize the limitations of the case study approach, with respect to its
application to a quantitative assessment between EPR programs. Given the differences in EPR
programs as well as other influencing factors such as broader legal context, societal
characteristics, and complementary environmental policies, which influence the results of a
particular EPR program, an analysis of the quantitative outputs from an environmental
assessment or economic analysis perspective was not undertaken. The lack of comparability of
data due to programmatic differences among EPR programs in different jurisdictions posed a
significant obstacle to an adequate assessment of the environmental benefits and economic
analyses.
Comparative Policy Analysis
Following the selection of the case studies, this thesis author engaged in the identification of
primary policy themes that were representative of the application of EPR in a particular
jurisdiction. Comparative policy analysis served as a key methodological tool to achieve
generalizations and identify common limitations and those approaches that lend themselves to
transferability. The comparative approach was particularly relevant to facilitating the
identification of the strengths and weaknesses in the current practice of EPR in the US.
Comparative policy analysis was particularly relevant given the internationalization of EPR and
the subsequent and ongoing exchange of policy constructs and evaluation between nations. While
the initial policy conceptualization of EPR occurred within the European Union, which
established the key concepts and overall framework for EPR, other countries built upon that
platform and adapted it for practice in their jurisdictions. This globalization of EPR policies not
only demonstrates policymakers’ interest in market-based environmental policy instruments but
illustrates that many of the producers that are subject to EPR regulatory requirements operate
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8globally and often advocate for a consistent EPR policy approach that most closely aligns with 
their business models. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This dissertation was structured into three distinct components as described in the following 
paragraphs: 
Introduction to the Topic 
Chapter 1 is an introduction to this research and defined the problem statement, articulated the 
research questions and research methodology. As described in Chapter 2, the research was guided 
by the theoretical framework of ‘Ecological Modernization’ that underpins much of the rationale 
and policy constructions fundamental to EPR. A contextual literature review that addressed the 
theory and history of the EPR was included in Chapter 2.  Several of the predominant choices 
associated with EPR policy construction were assessed and compared. The examination of policy 
choices within Chapter 3 was foundational for framing the research questions, the findings of 
which were presented in subsequent chapters.  
This thesis is premised on theories of governance with a particular emphasis on a regulatory 
approach that is essential for not only ensuring a level-playing field that addresses ‘free riders’ 
but is also necessary to institutionalize behavior within firms that results in broad-based 
measurable outcomes towards reducing the environmental impacts of their products.  
Published, Peer Reviewed Articles 
The thesis contains four articles that were published in peer-reviewed journals. Each of the four 
articles addressed specific thematic issues inherent within EPR.  
Chapter 5 presented a comparative policy analysis of EPR in the United States. and Canada that 
examined the policy context for EPR in each. The comparative analyses were performed through 
profiles of the waste electronics programs in the State of Minnesota in the U.S. and in the Province 
of Ontario in Canada to illustrate the differences in policy choices and program implementation in 
each nation respectively.  
Chapter 6 was built upon the findings of the research results presented in Chapter 5 with the 
objective to investigate the context of consistency of EPR programs between jurisdictions. This 
was accomplished by performing an analysis of three policy approaches for achieving greater 
consistency of EPR policies in the United States.  
In Chapter 7, this thesis author presented results of analyses of approaches to governance 
prevalent in EPR policy development and program implementation particularly, in North 
America.  In this context, governance was construed as the allocation of responsibilities among 
the various parties along the product chain. This thesis author situated the construct of 
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governance within EPR policy regimes and developed a typology of governance structures for
EPR in North America.
By building on the theme of private governance introduced in Chapter 7, in Chapter 8 this thesis
author examined the characterization of EPR within CSR through an examination of corporate
sustainability reports. As a result of this analysis, this thesis author proposed several strategies
from the EPR policy domain and for the common tools for implementation of CSR that may
enhance the integration and effectiveness of both.
Conclusions and Recommendations
This thesis author concluded the thesis in Chapter 9 by building upon the content and findings
published in the four articles, which addressed the research questions. Chapter 9 also included
policy recommendations for strengthening the application of EPR in the United States. In
conclusion, this thesis author underscored additional themes and topics that were identified
through the thesis research process, which should be addressed in future research to address gaps
in the existing body of research.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the progression of topics throughout the thesis and the relationship of each
research question to a corresponding chapter and finally, the synthesis of the individual papers
into the concluding chapter.
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Chapter 2: The Theoretical Framework
While EPR is representative of many strands of environmental policy and practice that have
emerged during the past half-century, the exploration of the key thematic aspects of EPR that
were addressed in the following chapters of this thesis were guided by Ecological Modernization
(EM) theory. For the purposes of this thesis, EM is suggested as a framework for social change
that presents a context for understanding the history, conceptualization and practice of EPR. The
concepts and approaches of EM were developed by European scholars during the 1980s and, as
characterized by Schlosberg and Rinfret, EM has emerged as a framework for understanding how
environmental policy and practice can utilize economic, technological and social structures to
achieve environmental progress (Schlosberg and Rinfret 2008).
The EM theory proposes a comprehensive approach that, as demonstrated through the application
of EPR, offers a synthesis of industrial production and growth and environmental protection.
While EM served as the foundational underpinning for industrial ecology and sustainable
development, its historical development parallels the conception and implementation of EPR. The
architects of EM contended that a new phase of industrial development commenced in the 1980s,
which was marked by innovations that will continue to guide the transformation to a more
sustainable future (Pellow and Brehm 2013).
While EM theory offers a robust worldview, several of the prominent themes are directly relevant
to the understanding and analysis of EPR. These themes included the recognition of the changing
role of science and technology though modernization and the increased emphasis on dynamics
within the economic market to promote sustainability. Huber suggested that technological
innovation is central to EM (Huber 2008). As described by Mol and Spaargaren, this
rationalization of production and consumption to achieve greater ecological progress is to be
accomplished, in part, through the realignment of the responsibilities between governmental
authorities and economic actors who must assume greater responsibility in achieving ecological
progress (Mol and Spaargaren 2000). Janicke noted that EM extends to the reconceptualization of
regulatory measures to promote innovation (Janicke 2008).
A hallmark of EM is the broadening of tools to include outcome focused and market-based
regulatory approaches such as voluntary agreements and information disclosures (Williamson and
Lynch-Wood 2012). However, as stated by Mol, the role of the state continues to be paramount
but is oriented towards the development of strategies that are dependent upon the circumstances
to support innovation (Mol 2002). Furthermore, Sonnenfeld and Mol observed that without
regulatory intervention and oversight, markets and economic instruments cannot be expected to
achieve an economic model premised on sustainability (Sonnenfeld and Mol 2002).
Given the prominence of EM as a framework, several authors have examined the application of
EM in particular jurisdictions. In his analysis of environmental policymaking in Sweden during
the 1990s, Vail concluded that, in the effort to promote sustainable development, environmental
policy decisions meshed with the theory of EM (Vail 2008). Based on an analysis of
environmental policymaking, including the adoption of EPR for several product categories in
Figure 1.1 Diagram of the research process and illustrative outline of the thesis contents
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concepts and approaches of EM were developed by European scholars during the 1980s and, as 
characterized by Schlosberg and Rinfret, EM has emerged as a framework for understanding how 
environmental policy and practice can utilize economic, technological and social structures to 
achieve environmental progress (Schlosberg and Rinfret 2008).  
The EM theory proposes a comprehensive approach that, as demonstrated through the application 
of EPR, offers a synthesis of industrial production and growth and environmental protection. 
While EM served as the foundational underpinning for industrial ecology and sustainable 
development, its historical development parallels the conception and implementation of EPR. The 
architects of EM contended that a new phase of industrial development commenced in the 1980s, 
which was marked by innovations that will continue to guide the transformation to a more 
sustainable future (Pellow and Brehm 2013).   
While EM theory offers a robust worldview, several of the prominent themes are directly relevant 
to the understanding and analysis of EPR. These themes included the recognition of the changing 
role of science and technology though modernization and the increased emphasis on dynamics 
within the economic market to promote sustainability. Huber suggested that technological 
innovation is central to EM (Huber 2008). As described by Mol and Spaargaren, this 
rationalization of production and consumption to achieve greater ecological progress is to be 
accomplished, in part, through the realignment of the responsibilities between governmental 
authorities and economic actors who must assume greater responsibility in achieving ecological 
progress (Mol and Spaargaren 2000). Janicke noted that EM extends to the reconceptualization of 
regulatory measures to promote innovation (Janicke 2008).  
A hallmark of EM is the broadening of tools to include outcome focused and market-based 
regulatory approaches such as voluntary agreements and information disclosures (Williamson and 
Lynch-Wood 2012). However, as stated by Mol, the role of the state continues to be paramount but 
is oriented towards the development of strategies that are dependent upon the circumstances to 
support innovation (Mol 2002). Furthermore, Sonnenfeld and Mol observed that without regulatory 
intervention and oversight, markets and economic instruments cannot be expected to achieve an 
economic model premised on sustainability (Sonnenfeld and Mol 2002).  
Given the prominence of EM as a framework, several authors have examined the application of 
EM in particular jurisdictions. In his analysis of environmental policymaking in Sweden during 
the 1990s, Vail concluded that, in the effort to promote sustainable development, environmental 
policy decisions meshed with the theory of EM (Vail 2008). Based on an analysis of 
environmental policymaking, including the adoption of EPR for several product categories in 
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Japan since the 1970s, Hotta asserted that the policy emphasis on efficiency and technological 
innovation that can be traced to the focus on pollution prevention in 1970s is consistent with EM 
(Hotta 2010). Examining the application of EM in the context of Brazil, Milanez and Buhrs 
suggested that EM provided a framework for development for middle-income countries but 
observed that capacity-building should be tailored to local circumstances (Milanez and Buhrs 
2008). Lastly, Zhu et al. examined the application of EM in China through an assessment of the 
adoption of green supply chain management (GSCM) practices by manufacturers (Zhu et al. 
2011). The study concluded that the firms that embraced GSCM ahead of competitors exceeded 
environmental and economic performance measures as compared to laggard companies.  
Despite assertions that EM has demonstrated influence in policymaking and implementation 
activities in Western Europe, Cohen observed that EM has generally not been embraced in the 
United States, in part, due to the motivations and orientation of many non-governmental 
environmental advocacy organizations such as a preference towards legislative advocacy and 
litigation as well as demonstrating a skepticism towards technological innovation approaches 
(Cohen 2006). Schlosberg and Rinfret offered a more optimistic view of EM’s emergence in the 
United States by citing the linkages between the environment and national security, the rise of the 
environmental justice movement and the growing presence of the green consumer as illustrations 
of EM in the U.S. (Schlosberg and Rinfret 2009). Furthermore, Scheinberg observed that the 
emergence of municipal recycling in the U.S. exhibits many of the attributes of EM including 
development of technology and the emergence of institutions to facilitate recycling and 
transformed the relationship between municipal government and waste management to emphasize 
materials, collection, quality and education activities (Scheinberg 2003).  
2.1 Ecological Modernization and Extended Producer Responsibility 
The proponents of EM have recognized that it is a contextual framework within which the 
transition of the roles of the nation state (or regulatory bodies) from prescriptive and enforcement 
oriented modes to those premised on flexibility and oversight that promote a blending of market 
forces and environmental protection outcomes are critical to an analysis of EPR. As observed by 
Williamson and Lynch-Wood, EM embraced many actors including industry, the regulatory 
authorities and civil society and the responsibility resides with those actors who are best 
positioned to execute actions to address the problems (Williamson and Lynch-Wood 2012).  
Ecological modernization’s explicit interdisciplinary nature embraces technological reform, 
innovative economic constructs and political modernization, which provides an important 
theoretical framework for EPR. For example, the assertion of EM of the integration of 
environmental and economic objectives, as actualized within EPR, is worthy of significant 
evaluation to determine if those objectives are being accomplished and whether more traditional 
‘command and control’ regulatory measures would be more effective. Similarly, the theory’s 
recognition of alternative forms of environmental governance, namely that of the greater centrality 
of market actors, is foundational to EPR and the evaluative framework necessary to determine if 
the articulated outcomes of EPR are being met.   
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Deutz framed the promotion of environmental protection and the flexibility accorded producers
for achieving the objectives of the EPR Directives in the European Union as demonstrative of EM
(Deutz 2009). However, the lack of emphasis upon limiting consumption as necessary to achieve
the minimization of waste within the Directives is also consistent with little consideration of
consumption with the EM framework (Deutz 2009). Lane and Watson also framed EPR within
the EM framework on institutional relationships while noting the lack of emphasis on
consumption, a critique of both EPR and EM (Lane and Watson 2012).
2.3 Critiques of Ecological Modernization
Despite EM’s prominence as an analytical framework for many of the concepts underpinning
sustainability, EM is not without its critics. York et al. challenged EM as promoting a synthesis of
environmental protection and economic development but failing to recognize the prevailing
model of growth and the environmental implications of that model (York et al. 2010). Others
observed that some proponents of EM posit an overly optimistic view of clean and sustainable
technology to advance at a pace to mitigate environmental decline (Gibbs 2006). Ecological
Modernization was cited to be in conflict with the concept of sustainable development due to the
emphasis on green consumerism and lack of explicit recognition of the limits to growth (Bakari
2014).
Pataki critiqued EM as overlooking the organizational and managerial dimensions of business
with little attention devoted to the methods by which organizations evolve to become more
sustainable (Pataki 2009). Pellow and Brehm elaborated further upon this critique of
organizational dynamics with the suggestion that EM inflates the degree of capacity within
institutions to change (Pellow and Brehm 2013).
Christoff argued that EM can be characterized as either ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ with the former
illustrated by a focus upon processes which emphasize a technocratic perspective and occur at the
industrial nation state level (Christoff 1996). Alternatively, ‘strong’ EM envisions sweeping
changes to institutions and economic models through democratic processes (Berger 2001).
Carolan, among others, faulted EM for its emphasis on production but lack of consideration of the
cumulative impacts of consumption even if that consumption is of goods that are increasingly
more resource efficient (Carolan 2004). Furthermore, Murphy stated that the EM literature is
meager as to how state institutions and public policy instruments may address consumption
(Murphy 2001).
Another critique of EM was that it fails to recognize the existing societal power dynamics and the
necessity to challenge that structure for EM to succeed. For example, Janicke noted that EM
theorists should continue to develop strategies to overcome resistance from entrenched interests
(Janicke 2008). Finally, EM was also criticized for its lack of recognition of social outcomes
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2.4 The Theoretical Framework and the Research Questions 
In this thesis, EM was employed as an important theoretical framework for EPR with several of 
the theory’s core attributes illustrated by the conceptualization and implementation of EPR as a 
policy approach. Each of the research questions examined in subsequent chapters reflects the 
constituent themes of EM.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis utilized a comparative policy analysis approach to identify the principal 
policy choices that were demonstrated within the application of EPR. Those choices illustrated 
how EM is reflected in the trajectory of public policy that, when applied to reducing the 
environmental impacts of products, it can further the embedding of an integrative approach for 
reducing the lifecycle impacts of products. Ecological modernization further recognizes the critical 
role of producers as best positioned to address those impacts in the most efficient manner.  
Chapter 5 was developed to address research question 2, that sought to identify the strategies 
available to achieve a greater consistency of EPR policy in the U.S. Mol’s assessment of EM’s 
influence on environmental reform in the context of globalization is underscored by the 
expansion of EPR policy adoption but also argued for greater international transference of EPR 
policy design and evaluation practices (Mol 2002). The argument for consistent application of 
EPR policy globally aligns with EM’s recognition of the increasing global patterns of commerce, 
and is most relevant to EPR, production and consumption. With the design, production and use of 
products occurring globally, EPR, when implemented as a producer designed and managed 
approach was positioned as the policy strategy to address the environmental impacts of products. 
However, for EPR to truly achieve the intended outcomes that extend up and down the product 
chain, the application of consistent EPR policy is necessary in order to deliver consistent and 
substantive signals to producers regarding design for environment priorities, supply chain 
decisions and end-of-life collection networks.  
Research question 3 was: “What are the existing models of governance of EPR programs that are 
functioning and how can these models be optimized to improve performance of programs?” 
which, was addressed in Chapter 6. It is focused upon the conceptualization and implementation 
of the governance within EPR policy regimes. Ecological modernization’s recognition of market-
based policy instruments that are structured to achieve environmental outcomes more 
economically efficient than traditional regulatory models combined with multi-actor governance 
mechanisms, makes it useful within the context of this thesis. This evolving conceptualization of 
the governance of EPR was embedded within EM’s emphasis on the transition from solely state 
actors to a conceptualization of governance models that support flexibility and the authority of 
non-state actors. This dialogue was expanded upon within the ongoing globalization and 
emergence of supranational institutions and processes (Sonnenfeld and Mol 2002).  
Research question 4, which is the final research question of this thesis, was: “How do individual 
firms view EPR as a component of their CSR strategy?” As noted by Pataki, EM’s foundational 
premise of the integration of economic objectives is further demonstrated by the premise of CSR 
that firms may benefit from recognizing and responding to the ecological context (Pataki 2009). 
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In some instances, the evolution of firm level CSR programs was illustrative of Hajer’s
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Chapter 3: Extended Producer Responsibility as an Environmental
Policy Tool
In Chapter 3, the thesis author presented an introduction to the topic of EPR with an overview of
the definition of terms and its genesis in and relationship to the ‘polluter pays principle.’ This
overview was followed by an examination of the operative feature of EPR- that of the
internalization of environmental externalities. The chapter concluded with a brief historical
synopsis of EPR with an emphasis on its origins in the European Union and its policy roots and
application in the U.S.
3.1 Defining Extended Producer Responsibility
Extended producer responsibility is structured to rectify the conceptualization of the EOL
management of products as the “weak link” in the product chain. This circumstance is due, in
part, to the dissipated responsibility for all actors who play a role in the product’s life cycle.
However, the proponents of EPR assert that producers are the operative actors along the product
chain since they are making decisions regarding the design and production of products and
therefore, have the ability to influence the costs of recycling (Dalhammer 2015).
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defined EPR as “an
environmental policy approach in which a producer’s responsibility for a product is extended to
the post-consumer stage of a product’s life cycle (OECD 2001). This definition functions as the
operative definition for EPR globally.
EPR policy is generally characterized by two objectives:
1) To shift the responsibility (physically and/or economically; fully or partially) upstream to
the producer and away from municipalities, and
2) To provide incentives to producers to incorporate environmental considerations in the design
of their products in order to reduce the overall environmental impacts of those products.
Lindhqvist, Tojo and others characterized EPR as being implemented through three categories of
responsibility: financial, physical and informative (Lindhqvist 2000; Tojo 2004). While specific
policy tools exist to implement each of these categories, EPR policies and subsequent program
implementation vary significantly as to the extent to which legal instruments reflect each of the
three categories.
In the United States, the term ‘product stewardship’ has often been used interchangeably with
EPR (Hickle 2014). While product stewardship is generally acknowledged to encompass a
broader range of strategies to address the environmental impacts of products, the regulatory
requirements established within EPR or product stewardship in the U.S., do not demonstrate any
functional differences in responsibilities for producers, retailers, local governments or others
along the product chain.
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Extended producer responsibility reflects the transition to a broader recognition of the life-cycle 
impacts of products and materials and the interest in integrative policy approaches to address 
those impacts. It is clearly infused with an emphasis on preventing pollution and is designed to 
extend the producer’s responsibilities beyond those envisioned with traditional tools such as bans, 
taxes and fees that illustrate the traditional policy emphases of ‘end-of-pipe’ strategies.  
Much attention has been devoted to EPR’s origins in the framework of the ‘polluter pays 
principle’ (PPP) that emerged in the global context with the Stockholm Declaration at the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment that was held in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1972 
(Fitzmaurice 2010). The PPP was subsequently enshrined within international accords and in 
regional treaties such as the Treaty for a European Union. Furthermore, the Waste Framework 
Directive adopted the concept within Article 9 and stressed that preventive action should be taken 
as well as PPP.   
As noted by Forslind, EPR was often characterized as a logical extension of the PPP (Forslind 
2007). However, while PPP was premised on two desired outcomes, the prevention of pollution 
and clean up and remediation if pollution does occur as illustrated by the Superfund Act in the 
U.S., it is argued that EPR goes beyond PPP (Deutz 2009). While often framed together, 
important distinctions between PPP and EPR exist. The most notable distinction is the difference 
that, under EPR, the producers of products are not the actual actors engaged in the end-of-life 
management activities that create waste and thus pollution (OECD 2004). EPR policies 
recognize, however, that producers have the greatest ability and capability to exercise authority 
over other players along the product chain to reduce the environmental impacts and ultimately 
waste (OECD 2004).
Given that the primary premise underpinning EPR is the promotion of the internalization of 
environmental externalities throughout the entire product chain, the implementation of EPR 
typically results in more economically efficient methods for achieving societal goals related to 
reuse and recycling by shifting financing from taxpayers–who may have no economic nexus with 
the product or material being addressed–to the producers and consumers.  
3.2 Internalization of Externalities and Promoting Economic Efficiency 
A fundamental principle of ecological economics is the internalization of externalities that are not 
now usually recognized by the market. As noted by Weismeth, the internalizing of the 
environmental costs of goods or services takes steps towards ensuring a more efficient 
functioning of the market (Wiesmeth 2012). The resulting benefits of this internalization were 
noted above and were suggested by Massarutto, as the internalization of costs sought by EPR 
reduces the incentives for non-compliance that may be associated with other financial instruments 
such as taxes or advance disposal fees (Massarutto 2014). Kalimo et al. noted that the 
internalization of the environmental costs could be efficiently addressed through inclusion in 
product prices (Kalimo et al. 2015). Kaffine and O’Reilly observed that EPR is differentiated 
from other forms of environmental regulation in that it addresses the life-cycle of the product 
including the end-of-life management (Kaffine and O’Reilly 2013). Furthermore, EPR was 
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positioned to serve as a more efficient financing mechanism than taxes or fees that require
governmental establishment and oversight.
Sachs identified two types of externalities associated with products, the first being the economic
costs to dispose of products and the second being the environmental impacts associated with their
disposal (Sachs 2006). However, EPR is being implemented as a strategy that extends, not only to
the downstream externalities as defined by Sachs, but also to the upstream externalities such as
the impacts of energy consumption and use of toxic and hazardous constituents associated with
the production of the products.
The concept of the internalization of externalities was broadly embraced as a tenet of
environmental policy with Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on the Internalization of
Environmental Costs, which endorsed action by national authorities to promote the internalization
of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments by taking into account the approach
that the polluter should, in principle, bear the costs of pollution, with due regard to the public
interest and without distorting international trade and investment. Such internalization was
intended to correct the failures of the market so that the social costs are recognized (Nahman
2010).
Of course, the achievement of the internalization of externalities is highly dependent upon the
policy choice of financing mechanisms for a particular product or material. For example, in the
case of the ‘eco-fees’ as commonly used in the Canadian provincial EPR programs, Bury argued
that fees included in the product price more clearly support the objectives of EPR including
incentivizing more environmentally beneficial product design choices (Bury 2012).
3.3 History of Extended Producer Responsibility
Extended producer responsibility emerged in recognition of the need to transition from sole
emphasis on the ‘end-of-pipe,’ policy measures to those that address the growing complexity of
solid waste dominated by products to embrace a life-cycle perspective to reduce the
environmental impacts of products. The term, ‘extended producer responsibility’ or ‘förlängt
producentansvar’ in Swedish was first introduced by Lindhqvist and Lidgren (1990) in a report to
the Swedish Ministry of the Environment in 1990 (Manomaivibool 2011). Lindhqvist expanded
and refined EPR as a product-oriented policy mechanism (Lindhqvist 2000).
Reflecting an increased emphasis on ecological concerns in Germany during the 1980s, the
German Parliament passed the Ordinance on the Avoidance of Packaging Waste in 1991. The
Ordinance is often referred to as ‘Topfer’s Law’ after Klaus Topfer, the German Minister of the
Environment and chief advocate for the Ordinance. That Ordinance inspired France and Austria
to adopt similar EPR laws for packaging in 1992. This individual country activity spurred the
European Union to enact Directive 94/62/EC on packaging and packaging waste to address the
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The Origins of EPR in the European Union 
Following the issuance of the Directive on Packaging, the European Union embraced EPR for a 
suite of other categories of products and enshrined EPR as a policy vehicle for reducing the 
environmental impacts of products. For example, the Waste Framework Directive (WFD), a 
Directive adopted in 2008 that emphasized waste prevention strategies and established the target of 
50 percent of household waste to be recycled, also stipulated that individual member states may 
pursue EPR for products or materials deemed by them to be important to address.   
For each Directive, the European Commission Directives outlined the general policy framework 
and established performance goals. Following enactment by the EU, each EU member states was 
required to transpose the Directive into its national laws. However, individual member states were 
accorded significant flexibility as to how to implement the Directives with notable differences that 
ranged from the allocation of responsibilities amongst parties, to financing mechanisms, to the 
design of implementation scenarios such as single or competitive compliance organizations. As an 
illustration of the diversity of implementation by the member states, there is variety in the scope of 
packaging addressed by the EPR programs in place, whereby, some countries initially only 
implemented targets for commercially generated packaging while other member states addressed 
commercial and household packaging simultaneously (Cahill et al. 2011).  
1) The Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive 94/62/EC
Inspired by the German Packaging Ordinance and subsequent regulatory requirements in other EU 
member states, the Packaging Waste Directive was enacted in 1994 and revised in 2004. The 
rationale for EU action on packaging was premised on ensuring the proper functioning of the 
common market. The Directive did not explicitly require the implementation of EPR but most 
member states have chosen EPR as the principle upon which to implement the Directive.  
2) The End-of-Life Vehicles Directive 2000/53/EC
Following the example of the Packaging Directive, the European Commission promulgated the 
End-of-Life Vehicle Directive (ELV) that was adopted in 2000.  The ELV directive took effect on 
July 1, 2002, but vehicles placed on the market in the EU before July 1, 2002, were not covered 
until January 1, 2007. The reuse and recycling rates as of January 1, 2015, were 80 and 85 percent 
respectively.   
The ELV Directive also included the provision to restrict the use of four heavy metals (lead, 
mercury, cadmium and hexavalent chromium) in vehicles marketed in the EU after July 1, 2003. 
3) The Waste of Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive 2012/19/EU
The Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive (WEEE) is the European Community 
Directive 2002/96/EC, which was adopted in 2003. The WEEE Directive established ten categories 
of WEEE for reporting purposes. The Directive specified a collection target of four 
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kilogram per capita/year. The Directive imposed the responsibility for the disposal of waste
electrical and electronic equipment on the manufacturers or distributors of such equipment. It
required that those companies establish an infrastructure for collecting WEEE, in such a way that
users of electrical and electronic equipment from private households should have the option of
returning WEEE without fees assessed at the point of collection.
An update to the WEEE Directive, referred to as the ‘Recast’ was promulgated in 2012. The
Recast reduced the number of categories of WEEE while increasing the number of products
addressed. In addition, the collection targets were increased and measures were enacted to reduce
the number of non-compliant producers (Yla Mella et al. 2014).
4) The Directive 2006/66/EU on Batteries and Accumulators and Waste Batteries and
Accumulators
The Batteries Directive was adopted in 2006 and prohibited the sale of batteries that exceed
certain limits for lead, mercury and cadmium and established specified recycling targets and
implementation timelines. The Directive addressed all batteries including automotive, industrial
and portable batteries. The overall target set by the Batteries Directive was that 25 percent of all
waste portable batteries should be collected by 2012 and 45 percent by 2016.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Following the pioneering EPR policy development in the European Union, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) convened a three-phase working group on
EPR between 1994 and 2001. Based on the working group, the OECD issued the Guidance
Manual for Governments in 2001, which was a seminal document, intended to guide EPR policy
consideration around the globe (OECD 2001). In addition to the Guidance Manual, the OECD
Working Group issued several other formative documents including the Economic Aspects of
EPR that have assisted with the development of EPR policy globally (OECD 2004).
EPR in the U.S. Context
As discussed in Chapter 4, recycling policy in the United States is largely implemented at the
state and local level with very few regulatory requirements and financial assistance emanating
from the federal government. As an outgrowth of the historical role for waste management, local
government is responsible for ensuring availability of recycling services for households. EPR,
however, emerged in the 1990s as a response to the limitations inherent with that framework for
waste management in the U.S. and the identified need for a broader strategy to promote policy
reform and innovation that was built upon the capability and responsibility of the private sector to
participate in advancing a more material efficient society.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the controlling federal statute for solid
and hazardous waste management in the United States enacted in 1976, did not provide statutory
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addressed. In addition, the collection targets were increased and measures were enacted to reduce 
the number of non-compliant producers (Yla Mella et al. 2014).  
4) The Directive 2006/66/EU on Batteries and Accumulators and Waste Batteries and
Accumulators
The Batteries Directive was adopted in 2006 and prohibited the sale of batteries that exceed 
certain limits for lead, mercury and cadmium and established specified recycling targets and 
implementation timelines. The Directive addressed all batteries including automotive, industrial 
and portable batteries. The overall target set by the Batteries Directive was that 25 percent of all 
waste portable batteries should be collected by 2012 and 45 percent by 2016.  
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Following the pioneering EPR policy development in the European Union, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) convened a three-phase working group on 
EPR between 1994 and 2001. Based on the working group, the OECD issued the Guidance 
Manual for Governments in 2001, which was a seminal document, intended to guide EPR policy 
consideration around the globe (OECD 2001). In addition to the Guidance Manual, the OECD 
Working Group issued several other formative documents including the Economic Aspects of 
EPR that have assisted with the development of EPR policy globally (OECD 2004).  
EPR in the U.S. Context 
As discussed in Chapter 4, recycling policy in the United States is largely implemented at the 
state and local level with very few regulatory requirements and financial assistance emanating 
from the federal government. As an outgrowth of the historical role for waste management, local 
government is responsible for ensuring availability of recycling services for households. EPR, 
however, emerged in the 1990s as a response to the limitations inherent with that framework for 
waste management in the U.S. and the identified need for a broader strategy to promote policy 
reform and innovation that was built upon the capability and responsibility of the private sector to 
participate in advancing a more material efficient society. 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the controlling federal statute for solid 
and hazardous waste management in the United States enacted in 1976, did not provide statutory 




requirements for products. Congress subsequently amended RCRA in 1984 with the Hazardous 
and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA). Those amendments to RCRA required the phasing out of 
land disposal of hazardous wastes. Some of the other provisions of this law included increased 
enforcement authority for the EPA, more stringent hazardous waste management standards, and a 
comprehensive underground storage tank program. The hazardous waste program established 
under RCRA created an approach for the management of hazardous wastes that covered the 
responsibilities from the initial generation to the final disposal of the hazardous wastes, which is 
generally referred to as a ‘Cradle-to-Grave’ approach (Kollikkathara et al. 2009). 
The President’s Council on Sustainable Development 
The most robust effort at the U.S. federal level to consider EPR measures occurred within the 
discussions of the President’s Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) meetings convened 
between 1993 and 1999. The PCSD was charged with examining new and innovative policy 
options for many longstanding and emerging environmental concerns. The PCSD took up EPR in 
1995 with an emphasis on recognizing voluntary actions of EPR. The Council’s efforts were not 
translated into policy or regulatory action by the federal government, but the PCSD’s members 
recognized the emerging roles for manufacturers and others along the product chain to assume 
responsibility for reducing the environmental impacts of their products (President’s Council on 
Sustainable Development 1996).  
The Emergence of EPR Policy and Practices within the U.S. 
Because of the need for policy strategies that were based upon pollution prevention that reach 
beyond the end-of-pipe approaches, EPR emerged in state policy discussions in the late 1990s. 
The enactment of statutes in several states for EPR for rechargeable batteries during the 1990s 
was formative for establishing EPR as a state-level policy choice to address problem materials, 
particularly those with toxic or hazardous constituents that followed in the subsequent decade 
(Nash and Bosso 2013). Building on this experience, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 
(MPCA) issued the first state policy regarding EPR in early 1999 (MPCA, 2009). The policy 
stipulated criteria for identifying products as well as for assigning roles to various players along 
the product chain. The policy was issued as part of the biennial, state solid waste policy report. 
While the policy was not enacted into law by the state legislature, the policy served to articulate a 
role for producers in the of EOL management and contributed to a framework for the emergence 
of the EPR discourse in the U.S. Other states such as New York, Massachusetts and Oregon have 
subsequently adapted EPR for application in the U.S. and integrated it as a core strategy into their 
state solid waste management plans (New York State 2010; State of Oregon, 2012; 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2013).  
In the United States, national dialogues during the 2000s engaged a wide range of stakeholders 
for the examination of EPR for specific products such as carpet, paint and WEEE and were 
instrumental to identify data needs, to articulate stakeholder perspectives and to develop policy 
strategies.  
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The first of those efforts, focused on EOL management of used carpet, resulted in ‘The National
Carpet Recycling Agreement.’ This was a voluntary agreement concluded in 2002 among the
states, the U.S. EPA and the carpet industry. The Agreement (also referred to as the
Memorandum of Understanding) stipulated specific reuse and recycling goals for post-consumer
carpet management over a ten-year timeframe (Helms and Hervani 2006). The agreement
prompted the creation of the Carpet America Recovery Effort (CARE); a producer funded and
managed organization that was charged with achieving the goals. Following the enactment of an
EPR regulatory measure in the State of California in 2010 to increase the recycling of carpet,
CARE transitioned to serving as the producer responsibility organization (PRO) for
manufacturers to comply with the statute.
The National Electronic Product Stewardship Initiative (NEPSI) was convened by the U.S. EPA
between 2001 and 2005 with the objective of developing a strategy for a comprehensive national
approach to managing waste electronics (Widmer et al. 2005). The initiative did not result in a
national program but was instrumental for establishing the terms of discussion and expectations
for implementation of EPR in the U.S.
Architectural paint emerged as the first product to be implemented through a national dialogue
premised on consistent state policy adoption. Based upon a national dialogue that convened
between 2003 and 2009, the effort resulted in an agreement on a financing mechanism and
outlined a state-based legislative strategy to enact the model that has been adopted by eight states
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Chapter 4: Expected Outcomes, General Policy Choices and Critiques
of EPR
Chapter 4 built on the contextualization of EPR in the previous chapter and characterized the
expected benefits to be achieved through the enactment of policy instruments to implement EPR.
This Chapter further described the common suite of themes contained within the EPR policy
approach and the prevailing choices available to implement those themes. This overview
identified the typical elements of EPR policies that are isolated and analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6.
Finally, this Chapter concluded with an inventory of the critiques of EPR.
4.1. Desired Outcomes of Extended Producer Responsibility
Extended producer responsibility policies were designed to assign financial responsibility to
producers associated with the EOL management of their products to realize the environmental
benefits not achieved through the reliance on ‘end-of-pipe’ policy mechanisms. As a result of this
internalization of environmental externalities, the intention of proponents of EPR was to move
beyond a policy focus on the impacts of products at EOL to that of a broader policy principle that
extends both up and down the product chain (Lifset 1993).
Of primary importance in supporting the rationale for EPR was the recognition of the market
failures associated with the design, manufacture, distribution, sale, and use generally associated
with products in commerce today (Dubois 2012). Because EPR served as a vehicle to identify and
to implement the internalization of environmental externalities, it created a defined economic
incentive to reduce the environmental impacts of products, materials and services and spurred
development of more environmentally preferable products and services.
To conduct a thorough analysis of EPR, it is essential to understand the landscape of the solid
waste management and recycling policies and programs that have traditionally been implemented
to address products and materials at the end of their useful lives. These programs, often operated
by local government, demonstrated significant limitations in their ability to uniformly achieve
high material recovery rates, to promote source reduction and to influence product designers and
manufacturers to develop more environmentally benign products.
Improved Environmental Performance
A primary objective of EPR was to achieve an overall reduction in the lifecycle environmental
impacts associated with products that may not be as efficiently accomplished by other product-
oriented tools or suite of tools. For example, EPR initiatives have resulted in expanded and
dedicated collection and recycling activities, particularly if legally enforceable targets for product
recovery or access to collection services are stipulated in the regulatory instruments. Such
expanded collection infrastructure not only results in an increase of materials for reuse and
recycling but consequently leads to decreased illegal disposal activities and poor recycling
practices. Several studies have identified an increase in collection that can be attributed to EPR
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(Favot et al. 2016; Kunz et al. 2014; Massarutto 2014; Nash and Bosso 2013). In an assessment of 
36 case studies in the EU, a recent analysis illustrated the collection rates, and in some cases the 
recycling and recovery rates, for eight product categories subject to EPR requirements in the EU 
(BIO by Deloitte 2014). This increase in the collection and recycling of products that results from 
EPR measures is often the due to the regulatory incentives and stability that channel investment 
in the processing infrastructure and promote innovation as demonstrated by the experience with 
tires in the EU (Sienkiewicz et al. 2010). 
There is expanded evaluation of the environmental benefits including GHG emission reductions 
due to the increased collection and recycling of products that are achieved through EPR programs 
(Geyer et al. 2015). Geyer et al. examined the GHG savings potential from the expanded 
collection and recycling of mattresses and box springs in the U.S. that will result if the EPR 
programs enacted in three states to date are expanded to address all mattresses generated annually 
nationally (Geyer et al. 2015).  
Incentivizing Design for the Environment 
With producers assuming the financing of the collection and management of their EOL products, 
EPR is intended to internalize previously externalized environmental costs. The assumption of the 
costs associated with EOL management thus translates into a financial incentive for DfE activities 
such as reducing the environmental impacts of their products through reduction of toxic and 
hazardous constituents and through activities that facilitate product disassembly for reuse and 
recycling.  
More broadly, EPR was structured as a market-based approach for re-conceptualizing and for 
redesigning of the product system to support product-service systems and for implementing 
closed-loop models whereby EOL products are reclaimed to serve as feedstock for new products 
or are reused, remanufactured or repaired.  
While significant debate continues regarding the influence of EPR to serve as a stimulus for 
product design change, particularly for more durable products that may not reach their EOL for a 
decade or more, there are some identifiable system benefits from implementation of EPR. These 
include enhancing the flow of information among suppliers and producers and supporting the 
development of new business models such as product-service systems. As noted by Kroepelien, 
EPR can motivate producers to assess their product design as well as their product information, 
reporting and labeling (Kroepelien 2000). As Tojo and Lindhqvist and others have observed, the 
effectiveness of EPR to provide signals for DfE is dependent upon the fundamental policy choices 
inherent in the policy design of a particular EPR program. The majority of research that examined 
the menu of EPR policy levers to promote DfE has suggested that individual producer 
responsibility (IPR), whereby, individual producers are responsible for their own branded 
products, presents the greatest opportunity to align and incentivize producers’ design choices 
around environmentally preferable options.  
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In a review of EPR for certain appliances and personal computers in Japan, Sawaki concluded
that the enactment of EPR requirements contributed to more robust DfE activities, such as design
for recyclability and a reduction in the use of hazardous substances between 2000 and 2010 for
products addressed by the Specified Household Appliance Recycling Law (SHARL) and for
computers that were addressed under the Act on the Promotion of Effective Utilization of
Resources (Sawaki 2011).
Private Governance
As examined in Chapter 7, another motivation for EPR was the intention, clearly identifiable in
the U.S., to transfer financial and programmatic responsibilities for EOL management of products
to private actors. This is due, in part, to the demonstrable limitations of a recycling system rooted
in municipal government but also to the recognition that a bi-furcated system, whereby financial
responsibility lies with one entity and programmatic decision-making with another, fails to
capture the potential improvements in program efficiency and dynamism offered by a more
integrated, producer designed and managed EPR system.
Promoting Sustainable Supply Chain Management
As addressed in Chapter 8, the growth of EPR globally has emerged in parallel with an expansion
of the emphasis on CSR within firms. While the definitions and expectations for CSR vary and
the frequently implemented metrics seldom identify EPR measures, the theoretical underpinnings
of CSR have supported not only individual firms’ actions to reduce supply chain impacts of their
products but also have incentivized their proactive engagement in the policy dialogue regarding
EPR. Citing the example of the requirements for ELVs in Germany, Hart asserted that EPR
regulations have spurred a revolution in product design based upon life-cycle management
approaches (Hart 2007). Extended producer responsibility may be viewed as a tool to
operationalize CSR objectives such as the integration of the collection and reuse or recycling of
materials that are then used for the production of new products and thus essential for their
processes and products. This product management strategy aligns with the notion that EPR can be
integrated with producers’ and material processors’ objectives to process and to recover greater
quantities of EOL products. As Koppius et al. noted, implementing product management
programs not only facilitates closed-loop supply chains but also provides information for shaping
of regulatory actions (Koppius et al. 2015).
From a firm-level perspective, EPR may operationalize supply chain objectives that are playing a
more visible role in corporate social responsibility activities. Motivated by objectives such as the
accrual of goodwill of customers and meeting sustainability goals or supply chain needs,
companies have increasingly identified EOL recovery goals for their products. For example, the
Coca-Cola Corporation established a goal in 2014 to ensure that at least 75 percent of their
containers sold in developed markets were recycled at EOL by 2020. Dell established quantitative
goals for product recovery efforts to reach two billion pounds of used electronics by 2020 (Dell
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percent by 2020 in their companies in fourteen countries as well as targets for utilizing higher 
percentages of post-consumer materials in their packaging (Unilever 2015).  
4.2 General Policy Choices for Extended Producer Responsibility 
As the OECD definition of EPR stated, EPR exists as a policy principle rather than a rigid 
roadmap for application in each jurisdiction. This policy entails a series of individual policy 
choices that address influence the overall cohesiveness of the regulatory approach and thus have 
implications for its ability to achieve the overall objective of EPR. Despite their treatment as 
distinct policy choices, they are often very much interlinked with one policy provision impacting 
the selection of another. The following discussion of the thematic policy choices provided a 
framework for the subsequent chapters of this thesis and importantly, provided the context for the 
recommendations following each of this thesis’ articles. 
Individual versus Collective Responsibility 
A primary point of departure for EPR policy design was whether the producers are required to 
fulfill their legal obligation individually or through engagement with a PRO that operates on their 
behalf. It was argued that collective approaches facilitate compliance and provide a more cost-
efficient mechanism for collection and recycling activities (Atasu and Subramanian 2012). An 
oft-voiced concern of the collective model was that it might incentivize ‘free riders’, thus placing 
greater financial responsibility on the participating companies (Khetriwal et al. 2009). On the 
other hand, individual producer responsibility (IPR) suggested that producers assume 
responsibility at EOL for the products that they placed on the market (Rotter et al. 2011). 
Individual producer responsibility was suggested as a strategy that allows producers to be 
incentivized and thus to derive benefit from proactive design changes that facilitate product reuse 
or recycling. As noted by Kalimo et al., the dialogue regarding collective versus individual 
responsibility hinges on the ‘trade-off’ between aligning incentives for DfE and a less complex 
system (Kalimo et al. 2012). Rotter noted that collection of products at the EOL remains an 
obstacle for IPR (Rotter 2011). However, Mayers et al. suggested that PROs could adopt 
financing methodologies that more directly connect the fees assessed to the costs of processing 
products the EOL (Mayers et al. 2013).  
Allocation of Responsibility within EPR 
A principal question, and often the most difficult, that underlines EPR policy development is the 
degree of financial and programmatic responsibility that should be borne by producers relative to 
other actors along the product chain. Despite the nomenclature of EPR, the majority of regulated 
EPR programs generally reflect a ‘shared responsibility’ approach whereby entities beyond the 
producers are often subject to legal requirements as participants in the system. As noted by 
Massarutto, EPR systems allocate financial responsibilities among various players (Massarutto 
2013). However, in noting the difference between operational responsibility for EPR and the 
entities who may be contracted to satisfy it, Kalimo et al. suggested that, for the purposes of 
proper alignment of incentives, given that producers assume legal responsibility associated with 
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an EPR regulatory requirement, should also be accorded significant flexibility to design systems
and engage other entities as needed (Kalimo et al. 2012).
Competition within EPR Programs
Another aspect of EPR policy design is the determination as to what extent is competition desired
among participants in an EPR program and where along the product chain should that
competition should take place. Within the dialogue on competition and EPR, the question is
usually posed as to whether one PRO is optimal to accomplish obligations imposed on producers
or whether multiple organizations offer a more optimal design. Huisman asserted that in
competitive EPR schemes with multiple PROs, producers are not motivated to engage in
collection and recycling activity beyond what is required (Husiman 2013). Richter and Koppejan
further illustrate this in an analysis of EPR for lamps in the Nordic Countries (Richter and
Koppejan 2015). Toyasaki et al. suggested that single-PRO arrangements result in a more
efficient approach that benefit from the economies of scale (Toyasaki et al. 2011). Furthermore,
Niza et al. suggested the PROs fulfilling the requirements for packaging recovery in Portugal
developed a stronger position to negotiate and eventually reduce the fees paid by producers (Niza
et al. 2014). With systems with multiple PROs, Mayers observed that allocation of waste
collection is essential to an efficient and equitable functioning (Mayers 2007).
Financing Mechanisms for EPR
The financing mechanisms that are most commonly associated with EPR programs are cost-
internalization and the eco-fees. The cost internalization method is generally associated with EPR
implementation methods by which producers arrange for collection and recycling individually.
Eco-fees are common with participation in a PRO that establishes a set schedule of fees for each
product or category. The fees are typically material type specific and are determined by the
weight and size (Fleckinger and Glachant 2010). Associated with the implementation of eco-fees
is the question of fee visibility. As Bury noted, in some jurisdictions, including Canada, the
question of whether the eco-fees should be visible to consumers was debated (Bury 2010). It was
also asserted that visible fees may result in the PROs accumulating significant reserves (Mayers
et al. 2011). Clift and France argued that the imposition of visible fees undermines a fundamental
tenet of EPR, that of encouraging producers to strive for improved resource efficiency (Clift and
France 2006).
While financing systems whereby fees are paid by PROs by producers are often assumed to
provide fewer incentives for DfE than cost internalization approaches, Eco-Systems, a PRO for
WEEE in France, modulates fees based on environmental considerations of the product in order
to incentivize DfE activities (Kunz et al. 2014).
Performance Goals
A much-debated feature of EPR is how performance goals are set, measured and evaluated. The
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example, if it is a consumable or durable product. For some product categories such as for 
packaging, the regulatory instrument may stipulate an overall collection or recovery target and 
then specify individual targets by material type (De Jaeger and Rogge 2013).  
As noted by Dubois, targets are difficult to change and the lack of dynamism that reflects 
evolving and maturing programs may inhibit dynamism (Dubois 2012).  In the case of the 
‘Recast’ of the WEEE Directive in the EU, the collection targets migrated from a static per capita 
rate to one that is a fixed percentage of the amount of products placed on the market (Van Eygen 
et al. 2016). Other performance goals stipulate convenience of collection opportunities. For 
example, the statute for the e-waste program in the State of Washington contains a ‘convenience 
standard’ that requires collection opportunities in jurisdictions with a population greater than 
10,000 residents (Gui et al. 2013).  
Van Sluisveld and Worrell, in their examination of source reduction activities within the Dutch 
packaging market, concluded that while packaging waste increased during the study time frame, 
the weight-based performance goals might not result in the optimal environmental outcome (van 
Sluisveld and Worrell 2013). The authors suggested that a life cycle approach with a suite of 
metrics broader than the weight-based recycling measure may be appropriate to more accurately 
evaluate the environmental benefits of packaging recovery efforts.  
4.3 Critiques of EPR 
Most of the specific criticism directed at EPR has been leveled at various aspects of 
implementation rather than overall conceptual approach. As discussed in Chapter 7, local 
government has challenged the conceptualization of EPR with the assertion that local 
governments are best positioned to address waste and recycling issues within a community 
(Hickle 2014). Furthermore, Hobson argued that policy measures such as the WEEE Directive 
fail to incentivize producers to adopt more radical production models that transcend an 
incremental resource efficiency approach (Hobson 2015). For example, several EPR laws have 
been criticized as requiring a collective compliance approach through a singular producer 
responsibility organization. More broadly, as noted by Atasu et al., some producers view EPR 
simply as a tax rather than as a market-based financing mechanism with broader policy objectives 
(Atasu 2011). Additionally, it is suggested that producers, given the differing requirements across 
jurisdictions, face significant administrative responsibilities (Kunz et al. 2014). 
Within the context of policy dialogues, the allocation of specific responsibilities for those entities 
along the product chain is also challenged. For example, the distribution of the responsibilities for 
financing collection activities among brand owners, retailers and municipalities is debated. For 
example, Hackl and Wiesmeth and questioned the exclusion of municipalities given their 
potential to optimize the solid waste system in order to promote recycling (Wiesmeth and Hackl, 
2012).  
An often-voiced criticism of EPR in practice was the lack of individual responsibility compliance 
options. This critique is frequently articulated by firms that are resistant to participation in 
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collective organizations as well as by supporters of IPR due to its potential role to promote
practices for DfE. While collective schemes are often viewed as reducing the resources necessary
for regulatory oversight, they are criticized for not allocating costs equitably (Mayers 2010).
As addressed in Chapter 6, significant attention was devoted to the lack of harmonization across
jurisdictions that often accompany EPR regulations and the accompanying challenges this
presents (Khetriwal et al. 2011; Cahill et al. 2011).
Performance Goals
The question of the efficacy of legally binding performance goals such as recovery or recycling
targets has also been subject to significant critique which was, in part, based on the argument that
the amount of material available for collection is often quite challenging to determine (Gui et al.
2013). Thus producers may be legally accountable for collection and recycling targets that require
active participation on the part of consumers (Kalimo et al. 2015). The legal targets are often
challenged due the lack of a producer’s ability to compel participation in a collection program,
which is an action engaged in by consumers voluntarily and potentially irregularly.
Legal instruments utilizing EPR have implemented a variety of metrics for tracking progress of
programs. While these metrics range from a traditional recycling rate based on percentage
recovered of what is placed on the market to those premised on convenience requirements that
stipulate availability of collection services per population or geographic area, legally binding
goals are often resisted since they generally require cooperation by entities which extend beyond
the producer’s product sales chain.
As Dubois noted, the static collection and recycling targets contained in many EPR regulatory
instruments do not promote innovation on behalf of the PRO to go beyond the legal requirements
(Dubois 2012). Furthermore, once established, the process to amend targets is often politically
challenging thus delaying the updating of targets to account for new information regarding
collection system dynamics and consumer participation among other factors.
Lack of Incentives for Product Design Changes
Significant scrutiny has been applied to the assertion that EPR serves as a factor for implementing
DfE practices, particularly for more durable, longer-lived products. Several segments of the
electronics industry have offered this argument given the lifespan of televisions, for example, and
that collection and recycling of older units offers no value for the design of units being produced
today. However, the empirical evidence to draw a conclusion on the relationship between EPR
and DfE changes for the range of products subject to EPR requirements is not determinative.
The prevailing application of EPR has also been challenged as failing to achieve the stated policy
outcomes, namely, to create incentives for product design changes. It has been observed that the




collective organizations as well as by supporters of IPR due to its potential role to promote 
practices for DfE. While collective schemes are often viewed as reducing the resources necessary 
for regulatory oversight, they are criticized for not allocating costs equitably (Mayers 2010).  
As addressed in Chapter 6, significant attention was devoted to the lack of harmonization across 
jurisdictions that often accompany EPR regulations and the accompanying challenges this 
presents (Khetriwal et al. 2011; Cahill et al. 2011).  
Performance Goals 
The question of the efficacy of legally binding performance goals such as recovery or recycling 
targets has also been subject to significant critique which was, in part, based on the argument that 
the amount of material available for collection is often quite challenging to determine (Gui et al. 
2013). Thus producers may be legally accountable for collection and recycling targets that require 
active participation on the part of consumers (Kalimo et al. 2015). The legal targets are often 
challenged due the lack of a producer’s ability to compel participation in a collection program, 
which is an action engaged in by consumers voluntarily and potentially irregularly. 
Legal instruments utilizing EPR have implemented a variety of metrics for tracking progress of 
programs. While these metrics range from a traditional recycling rate based on percentage 
recovered of what is placed on the market to those premised on convenience requirements that 
stipulate availability of collection services per population or geographic area, legally binding 
goals are often resisted since they generally require cooperation by entities which extend beyond 
the producer’s product sales chain.  
As Dubois noted, the static collection and recycling targets contained in many EPR regulatory 
instruments do not promote innovation on behalf of the PRO to go beyond the legal requirements 
(Dubois 2012). Furthermore, once established, the process to amend targets is often politically 
challenging thus delaying the updating of targets to account for new information regarding 
collection system dynamics and consumer participation among other factors.  
Lack of Incentives for Product Design Changes 
Significant scrutiny has been applied to the assertion that EPR serves as a factor for implementing 
DfE practices, particularly for more durable, longer-lived products. Several segments of the 
electronics industry have offered this argument given the lifespan of televisions, for example, and 
that collection and recycling of older units offers no value for the design of units being produced 
today. However, the empirical evidence to draw a conclusion on the relationship between EPR 
and DfE changes for the range of products subject to EPR requirements is not determinative.  
The prevailing application of EPR has also been challenged as failing to achieve the stated policy 
outcomes, namely, to create incentives for product design changes. It has been observed that the 




share are not adequate to send sufficient financial signals to the producers to implement DfE for 
WEEE (Gui et al. 2013).  
Several potential reasons for this lack of a clear causal connection between EPR and DfE were 
published in the literature. Assessing the efficacy of EPR as a motivator for DfE is problematic 
due to the methodological challenges associated with this type of evaluation. Given the many 
factors at play associated with products, it is often difficult to correlate a specific DfE outcome 
with EPP. For example, complementary measures such as the EU’s Restrictions on Hazardous 
Substances Directive (RoHS) for WEEE that restricts the usage of several heavy metals and 
brominated flame retardants impedes an assessment as to what impact EPR may have had on 
reducing these constituents in electronic products. For example, in their study of the European 
lighting sector, Gottberg et al. stipulated that bans on hazardous substances, public procurement 
and product declarations demonstrated clearer impacts on the producers’ product design practices 
than EPR (Gottberg et al. 2006). Another observation was that the lack of policy consistency 
across jurisdictions inhibits a consolidated signal being sent to producers for design changes. 
Finally, for some product categories such as WEEE, the linkage of financial benefits associated 
with DfE activities and thus reduced EOL management costs with future product returns cannot 
be demonstrated (Husiman 2013). In some cases, the costs associated with the EOL management 
of products may not be sufficient to significantly impact a company’s product design choices.  
Others challenge EPR from the perspective that it failed to take into account the full 
environmental impacts of products by emphasizing EOL, and recycling in particular. For 
example, EPR regulatory tools often do not sufficiently incentivize the repair, refurbishment and 
reuse of products. For example, the WEEE Directive did not specify a firm target to incentivize 
the reuse of unwanted electronic products (Roller and Fuhr 2008). Furthermore, Sachs noted the 
assessment that EPR regulatory mechanisms fail to explicitly address the issue of the 
consumption of the products within a regulatory regime (Sachs 2006).  
Finally, EPR policy was also faulted for the lack of specific requirements as to how products and 
their constituent materials are to be managed to ensure that producers and producer responsibility 
organizations adhere to environmentally sound management practices. Specifically, it was 
observed that EPR has resulted in increasing flows for materials and, particularly in the case of 
WEEE, resulted in expansion of low-quality recycling operations (Zoeteman et al. 2010). Alev et 
al. argued that EPR might result in interference in secondary markets for durable goods (Alev et 
al. 2014).  
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Chapter 5: Comparative Policy Analysis of EPR in the U.S. and
Canada
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 addressed research question 1 (How and to what extent is EPR policymaking in the U.S.
being influenced by the global policy landscape, and in particular that of Canada, for EPR policy
development and program implementation?) Given the geographic proximity and shared
characteristics between the two nations, the Canadian experience with EPR has influenced the
development of EPR policy in the U.S. However, as the following article that compares the
implementation of EPR in the U.S. and Canada, illustrated, there are notable differences
regarding prevailing policy choices between the U.S. states and the Canadian provinces.
This chapter is foundational to the other articles in this thesis because it identified the prominent
elements of EPR policy such as the definition of producer, structure of financing and performance
metrics. Through the use of a comparative framework, the analysis facilitated the recognition of
broader structural questions for EPR policy development. This included an exploration of the
rationale and potential strategies to achieve policy consistency between jurisdictions that is the
focus of Chapter 5 and the following chapter’s investigation of the governance of EPR programs.
Hickle, G. T. (2013). Comparative analysis of extended producer responsibility policy in the
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Comparative Analysis of Extended
Producer Responsibility Policy in the
United States and Canada
Garth T. Hickle
Summary
This article analyzes the policy choices and programmatic elements of extended producer
responsibility (EPR) as implemented in the United States and Canada. The article traces
the historical development of EPR in each country and defines common features of EPR in
each nation. The U.S. states and the Canadian provinces have assumed the primary role,
rather than the federal governments, for enacting producer responsibility requirements
in their respective countries. However, the paths taken demonstrate several fundamental
differences, including the prevalence of individual versus collective responsibility and the
financing mechanisms implemented for EPR. Given the deepening experience with EPR
and the breadth of its application to a widening array of products in the United States, the
Canadian model for EPR is starting to receive more examination from policy makers in the
United States, indicating that the policy and programmatic differences between the two
nations may eventually be narrowing.
The comparative policy analysis is illustrated through the lens of EPR regulatory efforts
for waste electronics, with particular profiles of the programs in the State of Minnesota and
Province of Ontario. Both approaches broadly reflect many of the policy considerations
and governance and programmatic themes that dominate EPR programs in each country.
Finally, the article offers recommendations for collaborative work between the United
States and Canada to explore consistency between programs and other complementary
strategies to support producer responsibility activities.
Keywords:
e-scrap




waste electrical and electronic equipment
(WEEE)
Overview
While the United States and Canada share a common bor-
der, a significant trade relationship with Canada as the largest
trading partner for the United States, and an interconnected
economy with many of the same manufacturers, retailers, and
others along the product chain, the political cultures and gov-
erning structures demonstrate significant contrasts. These dif-
ferences are illustrated by the prevailing policy approaches to
implementing the principle of extended producer responsibil-
ity (EPR) that are currently in place in the U.S. states and
Canadian provinces.1 Despite similar motivations and policy
drivers for implementing EPR, such as shifting the waste man-
agement costs from local governments to brand owners and the
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internalizing of costs to promote the design of more sustainable
products that are shared by both U.S. states and the Canadian
provinces, important differences exist in terms of how programs
are implemented to achieve these outcomes.
For example, the policy path in the United States has been
premised, until recently, on detailed statutory requirements,
while the Canadian provincial approach has emphasized a more
flexible outcome-based regulatory model. In another notable
difference, the Canadian regulatory approach to EPR has gener-
ally resulted in collective producer responsibility organizations
funded by brand owners through the use of eco-fees. In the
United States, however, the trend has been to emphasize the
collection and recycling obligations placed on individual brand
www.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jie Journal of Industrial Ecology 249
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owners with few regulatory incentives or requirements for the
brand owners to work in a collective fashion.
The article identifies the primary policy approaches and im-
plementation scenarios for EPR in Canada and the United
States and illustrates the thematic differences in policy struc-
tures through the use of two case studies for waste electronics,
one in the Province of Ontario and the other in the State of
Minnesota. Both case studies demonstrate several of the pre-
vailing policy features of EPR in their respective countries.
Finally, the analysis identifies opportunities for potential col-
laboration between programs as well as promoting policy consis-
tency in North America, albeit with the recognition that such
an effort may be well into the future. The analysis is intended
to inform the policy development process, including identifica-
tion of opportunities to support the evolving cross-fertilization
between the two countries on EPR.
The analysis is particularly timely with the application of
EPR policy to a wider breadth of products in Canada and the
ascendant influence of the Canadian policy structure for EPR
that is influencing the legislative footprint in the United States
(e.g., the EPR framework law adopted in Maine and the carpet
and paint statutes enacted in California in 2010).
Review of Comparative Environmental
Policy Analysis Between the United
States and Canada
Despite the fertile ground for comparative environmen-
tal policy and program analysis between the United States
and Canada relatively little research has been devoted to the
topic (Rabe 1999a). Harrison (2007) analyzes the differing ap-
proaches to climate change with a particular emphasis on the
Kyoto Treaty. Harrison (2007) also offers a comparison of the
regulation of the pulp and paper industry and Casey (2011)
identifies opportunities for collaboration in the area of public re-
source management. Product-oriented policy more broadly and
producer responsibility in particular has yet to receive compara-
ble attention. However, the research presented here identifies
specific characteristics of governing, policy making, and imple-
mentation that are clearly at play for EPR in each nation.
Fundamental to any comparative policy analysis is a recogni-
tion of the differences between a parliamentary system, as exists
in Canada, and the presidential system with a distinct separa-
tion of powers that exists in the United States (Harrison 2007).
These differing governing structures translate into an ease of
policy making in Canada that is not replicated in the United
States due to the clear division between the administrative and
legislative branches.
While both the United States and Canada can be character-
ized as exhibiting environmental regulatory regimes that invoke
both national and subnational governments, Canada is gener-
ally considered to do much more without federal government
preemption of provincial statutory actions or transfer grants to
provinces to implement national environmental laws, a hall-
mark component of state implementation of federal statutes
in the United States (Rabe 1999b). The United States has a
much more expanded national government footprint, an inter-
twined federal and state implementation approach, and thus an
often confrontational relationship between the national and
state regulatory authorities (Rabe 1999b). However, despite
the differing intergovernmental allocation of authority, both
the states and provinces are perceived as the environmental
policy innovators and more adept at replicating and enhancing
environmental policy adopted in other jurisdictions.
The literature emphasizes that the United States has had a
historical tendency toward a more legalistic approach to envi-
ronmental regulation and enforcement activity than in Canada
(Howlett 2000). On the other hand, Canada exemplifies a more
cooperative model of policy making, with the environmental
administrative agencies allowed more flexibility for implemen-
tation of provincial laws (Rabe 1999b). This dynamic is rein-
forced by a broader deference to the regulatory agencies and
generally less direct oversight and intervention from legisla-
tive bodies than is often present in the United States (Rabe
1999a).
In keeping with the overall tone of policy making, the judi-
cial system in Canada plays a much smaller role in regulatory
or policy implementation than in the United States, which is
not only more litigious generally, but offers broader access to
courts for citizens and advocacy organizations (Howlett 2000).
In Canada, however, compliance and enforcement activity of-
ten illustrate a more cooperative than prosecutorial emphasis
(Harrison 1995).
AsHowlett (2000) observes, little evidence of historical pol-
icy convergence between the United States and Canada exists,
but during the 1990s, both nations embraced voluntary, collab-
orative, market-based strategies that include more stakehold-
ers. This dynamic is clearly demonstrated with the embrace of
producer responsibility and the endorsement of market-based,
outcomes-oriented policy instruments.
As is evident in the EPRpolicy dialogue in theUnited States,
many elements of environmental policy making in Canada are
not only worthy of consideration for application in the United
States but present opportunities for joint policy consideration
and action (Casey 2011). As the following analysis demon-
strates, the broader differences in environmental policy mak-
ing between the United States and Canada are manifested in
the policy choices and implementation strategies for EPR. For
example, the primacy of the provincial regulatory, rather than
statutory, mechanism in Canada to mandate EPR for individual
products or categories of products combined with brand-owner-
driven plans and significant flexibility allocated to provincial
authorities is reflective of broader themes of environmental
policy making in Canada and is influencing EPR policy devel-
opment in the United States.
Profile of Extended Producer Responsibility in Canada
The evolution of EPR in Canada borrows significantly from
the experience in the European Union and reflects an industry-
managed and financed approach that generally offers significant
250 Journal of Industrial Ecology
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flexibility to brand owners (often referred to as “stewards” in the
provincial programs).
Recognizing that voluntary measures were insufficient to
achieve substantive results or ensure a level playing field
for brand owners, particularly for packaging, the Canadian
provinces have been engaged in developing and implementing
producer responsibility measures for a wide range of products
initiated with the Post-Consumer Paint Stewardship Program
Regulation in British Columbia in 1994 (Driedger 2001). As of
2011, there were approximately 65 mandated producer respon-
sibility programs in Canada, all regulated and implemented at
the provincial level, making Canada a global leader in terms
of applying EPR to the broadest palate of products. Given the
reach of EPR, it is serving as a transformative tool for transition-
ing waste management from a local government responsibility
to brand owners and consumers.
As in the case of the United States, there is no existing
federal authority to implement a federal approach for producer
responsibility except, under the Canadian Environmental Pro-
tection Act of 1999, to address products that contain toxic
substances (McKerlie et al. 2006). Unlike the United States,
however, the Canadian Constitution specifically reserves the
significant authority for environmental protection matters for
the provinces, a key dynamic that has arguably propelled provin-
cial regulatory activity because the question of at which level of
government regulations should be executed is largely resolved.
Therefore the provincial environment agencies are responsible
for drafting regulations, providing oversight of programs, and
ensuring compliance.
As illustrated by table 1, broad environmental protection
statutes such as the Environmental Management Act in British
Columbia and the Waste Reduction and Recycling Act in
Manitoba provide the statutory underpinning for issuing reg-
ulatory requirements for specific products or materials. How-
ever, a number of provinces, including British Columbia and
New Brunswick, offer a more comprehensive regulation that
provides authorization for the Minister of the Environment to
designate individual products or product categories for inclusion
in EPR programs through an amendment to the comprehensive
regulation without issuing a separate regulation.
The recycling regulation inBritishColumbia, issued in 2004,
consolidated all of the existing producer responsibility programs
in the province and created a pathway for adding additional
products for producer responsibility. TheBritishColumbia recy-
cling regulation, in particular, emphasizes an industry-managed,
outcomes-based approach (British Columbia Ministry of the
Environment 2006).
Four provinces, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and
Labrador, Ontario, and Quebec, have created nongovernmen-
tal organizations to oversee the development and implementa-
tion of producer responsibility programs. The organization in
Ontario, Waste Diversion Ontario (WDO), was created by the
WasteDiversionAct and serves as a permanent nongovernmen-
tal corporation with 16-member multistakeholder governance.
These entities have not functioned without some criticism,
and Recyc-Quebec, a sister organization to WDO, was briefly
considered for dissolution (Solid Waste and Recycling 2010).
Similarly, the elimination of WDO was suggested by one of the
political parties in Ontario in 2012 as part of a restructuring
of stewardship programs in the province The Canadian Press
2012).
One notable aspect of the EPR approach in the provinces
is the emphasis on brand owner development and submittal of
stewardship plans that outline the financing and operational
aspects of the proposed program. The regulations generally re-
quire a consultation process that engages other entities such as
local governments or recyclers in the development of the plan
and ultimately requires review and approval by the regulatory
authority.
While the majority of provincial programs assign financial
or physical responsibility to brand owners, the packaging and
printed paper regulations enacted to date specify a defined fi-
nancial obligation for local government. This ranges from 50%
of the net costs of operating the program in the case of the
Ontario “Blue Box” program to a 20% municipal share in the
Manitoba regulation (Green and Treiblock 2010). In 2010,
Quebec announced a regulation that transitions from the cost-
sharing arrangement for packaging and printed paper akin to
Ontario to 100% brand owner funding of municipal recycling
programs by 2013 (Government of Quebec 2011a). Furthering
the transition to 100% producer funding, the British Columbia
Ministry of the Environment issued a provincial regulation in
May 2011 for packaging and printed paper that places the full
financial responsibility on the brand owners (Solid Waste and
Recycling 2011).
Canadian EPR regulatory requirements emphasize, and in
some cases require, collective responsibility through producer
responsibility organizations (also referred to as industry fund-
ing organizations [IFOs] in a few provinces) that are managed
and funded by brand owners. Most of the producer responsi-
bility obligations are fulfilled by formal producer responsibility
organizations representing the majority, if not the entirety, of
brand owners selling in a particular province. While this ap-
proach provides an efficient portal for brand owners to comply
with the producer responsibility requirements and, it is argued,
results in greater economies of scale and improved compliance,
it is criticized as not promoting competition to attain higher
performance or drive down program costs (Quinn and Sinclair
2006).
A developing aspect of the EPR landscape in Canada is
the presence of organizations that provide services to fulfill
the brand owner EPR obligations in multiple provinces. For
example, Product Care, after an initial programmatic focus
on British Columbia for several different product categories
of household hazardous waste, including paint, expanded to
and began operating paint producer responsibility programs in
British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, and
Nova Scotia.
Another key feature of the provincial producer responsibil-
ity programs is the use of eco-fees as the financingmechanism to
fulfill the brand owner obligations. Eco-fees, as distinct from fees
collected on a product at its end of life, are generally determined
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by the estimated cost to fulfill the EPR program requirements
and are paid by producers to the producer responsibility orga-
nization on a per weight or unit basis of products placed on the
market in a particular jurisdiction. The characteristics of eco-
fees are not uniform and may or not be visible to the consumer
at the point of sale and managed through the sales chain by
different methods. The prevalence of eco-fees as the primary
financing vehicle chosen by producer responsibility organiza-
tions, whether visible to consumers or not, are an illustrative
outcome of the policy intent to support collective responsibil-
ity approaches as well as the brand owners recognition of the
benefits of a collective approach.
The reliance on eco-fees, rather than cost-internalized in-
dividual producer responsibility approaches, is often supported
due to the presumed benefits of promoting transparency re-
garding the costs of the program and as a communication tool
for consumers. It is argued that visible eco-fees support more
consistent pricing across the nation (Bury 2010). The retail
sector has consistently supported the use of visible eco-fees,
as illustrated by the positions taken by the Retail Council of
Canada, the primary trade association for retailers in Canada
(Bury 2010).
However, the use of eco-fees, and particularly those that
are visible, is receiving more scrutiny due to the controversy
generated by the implementation of the municipal hazardous or
special waste (MSHW) program in 2010 in Ontario with eco-
fees being assessed on an expanded range of products (Green
and Trebilcock 2010). In a departure from the other provinces,
both New Brunswick and Quebec have taken regulatory action
to curtail the use of visible fees (Bury 2010).
One notable feature of the provincial programs is the in-
clusion of “first importers,” as is included in the Saskatchewan
waste electronics regulation. The obligation for “first importers”
applies when a brand owner does not exist or an entity, such
as a retailer, takes title to the product or material as an option
for fulfilling stewardship obligations (Deathe et al. 2008). The
first importer obligation varies from province to province; for
example, Ontario has fewer first importers registered as stewards
relative to a province such as Manitoba.
Another prominent attribute of producer responsibility in
Canada is the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environ-
ment (CCME) work program. The CCME has led a discussion
to promote harmonization among provinces for particular prod-
ucts, but there is also a broad, yet common, framework that
has been applied across the product spectrum. This degree of
consistency not only substantiates the emphasis placed on con-
sistency by the CCME but also reflects the priority placed on
engagement in the EPR policy dialogue by representative in-
dustry associations. In October 2009 the Council of Ministers
approved the Canada-wide Action Plan for Extended Producer
Responsibility that specified products to be designated by all
of the provinces for inclusion in EPR programs in two phases
(CCME2009a). Recognizing the importance of promoting con-
sistency in the provincial packaging programs, theCCME issued
the Canada-wide Strategy for Sustainable Packaging (CCME
2009b).
Profile of Extended Producer Responsibility in the
United States
Individual states in theUnited States have enacted producer
responsibility measures that emphasize a specific policy and pro-
grammatic focus for each product. All mandated EPR activities
have occurred with statutory direction rather than regulation
under a broader environmental law. As withmany other aspects
of solid waste management, and recycling in particular, the fed-
eral government does not play a significant role in solid waste
policy, leaving the states to assert leadership regarding producer
responsibility (Vogel et al. 2010). However, individual states in
the United States are considering a statutory producer responsi-
bility framework underpinning thatwould guide the designation
of products, articulate the expectations for brand owners, and
direct the development and submittal of stewardship plans as
the key programmatic vehicle for implementing programs.
Producer responsibility measures were first enacted in the
United States in the mid-1990s with state statutes requiring
producer responsibility for rechargeable batteries that spurred
the development of the Rechargeable Battery Recycling Cor-
poration (RBRC), the first producer responsibility organization
in the United States (Sachs 2006).2
Given the preeminence of the product-specific statute-
driven mechanism in the United States, the statutes enacting
producer responsibility programs are thus necessarily often quite
detailed and stipulate specific performance requirements such
as recycling goals, standards for collection convenience, or re-
quirements for certain practices by recyclers. For example, under
the New York State Electronic Equipment Recycling and Reuse
Act, manufacturers must provide at least one reasonably conve-
nient method of collection within each county and within each
municipality with a population of 10,000 or greater (Buseman
2012). The statutory approach, while ensuring a degree of ac-
countability, contributes to a lack of flexibility for the programs
to accommodate new products placed on the market or respond
to changes in the collection and processing infrastructure with-
out returning to the legislative body for amendments to the
statute.
State environmental agencies are charged with oversight,
compliance, and enforcement and in some cases an active role
in implementation. In the United States, several producer re-
sponsibility programs for certain products offer a “government
administered” compliance option; examples include electron-
ics in Maryland and mercury-containing lamps in Washington
(Gregory and Kirchain 2008).
A key component of the compliance and enforcementmech-
anism to reduce the number of “free riders,” those companies
whose products are being collected and managed in the EPR
program but who are not fulfilling their financial obligations,
is the inclusion of a “do not sell” provision that prohibits both
brand owners and retailers from distributing products within
the state. This mechanism is featured in many of the state waste
electronics laws and is emerging in statutes for other products
such as that enacted for unwanted paint in Oregon (Oregon
Department of Environmental Quality 2011).
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The prevailing method for achieving the program outcomes
in the United States, particularly for electronic waste (e-waste)
laws, is to assign responsibility to individual brand owners of a
particular product to make collection and processing arrange-
ments to meet their legal obligation. This variant of individual
responsibility, more akin to an individual compliance approach,
places legal responsibility on brand owners to achieve a specific
obligation that is, in the case of several state statutes for waste
electronics, determined by the share of their products being re-
turned or by the total weight of products placed on the market.
While this approach for determining a brand owner’s respon-
sibility departs from the conventional emphasis of individual
responsibility whereby brand owners are specifically responsible
for their own products placed on the market, it differs markedly
from the collective responsibility approach that offers few op-
portunities for differentiation by product or brand (Atasu et al.
2008).
The emphasis on a specific obligation for each brand owner
rather than obligations assigned to a producer responsibility or-
ganization illustrates several important threads conspicuous in
the U.S. marketplace. The broader political context regarding
imposition or authorization of additional fees, frequently con-
strued as taxes, is apparent in the dialogue in the United States
and contributed to a preference for models that do not result
in programs funded by defined fees. This application of an in-
dividual obligation model also suggests policy makers’ interest
in spurring design for environmental activities on behalf of in-
dividual brand owners, a fundamental precept of EPR and a
theme of the policy dialogue in the United States (Lindhqvist
and Lifset 2003).
The competitive landscape in the United States spurs the
creation of distinct business models that often inhibit brand
owner collaboration, thus contributing to a desire for mandated
producer responsibility to accommodate this diversity and sup-
port individual company efforts to, for example, implement
product take-back programs. However, a significant driver for
the hesitancy to embrace collective responsibility models is the
concern regarding violating antitrust or anticompetitive con-
duct requirements, as could occur with collective fee-setting
activities. As Salzman (1997) and others have noted, recogniz-
ing restrictions on activity that may violate antitrust or anti-
competitive conduct statutes should give rise to provisions ad-
dressing this issue. Several state statutes, such as the Minnesota
Electronics Recycling Act, contain provisions that essentially
immunize brand owners for the purposes of fulfilling the intent
of the producer responsibility program.
However, the EPR landscape in the United States is under-
going a transition, as the paint and carpet producer responsi-
bility laws, at the behest of the brand owner trade associations,
stipulate establishment of collective organizations. These orga-
nizations, Paint Care inOregon andCalifornia and the formerly
purely voluntary organization the Carpet America Recovery
Effort (CARE) in California, are funded by statutorily autho-
rized eco-fees, a financing mechanism similar in practice to that
in Canada (Palmer and Walls 2002).
With a few notable exceptions, such as the waste electron-
ics program in the State of Maine whereby municipalities are
required to provide collection services, local governments of-
ten play a crucial role in providing collection infrastructure in
EPR programs, but it is generally of a voluntary rather than
mandatory nature (Wagner 2009).
Products addressed have emphasized household hazardous
waste broadly and waste electronics more specifically. By early
2011, 24 states had enacted producer responsibility require-
ments for waste electronics. Oregon and California adopted
laws for paint and California also added carpet to the list of
regulated programs in 2010. Following the first producer re-
sponsibility statute for mercury-containing lamps in Maine in
2009, Washington followed suit in 2010 and Vermont in 2011
(Wagner 2012). Maine and Washington have also considered
proposals for unwanted pharmaceuticals. In contrast to other
jurisdictions globally that have prioritized packaging as a waste
stream well positioned for producer responsibility, only Ver-
mont has considered, but not yet enacted, an EPR approach
modeled after the programs inCanada for packaging and printed
paper (Hickle 2010).
Key Differences Between the State and
Provincial Extended Producer
Responsibility Policy Approaches
As illustrated above, substantive policy and programmatic
differences exist between the United States and Canadian ap-
proaches to EPR. These differences reflect not only contrasts
in constitutional and legal authorities, and parliamentary ver-
sus presidential governance structures, but they also illustrate
cultural differences between the two nations.
The history and context for producer responsibility in
Canada reflects the higher degree of influence of the European
Union and other international policy activity and, in particular,
the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). In contrast, the European experience has had a much
less direct influence on producer responsibility in the United
States, as evidenced by hesitancy to embrace the term, the
products prioritized for producer responsibility, and elements of
policy design (Jackson 2007).
The maturity of EPR in the Canadian provinces has also
provided both provincial regulatory agencies and brand owners
with a common understanding of how the policy approach will
be applied and has resulted in a transition of the dialogue from
whether EPR is appropriate to how to optimize its application
in Canada.
A fundamental distinction between the U.S. and Canadian
policy structure is the process by which products are designated
for an EPR program. By instituting a regulation-driven designa-
tion, the provinces arguably create a streamlined approach that
favors greater industry engagement and thus a more direct role,
through the program planning process, in determining many as-
pects of program design and implementation.With the require-
ment for legislative action, the U.S. landscape for EPR may be
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subject to legislative politics and ensures that each product is
addressed individually, a factor that inhibits consistency.
Legal statutes in the United States are more prescriptive
than is generally encountered in the regulations adopted in
the Canadian provinces. U.S. practice is partly driven by the
desire to avoid the financial resources and time required to
engage in state agency promulgation of administrative rules
(MPCA 2009). However, as the stewardship planning compo-
nent becomes more commonplace in the United States, it is
expected that many of the requirements and program expecta-
tions currently contained in the statutes will migrate to content
requirements for inclusion in stewardship plans.
A prominent feature of the provincial EPR programs that
contrasts with those in the United States is the centrality of
collective producer responsibility organizations. While this as-
pect of EPR in Canada reflects the experience of the brand
owner response to EPR in the European Union, it also indi-
cates the leadership demonstrated by several of the industry
trade associations in assuming a proactive role in shaping EPR
policy development in Canada. This is illustrated, for example,
by the engagement of Electronics Product Stewardship Canada
(EPSC), an electronics industry association formed in 2003.
The EPSC forged a consensus among brand owners of elec-
tronic products, advanced an industry-developed approach for
provincial consideration, and engaged in the policy develop-
ment process in each province in order to promote consistency
(Deathe et al. 2008). However, the Ministry of the Environ-
ment in Ontario in 2009 signaled their intent to move toward
individual responsibility and full financial responsibility (On-
tario Ministry of the Environment 2009).
Another striking feature of the Canadian approach is the
primacy of the stewardship plans submitted on behalf of brand
owners as the tool to define brand owner obligations and illus-
trate the functioning of the program. While the United States
is beginning to implement a plan-driven approach, particu-
larly in regards to paint and carpet, many of the strictures and
expectations for brand owners and others along the product
chain are specified in statutes and regulations. The Canadian
approach to consultation during stewardship plan develop-
ment and review and approval by the provincial authority
shift much of the decision making outside of the legislative
process.
The significant difference in the use of eco-fees, and particu-
larly those that are visible, reflects a difference between theU.S.
and Canadian financing approaches and illustrates a greater de-
gree of comfort with collective organizations in Canada, but
also demonstrates the political challenges in the United States
facing the imposition of any fees that may be construed as a
tax. As opposed to the political dynamic in the United States,
retailers have been much less reticent to accept visible eco-fees
that are, for example, reflected on the receipt for products pur-
chased or to serve as the fee remitter on behalf of brand owners.
However, both the provincial and state regulatory approaches
have shied away from imposing mandatory collection require-
ments for discarded products as exemplified in the European
Union’s Waste Electrical and Electronic (WEEE) Directive.
While the United States has targeted EPR regulatory ac-
tivity for a single product or narrow suite of products within
a particular category, the provinces have typically addressed
a broad scope of products within a particular regulation. This
more comprehensive approach is exemplified by the household
hazardous waste regulations adopted in several provinces that
address products ranging from paint and solvents to mercury-
containing lamps. However, even within the more narrowly
tailored regulations for products such as waste electronics, the
scope of products is broad.
Case Studies of the Extended Producer
Responsibility Programs for Waste
Electronics in Minnesota and Ontario
This article offers two case studies of producer responsibility
programs to illustrate the similarities and differences between a
state product-specific producer responsibility program for waste
electronics and its counterpart in Ontario. Both programs are
representative ofmany of the policy principles for EPR in the re-
spective countries and demonstrate the common programmatic
emphasis in implementation. The programs in Minnesota and
Ontario for waste electronics were chosen due to their repre-
sentative nature as well as the availability of data for evaluation
and analysis.
Overview of Extended Producer Responsibility for
Electronics in the United States
As of May 2011, 25 states had enacted state waste elec-
tronics recycling laws. All of them, with the exception of an
advance recycling fee (ARF) program in California that was en-
acted in 2003, place requirements on brand owners to undertake
activities to increase the collection and recycling of waste elec-
tronics. However, these requirements often vary significantly
from state to state with varying degrees of statutory prescrip-
tion and responsibilities placed on brand owners (Ezroj 2010).
These differentiations range from, for example, what products
are included in the regulated program to whether brand owners
are required to meet certain performance criteria annually.
Most statutes address televisions, computer monitors, and
laptops, with several states obligating printers and desktop com-
puters. The statute adopted in New York in 2010 included a
much broader range of products, including gaming consoles
and equipment such as digital video disc (DVD) players, and
this may inspire other states to broaden the scope of obligated
products (Buseman 2012).
As opposed to other financing mechanisms that rely on
eco-fees established and managed by producer responsibility
organizations, the producer responsibility programs are often
premised on each manufacturer registering with the state regu-
latory agency and, in most programs, being obligated to reach
a certain level of recycling determined by their return share or
current market share. Unlike the context for the EPR program
in Canada and the European Union, there are no traditional
representative industry producer responsibility organizations
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Table 1 Overview of provincial legal authority and stewardship organizations for extended producer responsibility (EPR) in Canada as of
2012
Province Enabling statute Broad EPR regulation Stewardship oversight board
Alberta Environmental Protection and
Enhancement Act, RSA 2000,
c E-12
British Columbia Environmental Management Act,
SBC 2003, c 53
Recycling Regulation, BC Reg
449/2004
Manitoba The Waste Reduction and
Prevention Act, CCSM c W40
New Brunswick Clean Environment Act, RSNB
1973, c C-6
Designated Materials





SNL 2002, c E-14.2
Waste Management
Regulations, 2003, NLR 59/03
Multi-Materials Stewardship
Board (MMSB)
Nova Scotia Environment Act, SNS
1994–1995, c 1






RSPEI 1988, c E-9
Quebec Environment Quality Act, RSQ, c
Q-2
Regulation respecting the
recovery and reclamation of
products by enterprises, RRQ,
c Q-2, r 40.1
Recyc-Quebec
Saskatchewan Environmental Management and
Protection Act, 2002, SS 2002,
c E-10.21
that are engaged in proactive EPR program design and develop-
ment activities such as authoring stewardship plans, developing
and arranging collection infrastructure, and joint reporting ac-
tivities. In the United States, however, compliance entities
such as the Electronic Manufacturers Recycling Management
Company (MRM) have emerged to serve as vehicles for brand
owners in several states (Ongondo et al. 2011). For example, the
MRM contracts with one or more vendors to collect sufficient
weight to fulfill the individual obligations of its member com-
panies in states, such as Minnesota, with a market-share-based
obligation. These compliance entities, while easing the burden
of fulfilling a weight-based recycling obligation, are not repre-
senting the majority of the brand owners and are characterized
as providing a service rather than proactively developing and
managing an EPR program.
In the United States, the state waste electronics programs
can be broadly characterized by four approaches, as illustrated
in table 2: return share, a hybrid of market and return share,
market share, and registration and planning requirements. The
programs are often categorized by the methodology utilized for
establishing a brand owners obligation. This mechanism for
establishing obligation has often ignited significant debate
during legislative deliberations and is often determinative of
several other aspects of the program.
The return share approach, such as in Maine, determines a
manufacturer’s financial obligation based on the actual weight
or percentage of a manufacturer’s branded products that are
collected for recycling (Atasu and VanWassenhove 2011). On
the other hand, the market share model establishes a producer’s
obligation based on the weight of their products placed on
the market during a year. A hybrid approach embraces both the
return andmarket share approaches, typically implementing the
return share approach for information technology products such
as computers and peripherals and market share for consumer
electronics such as televisions.
Following the precedent establishedwith thewaste electron-
ics law enacted in California that requires compliance with the
European Union’s Directive on the Restriction of Hazardous
Substances (RoHS), seven states as of 2011 have followed suit
with either a requirement for compliance with the RoHS or dis-
closure regarding compliance with the directive (Sachs 2006).
Finally, the registration and plan model generally requires
producers to register with the state regulatory authority and
submit a plan that outlines their strategy for the collection
of discarded products. The states that have implemented this
approach have generally not imposed collection and recycling
goals and have lower recycling rates than other models.
Case Study: Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act
The Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act was enacted by
the legislature in 2007 following 5 years of intensive evaluation
and consideration of various policy approaches. The policy op-
tions, such as an advance recycling fee enacted in California in
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Table 2 Models of U.S. extended producer responsibility programs for waste electronics as of 2011
Market share obligation MN, WI, IN, NY, PA, VT
Return share obligation WA
Hybrid approach obligation ME, CT, RI, SC, OR, NJ, IL
Registration and plan MI, HI, MD, MO, NC, OK, TX, UT, VA, WV
Table 3 Provincial extended producer responsibility (EPR) regulations for waste electronics*
Province Program implemented Stewardship organization (industry funding organization)
British Columbia 2007 Electronics Stewardship Association of British Columbia
Manitoba Regulation approved in 2010 Electronic Products Recycling Association (EPRA) Manitoba
Nova Scotia 2008 Atlantic Canada Electronics Stewardship (ACES)
Ontario 2009 Ontario Electronic Stewardship
Prince Edward Island 2010 Atlantic Canada Electronics Stewardship (ACES)
Saskatchewan 2007 Saskatchewan Waste Electronic Equipment Program
Quebec Regulation issued in 2010 Electronic Products Recycling Association (EPRA) Quebec
Notes: *The waste electronics program in Alberta is operated by the Alberta Recycling Management Authority (ARMA), a provincial crown agency
governed by a broad range of stakeholders, including government representatives, that provides services for several other stewardship programs in Alberta.
While it shares several characteristics with the EPR programs for waste electronics across Canada, the brand owners have few responsibilities under the
regulation.
2003 as well as the return share obligation enacted in Maine in
2004, received significant scrutiny (Atasu andVanWassenhove
2010). The statute enacted in Minnesota is representative of
many of the producer responsibility measures enacted in the
United States, including those in Indiana, Wisconsin, New
York, Vermont, and Pennsylvania.
Driven by concerns regarding heavy metals in electronic
products, increasing management costs borne by local govern-
ments due to their presence in municipal solid waste, and a
disposal ban on cathode ray tube–containing products enacted
in 2003, the legislature ultimately endorsed a producer respon-
sibility model as the preferred policy option. The Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), the state environmen-
tal regulatory authority, is charged with oversight, compliance,
and enforcement activities to ensure implementation of the
statute.
Summary of the Act
The statute implements an individual responsibility ap-
proach that offers significant flexibility for brand owners to
achieve their obligation. The act implements a market share
obligation that applies tomanufacturers of video display devices
such as computer monitors, televisions, and laptop comput-
ers. The brand owner’s obligation for collection and recycling
is equivalent to 80% by weight of obligated products during
the program year (Eifert 2010). The determination of a brand
owner’s market share is accomplished through knowledge of
direct sales to consumers rather than through traditional re-
tail locations, such as the sales model employed by Dell, or
through the use of national sales data adjusted for Minnesota’s
population.
The statute does not prescribe requirements as to the type
of collection infrastructure that must be provided or contain
a convenience requirement as found in several other state’s
legal requirements, such as Washington, New York, and Ore-
gon, that require at least one site per county (Wagner 2012).
However, the act does attempt to ensure collection opportuni-
ties through an additional 0.5 pound credit for pounds collected
outside of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area as an incen-
tive for collection in less densely populated areas of the state
(Buseman 2012). The act also does not prohibit end-of-life fees
from being charged by collectors; a provision restricting such
fees is present in several others states’ EPR statutes for waste
electronics.
Recognizing that precisely gauging collection volume is chal-
lenging, the statute contains a provision for recycling credits
that are created and held by manufacturers if they collect more
than their annual obligation. Following an amendment to the
statute enacted in 2009, manufacturers may only meet 25%
of their annual obligation through the use of credits (MPCA
2010).
In order to facilitate accurate accounting, annual registration
and reporting is required for collectors, recyclers, and manufac-
turers. However, individual manufacturers report their sales and
collection weight to the Minnesota Department of Revenue,
rather than the MPCA, as a measure to ensure proprietary sales
data are not available to the public.
The statute also requires the disclosure by brand owners
of whether their obligated products are compliant with the
European Union’s RoHS directive.
Products Addressed
Although the obligation is determined by the individual
brand owner’s sale of video display devices, a broader category
of electronic products labeled covered electronic devices, such
as printers, desktop computers, and video cassette recorders
(VCRs), among others, can be collected and applied toward
the individual brand owner’s obligation.
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Financing
The financing mechanism can be defined as “cost internal-
ization,” given the lack of set fees, visible or otherwise, that are
common with many EPR programs for waste electronics glob-
ally. However, if a manufacturer does not fulfill their individual
obligation or chooses not to, the law stipulates a per pound
penalty of 0.30, 0.40, or 0.50 (U.S. dollars) per pound deter-
mined by how close they are to meeting their obligation (Ezroj
2010). The fee amounts were deliberately set by the legislature
at above market rates to encourage manufacturers to establish
their own programs.
Implementation
Since the program is premised on individual brand owner
responsibility, the law did not stipulate the creation of a formal
compliance organization. However, the act does permit one
or more collective organizations to represent obligated brand
owners, and in recognition of this option, it specifically autho-
rizes collaborative activity through statutory protections from
state anticompetitive conduct regulations. Manufacturers have
generally worked directly with recyclers who in turn develop
arrangements with collectors to provide sufficient pounds for
manufacturers to meet their program-year obligation.
While the law does not prescribe a particular responsibly for
collection and encourages awide array of entities to serve in that
role, local governments in Minnesota are central to the exist-
ing infrastructure, collecting approximately 50% of the weight
collected annually (MPCA 2011). The program also supports
a mix of collection strategies including permanent collection
sites, collection events, and mail-back efforts. Retailers such as
Best Buy, for example, are becoming essential to the collection
infrastructure in the state and collect approximately 30% of to-
tal weight of household-generatedwaste electronics in the state.
The Minnesota-based retailer began collecting a defined set of
discarded electronics through in-store offerings in the summer
of 2008 and has become the single largest collection entity in
the state.
Program Outcomes
Approximately 75 brand owners of video display devices
have registered with the MPCA each year of the program and
thus have a defined collection and recycling obligation deter-
mined by the weight of their products sold during the program
year.
Achieving one of the desired outcomes of the statute, there
has been a significant increase in the number of collectors as
well as the number of recyclers providing service in the state
since the law was implemented. The number of permanent col-
lection sites across the state has increased with nearly 80% of
Minnesota’s 87 counties having at least one permanent collec-
tion site.
The program has resulted in approximately 30 million
pounds of consumer electronics recycled in Minnesota each
year of the program. The program has resulted in per capita
collection rates of 5.7 pounds, 6.7 pounds, and 6.3 pounds for
the three completed program years (MPCA 2010).
One consequence of the absence of a central producer re-
sponsibility organization that publishes and collects fees as well
as reports on overall program costs is the difficulty in conducting
an economic analysis. However, the cost per pound to recycle
waste electronics from households has declined significantly
from the prevailing per pound costs prior to implementation of
the law, based on reported and anecdotal evidence from local
government collection programs (MPCA 2010).
While the program has resulted in a significant increase
in the collection of waste electronics from households in
Minnesota, it is not clear whether other desired outcomes of
EPR are being achieved. For example, no evaluation has been
conducted into what impact, if any, the program has had on
influencing product designs.
Summary of Extended Producer Responsibility for
Waste Electronics in Canada
As referenced in table 3, as of May 2011, eight provinces had
promulgated regulations for waste electronics in Canada, all of
which, with the exception of Alberta, are premised on EPR.
The regulations and implementation demonstrate a remarkable
degree of consistency, not only with each other, but also with
the overall framework for EPR in Canada as demonstrated by
significant flexibility in program design, stewardship plans, col-
lective compliance, and financing mechanisms. The producer
responsibility obligations are generally fulfilled by collective
compliance organizations and funded by eco-fees, referred to
as “environmental handling fees” in some provinces, that are
often visible to consumers at the point of sale.
With the exception of the regulation for EPR for waste elec-
tronics adopted in Quebec in 2011, the provincial regulations
do not specify quantitative performance goals for brand owners,
although the stewardship plans generally outline targets such
as, for example, collection volume (Government of Quebec
2011b).
Case Study: Extended Producer Responsibility for
Waste Electronics in Ontario
Ontario is one of six provincial e-waste programs that are
operational and is illustrative of the general policy approach
adopted inCanada for implementation of EPR.Other provinces
that have embraced EPR for waste electronics include Prince
Edward Island (PEI), Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and
Nova Scotia.
All of the mandatory EPR programs in the province are reg-
ulated under the authority of theWaste Diversion Act (WDA)
of 2002. TheWDA authorizes theMinister of the Environment
to designate a material for a producer responsibility program.
The WDA also created Waste Diversion Ontario (WDO) to
develop, implement, and operate waste diversion programs for
a broad range of materials.
In December 2004 the Minister of the Environment submit-
ted the regulation for WEEE with a program request letter sub-
mitted to WDO for creation of a diversion program for WEEE
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in June 2007. The initial regulation outlined seven categories
of electrical products as designated waste under the WDA. The
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Regulation did not
specify particular performance goals to be attained.
In September 2007 Ontario Electronic Stewardship (OES)
was created as the industry funding organization (terminology
used in Ontario for producer responsibility organization) for
WEEE in the province and led the effort to develop the stew-
ardship plan (OES 2009). While the first program plan was
approved by the minister in July 2008, a revised program plan
for phases 1 and 2 was submitted in July 2009 and approved by
the minister in August 2009.
Despite the central role of OES, theWDA creates a pathway
for individual manufacturers or a group of brand owners to
submit plans toWDOas long as it will fulfill the objectives of the
diversion program as an alternative to full participation in OES.
However, no brand owners, as of 2011, have availed themselves
of the individual plan option. The stewardship plan stipulates
performance goals for the program including 5-year collection,
reuse, and refurbishment and recycling targets. However, failure
to achieve the goals does not lead to potential enforcement
activity against a specific company.
Ontario Electronics Stewardship
OES is the producer responsibility organization responsible
for implementing the program forWEEE in Ontario. OESman-
ages the program on behalf of the obligated brand owners and
is governed by a board of directors composed of representatives
from the obligated brand owners.
OES activities to fulfill the brand owner obligations are
funded through fees that OES establishes. Unlike the cost-
sharing arrangement in place for the packaging and printed pa-
per program in Ontario, brand owners are obligated to assume
full financial responsibility for the costs of managing e-waste.
The fees are based on several factors, including the overall pro-
gram costs and the number of units placed on the market in On-
tario. In addition, several other considerations influence the fee
structure, including the desire to avoid the cross-subsidization of
products using an approach that defines the management costs
for each product category. However, management costs that are
common for all brand owners are shared. The fees remitted by
brand owners are not specifically designed to promote or reflect
design for environment activities and are not differentiated by
brand owner or other features within the product category
While OES establishes the fees, the regulation and program
plan do not prescribe how the fees are managed through the
product chain. In practice, many of the brand owners pass along
the fees to retailers, who then voluntarily implement visible fees
for consumers. OES also permits entities such as large retailers,
rather than brand owners, to remit fees to OES.
OES requires contracted recyclers to abide by the recycler
qualification requirements established by EPSC that were cre-
ated to ensure environmentally sound management practices
and adherence to the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal (Lepawsky 2012).
Products Addressed
The producer responsibility program for managing waste
electronics currently addresses 44 product types comprising the
phase 1 and phase 2 product categories articulated in the regula-
tion. Phase 1 of the programbegan onApril 1, 2009, with six ini-
tial products, including televisions, monitors, desktop comput-
ers, laptop computers, computers peripherals, and faxmachines.
Phase 2, which began on April 1, 2010, added new products in-
cluding phones, cameras, and audiovisual equipment.
Financing
OES collected 45 million Canadian dollars (C$) in eco-
fees during first program year, April 2009 to March 2010, with
current fees ranging from C$26.25 for displays with a larger
than 29-inch screen to C$0.10 for cell phones and pagers (OES
2010).
Program Outcomes
As of early 2011, there were approximately 780 stewards,
566 permanent collection sites, and 12 approved processors.
The goal of the first year of the program, April 2009 to March
2010, was to collect 42,000 metric tons of electronic waste; the
program actually collected 17,303 tons, or 1.31 kilograms (kg)
per capita (2.9 pounds). The cost for the year 1 WEEE program
was C$1604 per ton. It is estimated that OES is managing 60%
to 70% of all waste electronics managed in the province. It is
important to note that no disposal ban is yet in place in the
province.
Influence of the Canadian Approach to Extended
Producer Responsibility in the United States
Policy makers in the United States are examining EPR,
not only for specific products with a successful track record
in Canada, such as paint and pharmaceuticals, but they are also
conducting an intensive examination of the policy structure
guiding the provincial programs and the resulting outcomes.
This focus is directlymanifested in the development of producer
responsibility “framework” legislative proposals considered in
several states. These initiatives are directly influenced by the
provincial approach, particularly that in British Columbia, to
producer responsibility. Maine enacted a modified “framework”
in 2010, with similar bill introductions in New York and Rhode
Island in 2011 (Product Stewardship Institute 2010). Regard-
less of the fate of these individual state proposals, the themes
of consistency between programs, brand owner leadership in
program design and implementation, and an emphasis on out-
comes are coming to the fore in the EPR dialogue in the United
States.
With the enactment of several producer responsibility mea-
sures in several states starting in the 2009 legislative session
that borrow significantly from the approach to EPR in Canada,
the provincial policy influence continues to expand and deepen
in the United States. The producer responsibility statutes en-
acted in Oregon for paint in 2009, in California for paint and
carpet in 2010, and in Maine for mercury-containing lamps
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in 2009 all demonstrate thematic similarities to the general
policy approach prevalent in the provinces featuring broad
programmatic outlines in the statutes, significant flexibility
in how the outcomes are achieved, and a stewardship plan
requirement.
It is expected that policy makers in the United States will
continue to seek guidance from the experience in the provinces
both in terms of policy construction and in terms of emphasis
on particular products or product categories.
Opportunities for Collaboration
Given the historical cooperation between the United and
Canada on a number of environmental measures, an identifi-
cation of potential avenues and topics for collaboration with
a focus on steps toward consistency in EPR programs is worth-
while. Several institutions devoted to supporting cooperation
on environmentalmatters, such as the International JointCom-
mission between the United States and Canada that addresses
the Great Lakes region and the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (CEC) serving the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) region, create institutional bodies that
establish common environmental priorities and could serve as
vehicles for collaborative action.
There are several specific options for promoting program
consistency between the United States and Canada, including
joint identification and designation of products and materi-
als for producer responsibility measures. While challenging, the
United States andCanada could initiate an effort to identify the
common objectives and policy objectives of producer responsi-
bility and seek to realize their recognition in policy measures.
Of particular interest for both the United States and Canada
may be an emphasis on policy measures to support “design for
environment” in the context of EPR or developed as support-
ing measures as demonstrated by the RoHS directive in the
European Union.
Another potential initiative worthy of attention is to enable
and support producer responsibility organizations that func-
tion on a cross-border basis furthering the objective of pro-
gram consistency. An emerging binational initiative under way
is the Western Product Stewardship Collaborative (WPSC),
which is identifying opportunities for joint action, includ-
ing policy consistency and program assessment on EPR for
California, Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia (Bury
2012).
The development of a materials processing roadmap for en-
suring adequate end-market processing availability in North
America would be valuable for identifying currently available
processing locations and gaps in commodity end markets to
channel investment.
Finally, both the United States and Canada would bene-
fit from a coordinated effort at evaluation to further identify
the economic efficiency and environmental outcomes, such as
the nexus of EPR and product design, of the respective policy
choices and program implementation strategies.
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Notes
1. For the purposes of this article, EPR is characterized by the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
definition: EPR is an environmental policy approach in which a
producer’s responsibility for a product is extended to the postcon-
sumer stage of a product’s life cycle. An EPR policy is characterized
by (1) the shifting of responsibility (physically and/or economically;
fully or partially) upstream toward the producer and away from mu-
nicipalities, and (2) the provision of incentives to producers to take
into account environmental considerations when designing their
products (OECD 2001).
2. Lindhqvist and Lifset (2003) and Walls (2006) among others cite
deposit refund policies, most prominently for beverage containers,
as a policy tool that reflects the principles of EPR. However, given
the often significant level of prescriptive requirements and a financ-
ing mechanism that does not incentivize design for environment
practices, deposit programs are best characterized as “proto” EPR or
placed within a broader category of product-specific policy instru-
ments.
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a b s t r a c t
Product-oriented environmental policy with an emphasis on extended producer responsibility (EPR)
(frequently referred to as product stewardship in the U.S.) is being applied in the United States for an
increasingly broad scope of products including waste electronics and household hazardous wastes such
as paint and mercury-containing lamps. However, due to the lack of a uniﬁed federal response, these
efforts are driven by state-level policies and regulations. This state-led approach is frequently charac-
terized as resulting in a “patchwork” of disparate regulations. Historically, two strategies are often
suggested as offering a remedy for this situation; 1) federal legislation and 2) model state legislation.
However, another policy strategy has emerged in the U.S., that of an overall EPR policy framework, which
creates a clear process for selecting and designating products and articulates the roles and re-
sponsibilities for the various players along the product chain. This article provides an analysis of the
experiences and prospects for each of the three strategies to serve as a policy vehicle for greater con-
sistency of EPR regulations throughout the U.S.
In part motivated by global extended producer responsibility policy approaches, particularly in the
Canadian Provinces, efforts are now underway to investigate a similar comprehensive regulatory
approach to be implemented by individual states in the U.S. The article examines the “framework” model
that is envisioned in the U.S. and outlines the recommend components of this policy concept. Finally, the
article provides a comparison with other jurisdictions, most notably, British Columbia, which has
implemented a broad extended producer responsibility policy.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Motivated by concerns about the environmental impacts of
products such as electronic goods and household hazardous waste,
policymakers in the United States are taking a more expansive look
at products and are grappling with the appropriate policy response
to reduce their environmental impacts as well to address the
increasing costs for management at the ‘end-of-life’ management
phase of products. However, as with many public policy issues, the
debate surrounding what constitutes the most effective strategy to
address the problem and the appropriate roles for federal, state and
local governments are far from resolved.
Much of the policy attention is centered on the concept of
extended producer responsibility (EPR), a principle that is designed
to help society to reduce the environmental impacts of products
throughout their lifecycles (Lindhqvist and Lifset, 2003). Extended
producer responsibility, also commonly referred to as product
stewardship in the United States, seeks to internalize the environ-
mental costs of products thus serving as an incentive to reduce
toxic or hazardous constituents and embrace other ‘design-for-the-
environment’ practices (Scheijgrond, 2011). Signiﬁcantly, such cost
internalization is intended to move the ‘end-of-life’ product man-
agement costs from taxpayers and ratepayers, to the relationship
between manufacturers, retailers and consumers (Forslind, 2009).
EPR has historical antecedents in the polluter pays principle and
embraces the integration of economic and environmental objec-
tives illustrated by ecological modernization theory (Pellow et al.,
2000). Ecological modernization theory recognizes that market
dynamics can serve as an important tool for minimizing environ-
mental impacts and stimulates technological developments and
product innovations that create societal value (Berger et al., 2001).
While EPR is implemented through regulatory action by the state,
the primary actors are the producers and therefore, they are
generally accorded signiﬁcant ﬂexibility to implement a program
(Deutz, 2009).
Initially implemented in Europe for packaging in the early
1990’s and enshrined in waste policy in the European Union, EPRE-mail address: garth.hickle@state.mn.us.
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has been adopted, particularly for waste electronics (Ongondo et al.,
2011) in many of the OECD countries and is being, gradually
implemented in non-OECD nations (Manomaivibool, 2011). How-
ever, despite its expanding impact, EPR policy globally is marked by
the lack of a consistent policy approach, even for particular prod-
ucts, and by inconsistent application of policy in a particular
jurisdiction such as the European Union (Mayers, 2007).
Often inﬂuenced by the EPR experience globally with the Eu-
ropean Union and Canadian Provincial programs, in particular, EPR
is emerging as a prominent feature of waste management policy in
the United States, particularly for products containing hazardous
substances such as mercury-containing products and waste elec-
tronics (Silveria and Chang, 2011). In the absence of a U.S. federal
policy for regulating the environmental impacts of products, policy
considerations currently residewith individual U.S. states that view
EPR as an innovative strategy that transcends the typical “com-
mand and control” regulatory architecture (Sachs, 2006).
However, this strategy must be placed in the context of the
market participants, most notably the brand owners and argues for
a greater attention to jurisdictional consistency. Unlike the major
environmental media statutes that emphasize site-speciﬁc impacts,
EPR arguably requires a more concerted strategy for consistency
given its insertion into the movement of goods that are manufac-
tured, distributed and consumed in differing jurisdictions. In
another distinguishing feature, EPR programs that emphasize the
collection and recycling of materials result in commodities (e.g.
steel, plastic) destined for global markets.
The state level legislative activity in the U.S. is heightening calls
bymany stakeholders, with the impacted product manufacturers at
the forefront, for the U.S. Congress to assume a greater role to avoid
the emerging patchwork of disparate state EPR laws for the
collection and recycling of certain products. However, as discussed
in subsequent paragraphs of this paper, signiﬁcant impediments
exist for the U.S. Congressional action on this topic.
While the desire for a more harmonized approach is often felt
most acutely by manufacturers of designated products, the current
regulatory landscape for waste electronics offers a cautionary tale as
to the potential consequences for all actors along the product chain
as other products are subject to state regulatory requirements. The
desire for greater consistency and harmonization presents an op-
portunity for the U.S. Congress, or in lieu of federal action, for indi-
vidual states to fulﬁll their role as policy innovators to establish a
comprehensive policy framework that more fully embraces EPR as a
tool to address the environmental impacts of products.
This article identiﬁes three public policy strategies to achieve
greater consistency and suggests that the growing rationale for
producer developed and managed programs to be the avenue, best
suited to promote consistency of EPR policy efforts. Such a
comprehensive approach may be necessary to not only promote
consistency across jurisdictions but to realize the full potential of
EPR, not only as a tool to address ‘end-of-life’ management re-
sponsibilities but to achieve a reduction in the lifecycle impacts of
products.
1.1. State leadership on producer responsibility
Given the lack of policy momentum at the federal level, indi-
vidual states have emerged as the vanguard and source of inno-
vation for producer responsibility policy in the U.S. (Ezroj, 2010).
This state action has focused on individual products thus far but is
now evolving to consider comprehensive producer responsibility
framework policies that may potentially be applied towide range of
products and materials.
By serving as a catalyst to expand the suite of products addressed
by an EPR policy approach, measures for waste electronics have been
enacted in twenty-four U.S. states since 2004 (Atasu et al., 2012). The
StateofCalifornia requiresanadvancedrecycling fee tobecollectedby
retailers for funding of collection and recycling efforts e a policy
approach that is generally not considered to be producer re-
sponsibility (Kahhat et al., 2008). Such laws requiremanufacturers to
ﬁnance, to varying degrees, the costs to collect, transport and process
waste electronic products that are generated. As Eilert (2010),
Buseman (2012) and others note, that these laws are emblematic of a
“patchwork” of differing requirements and expectations for manu-
facturers as well as others in each state. A marked outcome of the
state-level legislative deliberation on waste electronics has been to
greatly advance the policy debate on EPR and an examination of the
allocation of roles between manufacturers and governments in the
U.S. However, while there are some similar provisions among the
various state laws, each state program demonstrates unique charac-
teristics, some of which were driven by local state political consider-
ations. Several products including paint, batteries, mercury-
containing products and carpet among other products are under
consideration for EPR requirements in individual U.S. states.
Capitalizing on the momentum for EPR stimulated by the
grappling with several waste electronics management approaches,
many states are not only broadening the scope of products under
consideration for EPR regimes but are also recognizing the need for
a broad policy framework to guide decisions regarding individual
products in an effort to produce a consistent and more efﬁcient
approach for PR.While this effort reﬂects amaturation of EPR in the
U.S., attention does need to be paid to the potential for “policy
chaos” and what tools, whether coordinated state activity such as
model state legislation or a federal presence is needed to achieve
greater policy and program harmonization.
1.2. The context for consistency of state programs
“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a lab-
oratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.” e U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis, New State Ice Co. v. Liebman (1932)
Due to the federalist nature of American governance, the tension
between individual state policy actions, thus realizing Justice
Brandeis’ exhortation and a consistent national approach is an
enduring feature of the political landscape in the U.S. While con-
sistency is often acknowledged to be desirable, several impedi-
ments often exist for achieving this goal among state legislative
efforts. Most prominently, the lack of consistency reﬂects the
differing constituencies, political contexts and past experiences
with EPR.
Of course, the perception is that policy approaches must be
tailored to the real or perceived unique state circumstances for each
state and developed in the context of factors such as available
collection and processing infrastructure available for a particular
product or material. In some arenas, “policy competition” between/
among states is a prevailing practice to promote policy innovation
(Adler, 2011). However, such individual state policy actions often
inhibit consistency. Also, there often exists a lack of a compre-
hensive understanding of the variables contributing to program
design and the implications of certain policy decisions. Finally, the
potential for the lack of agreement among producers e.g. the lack of
agreement amongst manufacturers of electronic products as to
how EPR obligations should be established and ﬁnanced, serves as a
disincentive for consistency.
As noted in reports by two federal agencies, the U.S. Department
of Commerce in 2005 and the U.S. General Accountability Ofﬁce in
2010, the lack of consistency among state level programs is illus-
trated by the differences inherent in the 24 states with statutory
G.T. Hickle / Journal of Cleaner Production 64 (2014) 266e276 267
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EPR programs for managing waste electronics (U.S. Department of
Commerce, 2006 and U.S. GAO, 2010) While it is difﬁcult to accu-
rately determine the actual compliance costs for both regulated
entities as well as the costs to state oversight agencies but certainly
the lack of consistency reduces the efﬁciency of compliance efforts
and may contribute to dissuading the development of national
initiatives.
To illustrate the differing requirements of the state electronics
waste management programs including the scope of products
addressed, the determination of producer’s obligations and the role
of state government among others, Table 1 outlines one of the
provisions of state EPR laws, the signiﬁcant variations of which
products are addressed under the various state e-waste laws.
Several of the factors that often serve to inhibit consistency
include that fact that while individual states are keenly aware of
innovative policy measures that have been enacted in other states,
there is generally no strong constituencywithin a particular state to
strive for policy consistency with neighboring states. Another
consideration is that achieving consistency requires strong
consensus among the impacted brand owners with the ability to
translate that consensus into policy leadership and ability to
navigate the political landscape in multiple states. However, this
approach requires signiﬁcant agreement amongst industry leaders
with potentially disparate business models, product lines, vertical
integration of take-back and recycling operations. The most vocal
constituency arguing for greater consistency among state-based
programs are the brand owners principally but other entities
along the product chain with deﬁned responsibilities such as re-
cyclers, for example, who stand to beneﬁt as well. While the
additional costs to brand owners for compliance with the myriad of
individual state programs beyond what would occur with greater
consistency of state laws is difﬁcult to ascertain, research indicates
that the differing compliance activities ranging from differing
brand owner registration procedures to reporting requirements
require signiﬁcant resources (NERIC and NCER, 2006).
Arguably, the implementation of national programs will result
in a reduction in the requirements for compliance resulting from
the disharmonized state programs and can result in improved
economies of scale that lead to an enhancement of the efﬁciency of
the programs. Another potential outcome of greater consistency
that is often overlooked is the reduction in staff and resources
necessary for state regulatory and implementation activities, a
Table 1
The scope of obligated products by state E-waste laws in different U.S. states.
Obligated products State and year of initial passage
Televisions, laptops, monitors (screen size nine inches or greater) Minnesota (2007)
Televisions, laptops, desktop computers, and monitors, printers, portable DVD player,
(screen size greater than seven inches)
Wisconsin (2009)
Televisions, monitors and laptops and tablets (screen size four inches or greater) Indiana (2009)
Televisions, desktops, laptops, tablets, monitors (screen size four inches or greater), printers Connecticut (2007), Michigan (2008)
Televisions, desktop printers, video game consoles, digital picture frames, portable computers,
monitors, and/or portable DVD players
Maine (2004)
Televisions, desktop computers, laptops, tablets, and computer monitors (screen size
of four inches or greater)
Washington (2006), West Virginia (2008),
Oregon (2007), Maryland (2005), New Jersey (2008)
Televisions, desktop computers, monitors, combination units, laptops (screen size
of nine inches or greater)
Rhode Island (2008)
Computers, televisions, small scale servers, computer peripherals (monitors, keyboards,
mice or similar pointing devices, facsimile machines, scanners, printers, small electronic
equipment (VCRs, DVRs, portable digital music players, DVD players, digital converter
boxes, cable or satellite receivers, game consoles)
New York (2010), Illinois (2008)
Televisions, laptops, desktop computers, monitors, printers, keyboard/mouse (screen size
of four inches or greater)
Pennsylvania (2010), Vermont (2010), Hawaii (2008)
Televisions (9 inches or greater), desktop computers, monitors, combination units, tablet
computers, laptops (no screen size limitation on IT devices), keyboards, mice, printers, s
canners, other peripherals
North Carolina (2007)
Desktop or notebook computers, monitors, and printing devices, Televisions (9 inches or greater),
combination units, tablets, laptops (no screen size limitation on IT devices)
South Carolina (2010)
Televisions, desktop computers, laptops, printers, keyboard/mouse, portable DVD player, VCR,
and tablets (no screen size speciﬁed)
Utah (2011)
Desktop computers, laptops and monitors Missouri (2008), Oklahoma (2008), Virginia (2008)
Desktop computers, laptops, and monitors, televisions (9 inches or greater TVs only) Texas (2007)
Source: National Center for Electronics Recycling.
Table 2
Comparison of Strategies to Promote Consistency of EPR Policy.
Implementation tool
to promote consistency
Implementation mechanism Advantages Disadvantages
Federal legislation Statute enacted by U.S. Congress Implements national approach that potentially
mandates a consistent set of requirements for
a particular product group
 In keeping with other federal environmental
statutes, a federal law may delegate signiﬁcant
decision-making to individual states
 Necessitates creation of a new body of federal
environmental law
Model state legislation Product speciﬁc statue enacted
by individual state legislatures
Allows for phased-in national program through
consistent state legislation
 Requires producer-led legislative engagement
 Does not prevent individual state action that may
be inconsistent with other state’s initiatives
Framework State statute enacted that
creates platform
for producer-led EPR programs
Creates common approach for all products and
provides a vision for producer-led program
development and implementation
 Politically challenging
 Requires that a similar framework must be adopted
in each state
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critical factor given the constraint due to the ﬁscal situation facing
many state environmental agencies.
Finally, more consistent policy application across states would
enhance the feasibility of robust program evaluation, particularly to
facilitate comparisons as to how EPR programs are functioning in
differing states.
1.3. Strategies for promoting consistency for EPR policy
Two principal strategies are often evaluated to emphasize na-
tional consistency for EPR as well as other product-related regu-
latory efforts. These strategies include federal legislation andmodel
legislation implemented at the state level. Recently, however, the
EPR “framework” concept has emerged in the U.S. and offers an
alternative approach for promoting consistency that places much of
the responsibility on brand owners for program design. Table 2
presents a brief comparison among the three policy approaches.
Each approach is elaborated upon in subsequent sections of this
paper.
1.3.1. Federal legislation
While federal action on EPR may be warranted, and certainly
offers the promise of greater harmonization than is occurring with
the diverse state efforts, there are several impediments, both sub-
stantively and politically, facing such action and therefore, there is
little agreement about the approach and timing for action that is
needed by the U.S. Congress.
While a national approach may reduce the state “patchwork” of
regulatory requirements for a particular product, it requires
congressional action as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(U.S. EPA) does not have the regulatory authority under the
Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) to implement a regu-
lated EPR program (Sachs, 2006). Furthermore, as discussed in the
previous section, much of the solid waste and recycling regulatory
responsibilities are addressed by the states. Even if federal legis-
lation is practicable, many of the existing federal environmental
statutes envision a model whereby, states have signiﬁcant roles for
implementation (Kraft, 2010). If the state delegation dynamic is
permitted by an EPR statute, the realization of consistency between
states may not be realized.
While there have been several Congressional bills introduced to
promote recycling requirements for products such as electronics in
the past decade, including a bi-partisan effort by Senator Wyden
and former Senator Talent, none has received signiﬁcant consid-
eration (Drayton, 2007). Previously, following action by several
states to enact EPR requirements for rechargeable batteries,
Congress enacted the Mercury-Containing and Rechargeable
Battery Management Act of, 1996 to facilitate the states laws by
addressing management requirements, but the act did not impose
EPR requirements for the collection and recycling of rechargeable
batteries (Mercury-Containing and Rechargeable Battery
Management Act of 1996).
Of particular interest to regulated parties is that the federal
regulatory framework provides the prospect of lower compliance
costs and greater consistency across the nation. A national program,
given the federal government’s jurisdiction over trade related
matters, may also be able tomore effectively address the tracking of
products and to promote compliance for ﬁrms importing products
into the U.S. Another element of a product policy that may be more
appropriate for implementation at the federal level is the imple-
mentation of ‘design-for-the-environment’ requirements such as
those required by the European Union’s Restrictions on Hazardous
Substances Directive (RoHS). Lastly, the most compelling argument
for a greater federal presence in product-oriented policy is that a
national approach should result in greater environmental beneﬁt-
increased recycling and resource conservation-than can be ach-
ieved by individual state approaches.
Despite the compelling rationale for Congressional action on
EPR, several impediments, reﬂecting political challenges exist for
the U.S. Congress to enact a comprehensive EPR approach for
products. As states continue to enact EPR requirements for speciﬁc
products in the absence of a federal leadership, the need for federal
action on national EPR measures may diminish. The inertia and
investment of the state programs serve as a potential obstacle to
state support for a federal approach. This is particularly true for
states that have funding derived from product-speciﬁc legislation
but also due to the investment in the program from a staff and
program perspective.
Of particular concern, from the states’ perspective, is the po-
tential for a policy approach that embraces federal preemption of
existing state programs or establishes a level of performance that is
less aggressive than that established in the more rigorous state
programs, a provision that would be strongly opposed by those
states and local interests.
From a political vantage point, the example offered by the
electronics industry illustrates the challenges facing enactment of a
national statute. Conﬂict has existedwithin the electronics industry
and among manufacturers and retailers and other stakeholders
with regard to the type of ﬁnancingmechanism that is preferable as
well as how to apportion responsibilities along the supply chain.
This lack of consensus, a factor that has contributed to the disparate
nature of programs at the state-level, also impedes Congressional
action.
The fact that a viable proposal with broad stakeholder support
has yet to be put forward further complicates the viability of na-
tional program. The difﬁculty in arriving at a broadly supported
approach is complicated by the lack of an existing precedence for
such an effort. It may also be argued that the lack of Congressional
success on a federal approach for waste electronics has been sty-
mied, in part, due to the lack of a broader product-oriented
framework and context to address the collection and recycling of
consumer products.
1.3.2. Model state legislation
Model state legislation, sometimes referred to as uniform laws,
is typically developed by organizations, such as the Uniform Law
Commission that has produced more than 250 acts, or interests
independent of state legislatures and provides guidance for state
lawmakers through templates or frameworks to address particular
topics (Fish, 2012).
The Toxics in Packaging model legislation, developed by the
Council of Northeastern Governors (CONEG) in 1989 to reduce the
use of toxic materials in packaging, has been adopted by nineteen
states and remains a preeminent example of the capacity of model
legislation to achieve consistency (Schneeweis, 2006). The stan-
dards contained in the model legislation were subsequently
adopted internationally (Lewis, 2012). The legislation spurred the
creation of the Toxics in Packaging Clearinghouse in 1992, a multi-
stakeholder entity, to provide assistance with compliance and a
forum to propose amendments.
Recognizing the need for consistent EPR legislation, the Amer-
ican Coatings Association (ACA), following a multi-year national
dialog, developed model state legislation and supported the lan-
guage in a schedule of states. Oregonwas the ﬁrst state to enact the
law in 2009. California followed suit in 2010 with Connecticut in
2011 and Rhode Island in 2012 adopting similar statutes. In all four
states, the provisions of the laws are similar regarding statutory
requirements for development and submittal of a producer devel-
oped plan and the speciﬁed fee-based ﬁnancing mechanism. Con-
necticut requires all brand owners to participate in the collective
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EPR organization thus precluding the option for individual
responsibility.
The ACA responded to the statutory requirements with the
formation of PaintCare, an industry-managed stewardship organi-
zation. Importantly, PaintCare is serving as a national entity to
implement the paint statutes in the states where they have been
enacted thus reinforcing a strategy of national consistency.
While the four enacted EPR laws for managing unwanted paint,
demonstrate remarkable consistency, the example illustrates the
necessary circumstances for achieving consistency of state-based
producer responsibility programs for a particular product namely
signiﬁcant unanimity among the brand owners and acceptance by
state policymakers as well as by other key stakeholders. It does
little, however, in terms of establishing consistency of programs
within a particular state and requires signiﬁcant resources from the
brand owners and other actors in the legislative arena.
1.3.3. An extended producer responsibility framework
The current situation with state waste electronics programs il-
luminates the need for action to, not only, support efforts to
harmonize disparate state EPR laws but, more pointedly, it illus-
trates the need for a transition to broader product policies or
“framework” that establishes clear expectations and outcomes for
EPR programs. The challenge for harmonization is not only facing
the manufacturers of electronic products confronted by individual
state regulations but is likely to extend to other manufacturers,
such as those of mercury containing products well as other items in
household hazardous waste and as well as to products that are
difﬁcult and expensive to manage.
An EPR framework is designed to move beyond the current
piecemeal regulatory approach that addresses products individu-
ally and recognizes that, in many cases for consumer products, the
sales chain may be quite similar with even some manufacturers
offering disparate products (e.g. electronics and lighting products)
under consideration in stewardship programs. The framework
concept suggested for application in the U.S. asserts extended
producer leadership in program design and implementation deci-
sion through the use of EPR plans and departs from a more tradi-
tional regulatory model that is usually quite prescriptive. The
framework offers the promise of a consistent, yet ﬂexible, approach
that recognizes that each product has unique features but places
producer responsibility efforts within a standardized format. Such a
framework could greatly accelerate the development and market-
ing of “greener products” thus supporting the “cradle to cradle”
paradigm more effectively than traditional recycling programs.
While a comprehensive product policy implemented at the
federal level potentially offers greatest promise for national con-
sistency, adoption of the framework approach by multiple states
offers a vehicle for greater harmonization than is occurringwith the
current disjointed landscape of state efforts. A consistent state
statutory framework for selecting and designating products for an
EPR reduces the likelihood that state level political considerations
will unduly inﬂuence regulations for individual products thus
thwarting attempts to promote harmonized state approaches. The
industry-led stewardship plan development component, a center-
piece of the framework, shifts the locus of decision-making from
prescriptive legislative requirements to brand owners thus
encouraging manufacturers to implement multi-state imple-
mentation strategies thus fostering program consistency.
An argument offered in support of a framework is that it pre-
sents the opportunity to institute a consistent approach for iden-
tifying products as well as the mechanism for designating products
under the framework. Under a framework, two mechanisms,
administrative action through rulemaking and, most frequently
suggested, afﬁrmative legislative action, are required to obligate
products for EPR requirements.
Embracing the call for industry driven programs, such a
framework will encourage the development of extended producer
responsibility organizations that can more efﬁciently manage
multi-state programs. Similarly, a framework may support the
Table 3




Deﬁnitions A framework will establish common deﬁnitions for key terms underlying product policy. For example, deﬁning commonly




A framework will establish the speciﬁc criteria such as toxicity, quantity in solid waste, and costs to manage that will guide




Of critical importance to the functioning of the framework is the mechanism for determining which products should fall under
an EPR approach and the timeframe by which that should occur. The traditional options for this type of action, legislative ﬁat or
a regulatory determination by an agency, offer their respective beneﬁts and drawbacks.
Roles
and responsibilities
Identifying and allocating responsibility for the players along the product chain are also essential. This will not only address the role
of manufacturers but clearly identify the appropriate roles for federal, state and local government, as well as distributors, retailers
and consumers as appropriate.
Financing
mechanisms
Since much of the legislative consideration for EPR in the U.S. centers on the appropriate ﬁnancing mechanism for particular products





While many industry-wide EPR programs anticipate a level of industry collaboration, action to facilitate industry cooperation is essential.
For instance, business interests often voice legitimate concerns regarding potential state-regulated anti-trust activity during the policy
and regulatory development process for products. Starting with several states that enacted EPR statutes for rechargeable batteries
in the 1990’s, the exemptions for state, anti-trust laws have now become commonplace (Weinberg, 2008).
Program plans A framework requires the submittal of EPR plans to the appropriate regulatory authority, an approach that identiﬁes the manufacturers
recommended approach for fulﬁlling the EPR responsibilities including the collection strategy among other attributes.
Performance
metrics
A crucial component of a framework is the goal setting mechanism. Transparent goals not only permit more effective evaluation but also
serve to ensure that the collection and recycling infrastructure is used effectively, is closely matched to the demand and can be adjusted
as necessary. The framework may stipulate a suite of potential performance standards such as recycling and reuse goals along with
for collection opportunities.
Reporting A framework also institutes a common reporting methodology that will not only support accountability and transparency but will also
facilitate evaluation of the program to determine if course corrections are necessary.
Process for engaging
stakeholders
A framework enumerates a process for stakeholder input, frequently referred to as a consultation; this is akin to what may be accomplished
under traditional administrative rulemaking by a state environmental agency.
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engagement of stewardship organizations that function in multiple
states as demonstrated by PaintCare in the four states that have
enacted paint stewardship statutes.
A framework approach would not only serve to reduce the
complexity and confusion inherent with multiple approaches to
product regulation but would also reduce the state resources
required for implementation. If crafted to support industry-
managed programs and promote accountability across various
stewardship efforts, state agencies would be able to focus on
ensuring a level-playing ﬁeld and other compliance activities rather
than devoting signiﬁcant staff and potentially ﬁnancial resources to
multiple programs for speciﬁc products.
While the framework approach may offer a strategy to promote
consistency for the application of EPR measures in the U.S., its
effectiveness hinges on several factors. Aside from the signiﬁcant
political obstacles that may inhibit widespread adoption of a
broader regulatory framework for EPR in the U.S., the framework
must be relatively consistent overall to serve as an effective tool to
promote consistency. A regulatory framework measure must also
balance the need for ﬂexibility to account for the unique features of
each product while retaining the value of a regulatory strategy that
provides sufﬁcient guidance for relatively consistent program
development. For example, the policy may require some accom-
modation for product-speciﬁc ﬁnancing mechanisms, particularly
those that obligate participation by other parties such as retailers.
It is important to acknowledge that this approach is to be
implemented through the public policy process and is not designed
to replace ﬁrm-level environmental management strategies such as
ISO 14001 or other environmental managements systems that are
designed to achieve ﬁrm-level objectives but are necessary for
effective in achieving the broader public goals sought by PR regu-
latory action (Kautto, 2006). Similarly, the framework policy
concept, discussed in the U.S. as well as that implementation in
other jurisdictions around the globe, cannot be considered a policy
tool to address all of the environmental impacts of products and
other complementary measures such as product sales or disposal
bans, material’s restrictions or other tools that may be appropriate
for particular products.
1.4. Components of a comprehensive extended producer
responsibility policy
As EPR measures for speciﬁc products are contemplated in the
U.S., several key components of a comprehensive policy are
emerging that would improve consistency if implemented by in-
dividual states. However, these components must be balanced be-
tween the articulation of sufﬁcient detail to establish expectations
for producers of designated products but also remain sufﬁciently
ﬂexible to accommodate variations between the various product
sales chains and end-of-life management systems.
The components of a comprehensive EPR policy illustrated in
Table 3 were identiﬁed from the state legislative initiatives refer-
enced in Table 4 as well as from reports for speciﬁc states such as
Minnesota (MPCA, 2009) and Rhode Island (PSI, 2010) and were
inﬂuenced by the regulation enacted in the Canadian Provinces.
Other potential provisions for a comprehensive EPR policy
include the integration of government purchasing requirements to
support markets for environmentally preferable products. A
renewed commitment to the government exerting its market
presence to reward manufacturers that have invested in sustain-
able products needs to be coupled with an emphasis on the
development of product evaluation and selection tools such as the
Electronic Product Environmental Assessment Tool (EPEAT) that is
being implemented by public entities, as well as by corporate
purchasers to identify environmentally-preferable computer
equipment (Fava et al., 2011).
While the particular components of a legislated EPR framework
may be inﬂuenced with regard to how the framework is imple-
mented at the state level, the components describe an essential
roadmap for all parties, regulated and otherwise, as to how a robust
and consistent framework can be applied. However, depending
upon the speciﬁc product and circumstances that warrant consid-
eration for EPR, other policy tools such as restrictions on disposal or
material’s bans or disclosures may be necessary as complementary
measures.
1.5. The framework approach in the United States
Inspired, in part, by the examples of the Canadian Provinces,
as well as by experience with speciﬁc product efforts, states in
the U.S. have begun to consider broader product policy frame-
works to focus and streamline policy considerations. As illus-
trated by Table 4, framework legislation has been introduced in
nine states since 2009 and was enacted in one. Several of the
legislative proposals, not only create the framework policy ar-
chitecture with the components speciﬁed above, but also identify
products to be initially addressed within the framework. Unlike
the British Columbia Recycling Regulation among other “frame-
work” regulatory tools in Canada, the “framework” policy
approach in the United States typically identiﬁes a set of speciﬁc
criteria to select products for EPR and a regulatory mechanism
for doing so.
In two states, Minnesota in 2009 and Rhode Island in 2010,
the framework bill was preceded by legislatively mandated
studies that required state environmental regulatory agencies to
conduct analyses of the issues and to provide recommendations
of policy strategies to improve the management of such
products.
The following state examples provide context and historical
background for two states identiﬁed in Table 4.
Table 4
U.S. states with legislation introduced for an extended producer responsibility framework.
State Legislatively required
study report
“Framework” bill introduction Products speciﬁed in the framework Enacted in statute
California No Yes (2009) None No
Maine No Yes (2010) None Yes
Massachusetts No Yes (2011) None No
Minnesota Yes Yes (2009) None No
New York No Yes (2011) None No
Oregon No Yes (2009) Mercury-containing lights and rechargeable batteries No
Rhode Island Yes Yes (2011) Paint, medical sharps, mattresses No
Vermont No Yes (2010) Packaging and printed paper No
Washington No Yes (2009) Included in Omnibus
Climate Change Bill
Carpet, mercury-containing-lighting, mercury-containing
thermostats, paint, and rechargeable batteries
No




As with many environmental law and policy matters, California
demonstrated a leadership role with the development of a frame-
work approach issued in 2009. Inspired by a 2006 decision to
remove the hazardous waste exemption on household hazardous
and the ensuing calls for EPR from local government, the California
Integrated Waste Management Board (CIWMB), now part of Cal
Recycle, initiated a process with signiﬁcant stakeholder input to
develop an EPR framework.
The Board’s framework articulated guiding principles, deﬁni-
tions, outlines roles and responsibilities for various parties along
the product chain and implements a priority product selection
process (CIWMB, 2009). Building on the CIWMB’s policy develop-
ment efforts, legislation to enact a statutory EPR framework was
introduced and considered, but not enacted, in 2009 (CA Assembly,
2009).
1.5.2. Maine
Embracing many of the components of an EPR framework
identiﬁed above, the Maine framework statute, An Act to Provide
Leadership Regarding the Responsible Recycling of Consumer
Products creates a process for the state agency, the Maine Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection (DEP), to identify and prioritize
candidate products using a set of criteria articulated in the statute
(Maine Legislature, 2010). The DEP is to ﬁle an annual report to the
legislature on the existing stewardship programs such as those for
waste electronics and mercury-containing lamps in the state and
may elect to recommend products for stewardship consideration.
While the statute still vests ultimate decision-making authority
with the legislature regarding whether a particular product or
material is to be regulated, the statute does require the DEP to
develop legislative proposals for products prioritized in the annual
report, an important step towards harmonizing ﬁnancing and ex-
pectations for collection infrastructure.
The ﬁrst report issued by the DEP in December 2011 identiﬁed
several products including architectural paint, unused pharma-
ceuticals, and medical sharps, for consideration (Maine DEP, 2012).
In contrast, the second report issued in 2013, did not recommend
speciﬁc products for inclusion under the statutory framework but
suggests amendments to the framework to achieve more effective
implementation (Maine DEP, 2013). Speciﬁcally, the report identi-
ﬁed producer responsibility program requirements that are not
directly required as part of the existing statute. For example, the
DEP spells out expectations for a product stewardship program
including necessary provisions for the stewardship plan, the
allowance for collective or individual company compliance and a
requirement for a collection system that is prevalent through the
state and offer collection opportunities in both urban and rural
areas.
1.6. Global examples of a comprehensive regulatory approach
The consideration of an EPR framework in the United States, as
EPR matures conceptually, is in large measure inspired by similar
policy developments and implementations in other nations, most
notably Canada. However, the producer responsibility framework
concept is applied differently in different nations as illustrated by
the following examples.
1.6.1. Australia
With the issuance of the National Waste Policy in 2009, the
Australian federal government recognized that product steward-
ship is key tool available to advance many of the goals articulated in
the Waste Policy and create a national approach to promote con-
sistency (National Waste Policy, 2009). The Department of the
Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts’ Waste Policy Task Force
speciﬁcally articulated that a broad, ﬂexible product stewardship
framework should be considered to not only advance the concept
but to create a consistent approach to addressing products such as
waste electronics and tires.
Following the direction articulated in the Waste Policy, Parlia-
ment enacted the Product Stewardship Act in June 2011 to establish
a national framework to reduce the environmental impacts of
products (Product Stewardship Act, 2011). As Lane and Watson
note, the National Waste Policy and Product Stewardship Act sug-
gests a recognition of the full lifecycle impacts of products and
packaging and suggests the need for greater engagement of all
parties from all parties along the product chain to reduce envi-
ronmental impacts (Lane and Watson, 2012).
As opposed to other broader EPR regulations, the Act creates a
three-tiered structure for PR programs by establishing guidelines
for regulated, co-regulated or voluntary approaches. Building on
the experiencewith the National Packaging Covenant that has been
in place since 1999 and its co-regulatory structure, the Act’s co-
regulatory model presents a requirement for participation on
behalf of product manufacturers but offers signiﬁcant ﬂexibility as
to how the program’s goals are attained (Lewis, 2005). The volun-
tary option provides for accreditation of programs to ensure
accountability and transparency.
The law stipulates that each year, the Ministry will publish a list
of products being considered for coverage by the legislation. Tele-
visions and computers were identiﬁed in the Act as the initial
product category. The National Television and Computer Recycling
Scheme, a co-regulatory arrangement supported by regulations
that became effective in November 2011 is the ﬁrst product to be
addressed under the Act. The Regulations require importers and
manufacturers of televisions, computers and computer products to
fund and implement recycling services for these products, and to
meet a range of requirements (Product Stewardship for Televisions
and Computers) Regulations 2011 (the Regulations).
In late 2011, the Government issued a notice that a Consultation
Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) is be prepared to consider op-
tions to improve packaging recycling and reduce litter. The
outcome of the analysis could lead to packaging being addressed as
a co-regulatory scheme under the Act.
In 2012, the Ministry issued the Product Stewardship (Voluntary
Arrangements) Instruments regulation document to fulﬁll Part 2 of
the Act that implements an accreditation process for promoting
voluntary stewardship programs (Government of Australia, 2012).
The instrument sets out the requirements and conditions for
accreditation by the Australian Government for voluntary product
stewardship arrangements.
While it is premature to evaluate the effectiveness of the
Product Stewardship Act, the policy recognizes the importance of
an intentional and structured approach to implementation of
product stewardship in Australia.
1.6.2. The European Union
While the European Union has not adopted an extended pro-
ducer responsibility framework, per se, that permits the designa-
tion of products under a common framework; the concept is
enshrined in the EU’s Community Waste Strategy. Building on the
EU’s Thematic Strategy on Waste Prevention and Recycling, the
Waste Framework Directive adopted in 2008 clearly articulates the
role that producers have in fulﬁlling the waste management ob-
jectives of the EU with Article 8 stipulating that individual member
states may take measures to ensure producer responsibility
(European Union, 2008).
The European Union has implemented producer responsibility
through the use of Directives that have been enacted for packaging,
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end of life vehicles, waste electronics and batteries (Milanez and
Biihrs, 2009) While the Directives are developed by the Commis-
sionwith adoption by the Council and the Parliament, theymust be
transposed by the 27 individual member states. As Khetriwal and
Widner have acknowledged, the implementation has been variable
(Khetriwal andWidner, 2011). Of particular relevance for the policy
dialog in the United States, the transposition by the member states,
as illustrated by Table 5 regarding the variety of implementation
strategies for the Packaging Directive, has not resulted in the
desired level of consistency that was expected.
1.7. Canada
Ranging from products such as waste electronics to pharma-
ceuticals to “blue box” curbside recyclables, the Canadian Provinces
are at the vanguard of global policymaking for EPR measures
(McKerlie et al., 2006). Responding to calls for greater consistency,
the Provincial programs are taking steps to create consistent
standards for EPR programs, harmonize their programs, and
experience industry stewardship organizations beginning to oper-
ate in multiple provinces simultaneously (CCME, 2009). The Ca-
nadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) issued a
Canada wide action plan for producer responsibility to strive for
consistency between provincial efforts with a separate document
offered for packaging and printed paper. While the “framework”
concept is prevalent throughout Canada, British Columbia and
Manitoba are highlighted as examples.
1.7.1. British Columbia
British Columbia is a leader in establishing and implementing a
ﬂexible, stewardship framework that now underpins several
stewardship programs in the province. Authorized by the statutory,
Environmental Management Act, the province has implemented a
variety of stewardship programs beginning with a regulation for
managing leftover paint in 1994 with other regulations imple-
mented soon thereafter (Driedger, 2001). The province currently
has stewardship programs in place for 18 product categories.
In an effort to move from a “product by product” approach to
one that is based upon a methodical and comprehensive steward-
ship program, the Ministry of the Environment developed an In-
dustry Product Stewardship Business Plan that was adopted in
2002. The business plan articulated a framework for the existing as
well as for new stewardship programs. The framework was based
on four principles: 1) producer/user responsibility 2) level playing
ﬁeld, 3) results-based and transparency and 4) accountability.
Following the release of the business plan, the Ministry determined
that a new regulatory model was necessary to meet the objectives
of the business.
Initially promulgated in 2004, the Province’s Recycling Regula-
tion implemented a performance-based, ﬂexible, extended pro-
ducer responsibility approach to promote consistency among the
stewardship programs (Deathe and McDonald, 2008). Most
notably, the regulation presents the legal framework, program
principles and schedules for product categories to be used for
creating industry-led stewardship programs. The regulation out-
lines the requirements for a stewardship plan including how a 75
percent recovery rate will be attained as well as addresses the need
for stakeholder consultation and the roles of the Ministry (Bury,
2010). The regulation replaced the Beverage Container Product
Stewardship Program Regulation and Post-Consumer Residual
Stewardship Program Regulation with those programs now func-
tioning under the broader regulation.
Since the Province’s extended producer responsibility programs
were folded into the framework of the recycling regulation, several
other products including electronic products in 2006, tires in 2007
and batteries in 2009 have been added. The regulation for elec-
tronic products is notable since it established a comprehensive ﬁve-
phase schedule of products that also included products such as
lighting equipment and batteries, two products typically addressed
separately in the U.S. In 2011, the Ministry designated packaging
and printed-paper for EPR under the recycling regulation with a
2014 program implementation date.
1.7.2. Case study of mercury-containing lamps producer
responsibility program in British Columbia
To illustrate the application of the implementation of the
Recycling Regulation in British Columbia, the program for lamps
and lighting equipment is examined. The stewardship organization
‘s LightRecycle program demonstrates a producer-led initiative
demonstrates the signiﬁcant ﬂexibility inherent within the Prov-
ince’s Recycling Regulation and reﬂects the “framework” concept
described above.
1.7.3. Regulatory context
The British Columbia Ministry of the Environment issued a
statement in 2008 indicating the intention to add mercury-
containing lamps to the schedule of products addressed by the
Recycling Regulation. A stewardship programwas required to be in
place by July 1, 2010 for household compact ﬂuorescent lamps
(CFLs) and ﬂuorescent tubes.
Recognizing that ﬂuorescent lamp and lighting equipment
collection options needed to be available for all generators, the BC
Recycling Regulation also stipulated a requirement in Schedule 3 of
the regulation to expand the types of lamps included, commercially
generated lamps, as well as speciﬁed lighting equipment including
such as ﬁxtures and ballasts. A plan recognizing the program
expansionwas prepared by Product Care and issued to the Ministry
on October 1, 2011 and subsequently approved in April 2012 with
an implementation date of October 1, 2012 (Product Care, 2012).
1.7.4. Stewardship plan
The LightRecycle program exempliﬁes the prevailing trend of
producer responsibility programs in British Columbia, that of
producer-led with few prescriptive regulatory requirements. While
the Regulation permits companies to fulﬁll the regulatory re-
quirements on an individual basis, all of the manufacturers of
lighting equipment subject to the regulation in British Columbia are
participating in an industry-wide compliance organization. The
regulation does not prescribe the governance, cost structure or
program management of the stewardship organization but does
recognize the value of engagement of other stakeholders, either
formally though representation on the governing board or in
advisory role.
Table 5
The primary taxonomy of EU packaging programs.
Policy mechanism Member state examples
Packaging taxes Denmark
Tradable credits United Kingdom, Poland
Dual model (Full responsibility
for industry for collection, sorting
and recycling; separate collection
system besides collection by local
authorities, limited inﬂuence from
local authorities)
Germany, Austria
Shared model (Shared responsibility
between industry and local authorities,
common agreements on the way
of collection necessary)
France, Spain, Czech Republic
Source: Joachim Quoden, PRO Europe (2011).
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In response to the regulation, the Electrical Equipment Manu-
facturers Association of Canada (EEMAC) steered the development
of the BC Fluorescent Lamps Stewardship Plan as required. EEMAC
retained the Product Care Association, a stewardship organization
that has been operating producer responsibility programs in the
Province since 1997, was to manage and operate the program. The
plan was jointly submitted by EEMAC on behalf of six lamp man-
ufacturers and Product Care by January 1, 2010 with an expected
duration of ﬁve years.
The plan was approved by the Ministry in March 2010 to enable
implementation by the July 1, 2010 deadline.
Section ﬁve of the Recycling Regulation outlines the speciﬁc
program components that are to be addressed by the stewardship
plan. The regulation stipulates that the plan must detail the
collection system and opportunities for consumer access, identify a
recovery rate, indicate how program costs will be managed and
speciﬁes the steps to manage environmental impacts among other
requirements (BC Ministry of the Environment, 2012).
To ensure identiﬁcation of potential implementation challenges
through the solicitation of input from interested stakeholders, a
central component of the planning development process and
speciﬁed in the Recycling Regulation, is the consultation process.
The essential consultation process, akin to administrative rule-
making in the U.S., is managed by the stewardship organization.
In keeping with the ﬂexibility inherent in the regulation and
consistent with the other EPR programs in the Canadian Provinces,
the ﬁnancial responsibility of the industry members is fulﬁlled
through the use of eco-fees that are remitted to Product Care based
on type of product and unit sales. As Bury and others have noted,
the question of eco-fee visibility is debated, and in accordance with
the lack of a requirement for visibility or eco-fee included pricing in
the Recycling Regulation, the fee may or may not be visible to
consumers (Bury, 2010).
The fees for the ﬁrst program year ranged from $0.20 per ﬂuo-
rescent tubes that two feet or less to $0.40 for those tubes greater
than four feet. However, starting in October 2011, the fees were
decreased for compact ﬂuorescent lamps while increasing for tubes
greater than two feet.
The program plan does not make a distinction between current,
orphan or historic products, thus providing an ‘end-of-life’ man-
agement system regardless of whether the manufacturer of a lamp
still exists or is no longer manufacturing that product.
To support one of the objectives of EPR, that of reducing lifecycle
impacts of products, the Recycling Regulation stipulates that the
plan identify design for environment strategies. In the case of the
program plan for lamps and lighting equipment, Product Care
provides a summary of the constituent materials of lamps and
lighting equipment as well as acknowledges the extension of the
lifespan of several of the products but does not specify speciﬁc
design for environment objectives or targets (Product Care, 2012).
Much of the program plan is devoted to the program’s perfor-
mance measures and targets. Reﬂecting the Recycling Regulation’s
requirement for stewardship programs to achieve a 75 percent
recovery goal to be achieved, the plan outlines the collection
methods as well as the annual performance goals that will
benchmark progress towards meeting the required targets.
1.7.5. Program performance
Since the implementation of the program, now branded as
LightRecycle, on July 1, 2010, the program members has expanded
beyond the six foundingmembers to include other brand owners as
well as retailers and distributors.
Given the longer lifespan of lighting products, Product Care
departs from calculating a traditional recycling rate to instead using
a capture rates that is based on units collected relative to what is
available for collection based on the traditional lifespan of a product
during a speciﬁed timeframe.
The capture rate goals contained in the stewardship plan ranged
from an initial ten to twelve percent during the ﬁrst six months of
the program and escalating to between 40 and 75 percent for 2015
(Product Care, 2012). LightRecycle’s network of 165 collection op-
portunities is dominated by 145 retail locations with only nine
municipal facilities participating in the program (Product Care,
2011).
The LightRecycle program in British Columbia, while clearly
recognizing the existence of product-speciﬁc attributes and
differing collection and recycling needs for lamps and lighting
equipment, shares many of the same program elements as the
other regulated producer responsibility initiatives in the province.
The similarities between the EPR programs reﬂect the thematic
elements of the Recycling Regulation, most notably the emphasis
on producer developed and managed programs and the Ministry of
the Environment with an oversight and, if necessary, compliance
and enforcement role.
1.7.6. Manitoba
The Waste Reduction and Prevention Act (WRAP) enacted in
1994, provides the statutory support for product stewardship reg-
ulations in Manitoba (Manitoba, 1994). The ﬁrst stewardship pro-
gram to move forward in the province assessed a two-cent levy on
beverage containers to ﬁnance the collection and recycling of “blue
box” materials (Quinn and Sinclair, 2006). The province is moving
forward with a suite of product stewardship regulations under the
WRAP Act addressing household hazardous waste, packaging and
printed paper and waste electronics. The ﬁrst of these programs,
packaging and printed paper, was implemented in 2010.
2. Conclusion
The burgeoning interest of state policymakers in EPR illustrates
not only the increasing interest in innovative policy tools to address
the environmental impacts of products, but also reinforces the
argument for a cohesive approach that promotes consistency and
efﬁciency of producer responsibility measures. Given the experi-
ence to date, an opportunity exists for policymakers to enact
broader EPR measures that lessen the likelihood that other prod-
ucts will face a similar fate of inconsistent and divergent state
regulations now confronting the electronics industry. The current
approach, whereby, products are addressed on a case-by-case basis
and outside of a broader, more systematic approach, is not sus-
tainable and will create substantial additional transaction costs for
all of the players along the product chain.
The trend of product-speciﬁc regulations by states is certain to
accelerate as climate change, environmental health considerations
and state and local budget constraints rise on the public agenda.
The challenge facing state policymakers is how to develop a
coherent, systemic approach for EPR that recognizes ﬂexibility for
regulated parties yet promotes efﬁciency and consistency that
transcend the current trend of disparate state efforts. This challenge
is even greater given that a national imprimatur, which may be
necessary to achieve a truly uniform approach in the U.S., is unlikely
in the near term. While the “framework” approach certainly does
not guarantee uniformity among states, it offers the greater likeli-
hood that, not only are state-speciﬁc EPR programs addressing
products more consistently, but that industry developed and
managed stewardship programs can be implemented in multiple
states. Given the obstacles confronting the creation of a new body
of environmental law at the federal level, the framework concept
offers a vehicle for achieving greater national consistency for EPR
efforts.
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While the “framework” concept is seated within the U.S. envi-
ronmental regulatory architecture, it draws heavily from global EPR
policy precedents, particularly from the Canadian provinces. With a
recognition that several of the framework components may be
solely germane to the U.S., the overall policy approach may have
resonance in other jurisdictions as EPR becomes further embedded
in environmental policy strategy.
The framework is designed to not only increase recycling rates
but to lead to a productive dialog regarding an overall materials
management strategy such as that suggested by a recent report by
US EPA, promoting effective policy based on resource conservation
and sustainability (U.S. EPA, 2009). With increasing demands
globally, for resources, recycling and management of discarded
products will play an increasing role in maintaining U.S. economic
competitiveness and to take advantage of strengths in product
innovation and the development of market opportunities such as
moving from products to producteservice combinations.
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Chapter 7 addressed research question 3 (What are the existing models of governance of EPR 
programs that are functioning and how might these models be optimized to improve performance 
of programs?)  
 
As illustrated in Chapter 5, the question of the allocation of responsibilities among the actors 
along the product chain and, in particular, the extent of program flexibility accorded to producers 
to design and operate programs to fulfill the legal requirements varies substantially across 
jurisdictions. An exploration of the governance of EPR programs illuminated the tensions that are 
often present within EPR such as the desire to inject a greater emphasis on private governance 
models while at the same time recognizing the historical responsibilities of local authorities for 
managing products at EOL.  
 
The comparative analysis of programs in the United States and Canada in Chapter 4 highlighted 
the producer-led EPR program planning approach common in the Canadian provinces that 
allocates significant responsibilities to producers for the construction and operation of EPR 
programs. The following article analyzed the approaches to governance of EPR programs in 
Canada through the use of case studies and then constructed a typology of governance 
mechanisms of EPR programs. 
Hickle, G. T. (2014). An examination of governance within extended producer responsibility 












Schneeweiss, J., 2006. Proper packaging planning: do we need a federal law? Vir-
ginia Environmental Law Journal 15, 443e446.
Scheijgrond, J.W., 2011. Extending producer responsibility up and down the supply
chain, challenges and limitation. Waste Management & Research 29 (9), 911e
918.
Silveira, G., Chang, S., 2011. Fluorescent lamp recycling initiatives in the United States
and a recycling proposal based on extended producer responsibility and product
stewardship concepts. Waste Management and Research 29 (6), 656e668.
U.S. Department of Commerce Ofﬁce of Technology Policy, 2006. Recycling Tech-
nology Products: an Overview of E-waste Policy Issues. Available from: http:
www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd57/recycling/intro.pdf (accessed March 2012).
U.S Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), 2009. Sustainable Materials Man-
agement: the Road Ahead. Available from: http://www.epa.gov/smm/pdf/
vision2.pdf.
U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce. (GAO), 2010. Considerations for Promoting
Environmentally Sound Reuse and Recycling GAO-10-626. Available from:
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-626 (accessed March 2012).
Weinberg, D., 2008. Going Greenwith Product Stewardship. Associations Now. May.
Available from: http://www.asaecenter.org/Resources/ANowDetail.cfm?Item
Number¼34066 (accessed March 2012).
Garth T. Hickle is the product stewardship team leader with the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency (MPCA). He is also a Senior Lecturer at the University of Minnesota. He
holds a B.A. from the College of Wooster, an M.S.E.L. from Vermont Law School, an M.A.
from Hamline University and is currently pursuing a PhD in Cleaner Production,
Cleaner Products, Industrial Ecology & Sustainability at Erasmus University in the
Netherlands.
G.T. Hickle / Journal of Cleaner Production 64 (2014) 266e276276
58
Chapter 6




Chapter 7: An Examination of Governance within Extended Producer 




Chapter 7 addressed research question 3 (What are the existing models of governance of EPR 
programs that are functioning and how might these models be optimized to improve performance 
of programs?)  
 
As illustrated in Chapter 5, the question of the allocation of responsibilities among the actors 
along the product chain and, in particular, the extent of program flexibility accorded to producers 
to design and operate programs to fulfill the legal requirements varies substantially across 
jurisdictions. An exploration of the governance of EPR programs illuminated the tensions that are 
often present within EPR such as the desire to inject a greater emphasis on private governance 
models while at the same time recognizing the historical responsibilities of local authorities for 
managing products at EOL.  
 
The comparative analysis of programs in the United States and Canada in Chapter 4 highlighted 
the producer-led EPR program planning approach common in the Canadian provinces that 
allocates significant responsibilities to producers for the construction and operation of EPR 
programs. The following article analyzed the approaches to governance of EPR programs in 
Canada through the use of case studies and then constructed a typology of governance 
mechanisms of EPR programs. 
Hickle, G. T. (2014). An examination of governance within extended producer responsibility 













Resources, Conservation and Recycling 92 (2014) 55–65
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Resources, Conservation and Recycling
journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate / resconrec
Review
An examination of governance within extended producer
responsibility policy regimes in North America
Garth T. Hickle ∗
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), 520 Lafayette Rd., St. Paul, MN 651-757-2434, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 28 February 2014
Received in revised form 15 August 2014







a b s t r a c t
Extended producer responsibility seeks to integrate environmental impacts into the product lifecycle
and achieve greater economic efﬁciencies in the management of products at end of life. For such inte-
gration to be actualized, however, producers may need to be accorded greater programmatic authority
and ﬂexibility than is often in some EPR policies that stipulate deﬁned roles for other entities along the
product chain. The proper allocation of responsibility among the parties and, in particular, the roles of the
producers and local authorities remains a principal component of EPR policy construction. The analysis
outlines four broad categories of ﬁnancial and programmatic responsibility that currently reside within
EPR programs in North America. The article concludes with recommendations for a research agenda to
further deﬁne the governance characteristics that result in effective and efﬁcient EPR programs.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
As extended producer responsibility (EPR) is applied to a greater
number of products in an expanding number of jurisdictions, the
question of governance, the processes and decisions grant power
and deﬁne actions, and the proper allocation of responsibilities
amongst key parties in EPR policy regimes is receiving greater
scrutiny. To further the objectives of EPR beyond simply existing
as a tool that transfers a ﬁnancial obligation from municipalities
to brand owners and achieving the internalization of environmen-
tal costs, the identiﬁcation and evaluation of effective governance
strategies is crucial.
As is frequently referenced, the changing, more complex
nature of environmental problems necessitates not only innova-
tive strategies, regulatory and otherwise, but also necessitates new
governancemechanisms that, in the caseofwastemanagementand
recycling, engage amultiplicity of actors including producers, local
authorities, recyclers, and global commoditymarkets (Agrawal and
Lemos, 2007). The diffuse supply chains for materials and products
are indicative of the trend of globalization and not only require
greater interaction among actors along the supply chain but neces-
sitate a governance model that that departs from the prevailing
public authority model that is in place today. Extended producer
responsibility is an environmental policy tool that is illustrative
of a governance mechanism that reﬂects many of the attributes
associated with the conceptualization of private environmental
governance, an approach to governance that is led in largemeasure
by private actors.
The further deﬁnition of enabling private governance mecha-
nisms within EPR may be critical if the policy tool is to achieve
the vision of producer responsibility of creating informed decision-
making and robust feedback throughout the product lifecycle. As
Kalimo and colleagues (2012) observe, such full authority,whereby
the producer needs the autonomy to fulﬁll the regulatory objec-
tives and responsibility for their costs, may be necessary if EPR
is to fully achieve the envisioned objective of stimulating product
design for environment activities by ﬁrms. While there are a myr-
iad of governance models within the context of EPR ranging from
the ﬁrm level to governance structure within collective compli-
ance organizations, this analysis focuses on the diverse approaches
to allocation of responsibility, often stipulated through regulation,
between producers and governmental authorities.
While a substantive body of literature exists that examines
the changing nature of governance for a range of environmen-
tal governance, voluntary environmental management activities
by private actors such as those engaged in product standards
and certiﬁcation programs such as the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC), has dominated the research. The governance of EPR pro-
grams has not received such scrutiny, in part due to, as Lane
and Watson (2012) assert, that producer responsibility derives
legitimacy from government rather than non-governmental orga-
nizations. However, extended producer responsibility occupies a
hybrid governance structure or “mixed regime” as conceptualized
by Falkner (2003). Under an EPR policy regime, a legislative body or
regulatory authority imposes ﬁnancial and often performance obli-
gations on producers for the collection and recycling of products
but the program design and management is conducted by produc-
ers, often realized through producer responsibility organizations
(PRO), an illustration of the model of self-organization by produc-
ers. Despite the hybrid nature of governance for EPR programs, an
analysis of the role, function and challenges facing producers in EPR
regimes borrow heavily from the literature of private environmen-
tal governance.
The analysis examines the role of private governance within
EPR and develops a typology for characterizing differing gover-
nance models under EPR. The paper outlines the allocation of
responsibilities often assumed by principal parties under an EPR
regime and follows with a discussion of how “private governance”
is illustrated within EPR and identiﬁes how this departs from
the prevailing municipal service model. Finally, a structure and
recommendations for evaluationand future researchare suggested.
2. Overview of producer responsibility
Extended producer responsibility is a policy tool that extends
up and down the product chain and is intended to internalize the
environmental costs of products and materials thus spurring the
design for greener products with a smaller environmental foot-
print (Dubois, 2012). EPR seeks to embedwithin private enterprise
the responsibility for the design and implementation of strate-
gies for the collection, transportation and processing of discarded
products. By transitioning the ‘end-of-life’ management costs to
producers frommunicipalities, an incentive is created forproducers
toachievegreatereconomicefﬁciencies throughout the life-cycleof
their products fromproduct and service design through the ‘end-of
life’ management system. This enhanced efﬁciency in the con-
text of ‘end-of-life’ management can be achieved through greater
consistency across jurisdictions, product design changes to facili-
tate end-of-lifemanagement and investments in infrastructure and
technology as well as via public outreach and education efforts.
Extended producer responsibility can be characterized as
embracing an innovative strategy that is a public policy strategy
that builds on corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities while
recognizing the institutional barriers that create limitations for the
local governmental model.
Extended producer responsibility functions as a remedy for the
ineffectivenessof government, either actual orperceived to address
problemswith signiﬁcant economic and social features (Buclet and
Godard, 2001). Speciﬁcally, EPR is a policy reaction to the lim-
itations of local government funded and administered recycling
initiatives to achieve sustained and effective programs and as well
as the inability of these efforts to spur producers to implement
design for environment activities and product service strategies.
As Kroepelien (2000) noted, EPR through the engagement of direct
market actors may result in a fundamental rearrangement of the
institutional relationship between public authorities and produc-
ers.
Extended producer responsibility is promoted as a market-
based, life-cycle-oriented instrument that is positioned to be
more effective than traditional “command and control” regula-
tory measures to address the environmental impacts, including
end of life management, posed by the product chain in today’s
globalized economy. While the traditional regulatory model often
has limited capacity to address environmental externalities (Esty,
1999), market-based instruments are designed to promote the
internalization of these externalities (OECD, 2007). By engaging in
themarketplace, EPR often results in the institutional realignments
of both private and public sector actors (Kroepelien, 2000). The
policy emphasis on mitigating externalities as well as the engage-
ment of non-state actors in governance falls within the ecological
modernization theoretical framework (Sonnenfeld andMol, 2002).
Producer responsibility, while instituted in policy measures
in Europe starting in the early 1990s, most recognizably with the
German Packaging Ordinance in 1991, is now embraced globally,
particularly for packaging and waste electronics (Sachs, 2006).
Typically, producer responsibility regulatory measures are imple-
mented by one or more producer responsibility organizations
(PROs), often referred to, as stewardship organizations in the
North American context, that are the organizational vehicles for
producers to execute the regulatory requirements. However, the
formation and operation of PROs has garnered scrutiny from com-
petition authorities and often necessitated a legislative response,
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particularly in the U.S., to facilitate their functioning through
exemption from state competitive conduct laws.
While EPR is premised on the integration of ﬁnancial respon-
sibility for managing products at end of life into a ﬁrm’s business
model, it also invites a systematic reframing as to the speciﬁc allo-
cationof roles and responsibilities, not only betweenproducers and
municipal government but also between producers themselves,
principally through the participation in PROs. Despite the common
thread of ﬁnancial responsibility, albeit varying levels, borne by
producers, EPR policies differ dramatically in terms of the level of
prescription and role for various actors along the product chain.
3. Common allocation of responsibilities within EPR
Roles and responsibilities are typically assigned tobrandowners
and others along the product chain through EPR regulatory instru-
ments. Typically, the regulatory action occurs at the national level
with the exception of the United States and Canada wherein state
and provincial policymaking are dominant. While EPR shifts the
ﬁnancial responsibility, either wholly or partially, for end of life
management of products to producers, the regulatory regimes
often acknowledge, and in some cases directly codify, a role for
other entities including municipalities to achieve public policy
outcomes. This allocation of responsibilities directly impacts the
decision-making structure and thus governance of EPR programs.
A fundamental tension often present within the allocation of
responsibilities within EPR is the desire of producers to operate
with more programmatic authority but being simultaneously cau-
tious about assuming the full ﬁnancial responsibility that such
authority often demands. Despite the broad acknowledgement of
the imperative for programmatic ﬂexibility for producers (Ontario,
2009; Massarutto, 2014; Nash and Bosso, 2013), this is often ham-
pered by local political circumstances and existing relationships
among key institutional players such as waste management ﬁrms
and commodity processors.
The following section offers a brief synopsis of the roles and
responsibilities that can be assumed by the principal parties under
an EPR regulatory regime. The description illustrates the diver-
sity of requirements within and among EPR programs and their
prescribed interaction between these relevant parties.
3.1. Producers
Producers, sometimes deﬁned as brand owners, serve as the
entities charged with the primary, if not sole, responsibility for
ﬁnancing the collection, transportation and recycling of discarded
products. The operational responsibility, also referred to as func-
tional responsibility, refers to theprogrammatic tasks forwhich the
producers are responsible (Kalimo et al., 2012). These tasks may
be fulﬁlled by individual companies, if an individual compliance
option is available through the regulatory model, but are generally
fulﬁlled through participation in a PRO. In many cases, the regu-
latory mechanism allows for either individual responsibility or to
facilitate producer cooperation, collective responsibility.
3.2. Retailers
Retailers may have speciﬁed responsibilities within EPR pro-
grams such as serving as collection entities for discarded products.
For example, such collection is required by the European Union’s
WEEE Directive (Khetriwal et al., 2011) or for home appliances in
Japan (Wagner et al., 2013). Even if not a regulatory requirement,
voluntary retail collection efforts for products addressed under EPR
are expanding, often reinforced by the ﬁrm’s broader sustainability
initiatives (Dauvergne and Lister, 2012).
In some jurisdictions, such as in several of the Canadian
Provinces, retailers when serving as a “ﬁrst importer” for products
may serve as the obligated entity on behalf of producers (Quinn
and Sinclair, 2006). Retailers, particularly in the context of EPR
in the U.S. often play an important compliance function through
implementation of a “do not sell” provision that stipulates that
only products offered by compliant producers may be sold (Hickle,
2013a). Retailers may also be required to provide information to
customers with regard to the available collection opportunities for
a particular product.
3.3. Regulatory authority
The regulatory authority, at the national or, as in the case in the
United States and Canada, the sub national level, is charged with
providing overall oversight of the program including responsibility
for ensuring compliance and, if warranted, initiating enforcement
actions.
Additional responsibilities may include registration of partici-
patingproducers, reviewandapproval of a programplan submitted
by individual producers or a PRO. In a few examples, the regu-
latory entity assumes a more substantive role that may include
selection of vendors as well as setting of fees. In some instances,
the authority may be actively engaged in establishing the ﬁnancial
terms for theprogram. For example, theConnecticutDepartment of
Environmental Protection is charged with the selection of eligible
recyclers and authoring acceptable rates (Connecticut Legislature,
2007).
3.4. Municipalities
Municipalities, the organizational actors that have traditionally
organized, managed and often directly provided recycling service,
have historically been presumed to serve a “crucial” function in
EPR programs frequently continue in that role under EPR programs
(OECD, 2001). As noted by Cahill and Grimes in their analysis of the
role of local authorities in EPR programs in the European Union,
there is a signiﬁcant diversity as to whether the municipalities
retain physical and, in some cases, some degree of ﬁnancial respon-
sibility for household generated packaging and waste electronics
(Cahill et al., 2011).
The municipal role in service provision, depending upon the
jurisdiction and the product, is sometimes mandated under the
regulatory regime as in Spain where the collection of WEEE
in cities with 5000 or greater residents is the responsibility of
the local authorities (Queiruga, 2012). Under the legislation in
France implementing the EU Directive on Packaging and Pack-
aging Waste, while producers are responsible for 80% of costs
borne by local authorities, the authorities are designated as
providers of collection services for waste packaging (da Cruz et al.,
2013).
The EPR regulation for the packaging program in Quebec retains
themunicipal role of providing servicewith theproducers compen-
sating themunicipalities for collection. Similarly, theEPRstatute for
waste electronics in the State of Maine assigns municipalities with
the responsibility to provide for the collection and transport mate-
rial to consolidation points (Wagner, 2009). In other circumstances,
municipalities may choose to participate on a voluntary basis as
well as serve as an important in providing information to residents
regarding available collection opportunities. In recognition of the
traditional role of municipalities for providing education to con-
stituents about waste management, EPR regulatory mechanisms,
such as the law for waste electronics in the State of Washington,
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3.5. Consumers
Consumers, while generally not subject to speciﬁc legal require-
ments under EPR, are instrumental to the effectiveness of the
program. In a few instances, such as the Act for Recycling of Speci-
ﬁed Kinds of Home Appliances in Japan, consumers pay a fee when
the product is collected for recycling (Aizawa et al., 2008). If a ban
on the disposal of a particular product or material is in place, con-
sumers are to ensure that these products or materials must be
collected for recycling or otherwise managed outside of the waste
destined for disposal.
While the speciﬁc legal requirements assigned to the produc-
ers, retailers and local authorities vary widely depending upon the
particular jurisdiction and the circumstances of the product, the
producer’s assumption of responsibilities under EPR, both ﬁnancial
and operational, requires the development of self-organizational
strategies, many of which are prominent within the conceptual
framework of private environmental governance.
Fundamental to the transference of decision-making and oper-
ational responsibilities from the public sector to private actors is
the direct impact on the existing institutional relations and enti-
ties including how to address existing infrastructure, contracts and
ultimately, the loss of control and potential employment built on
the prevailing system.
4. Description of the current governance model for
residential recycling
Intrinsic within the policy rationale for EPR is not only an
acknowledgment of market-based instruments as a strategy for
achieving improved environmental outcomes, but also that trans-
forming the governance of collection and recycling programs may
be necessary to achieve signiﬁcant advances in material recov-
ery. This, of course, departs from the current role of municipalities
in ensuring collection and recycling services, a historical out-
growth of the responsibility for ensuring sanitation (Vergara and
Tchobanoglous, 2012) and then an emphasis on diverting mate-
rials from landﬁlls, varies but generally falls within two options,
either directly providing collection or contracting for service with
a waste management company (Kollikkathara et al., 2009).
Reﬂecting upon the historical role of municipalities in solid
waste management, local and regional governmental entities may
also operate facilities for processing of collected products and com-
modity materials. As Louis (2004) notes, the emphasis on locally
centered decision-making is essentially the same since its waste
management originated. Local governments are responsible for
not only arranging recycling opportunities for their citizens but
also providing education, program analysis, evaluation and proper
reporting for that jurisdiction.
Residential recycling in theU.S. ismarked by a pronounced level
of decentralization as evidenced by 9000 curbside programs for
packaging and paper materials (U.S. EPA, 2013). This scenario con-
tributes to a disaggregated system that has resulted in a lack of
coherence in the collection and processing system for recyclable
materials and has resulted in signiﬁcant variability of recycling
rates. Speciﬁcally, a collection and recycling system premised on
local governmental decision-making results in a signiﬁcant vari-
ability of materials being collected in programs across the U.S. thus
rendering a cohesive public education strategy virtually impracti-
cable. This localized decision-making persists despite the overall
globalization, concentration and privatization that has dominated
the waste management industry over the past several decades
(O’Neill, 2001). This disaggregation results in a signiﬁcant fragmen-
tation of markets and poses signiﬁcant challenges for the ability to
collect data and permit the meaningful comparisons of programs
(Tonjes and Greene, 2012).
While someU.S. states, for example,may provide someﬁnancial
support for local government recycling activities aswell as, in some
cases require speciﬁc requirements suchas “opportunity to recycle”
and reporting, the ﬁnancing and governance of recycling is diffuse
with decision-making seated at the community level (Folz, 1999).
However, given that municipal provision of curbside recycling is
often motivated by constituent demand rather than by economic
decision-making, assessing the full costs of municipal waste man-
agement is often challenging (Bohm et al., 2010).
Local governments, while providing critical services that can-
not be performed by private actors, have been characterized as
non-rational economic actors thus inhibiting the most efﬁcient
approach to reducing the environmental impact of products and in
creating circumstances to achieve a truly closed economic model.
This is, in part, driven by the local political overlay that is infused
in the decision-making process and often trumps establishment of
program that prioritizes commodity supply and demand.
The reliance on municipal funding mechanisms often results in
an undercapitalized system with a generally stable ﬁnancing sys-
tem that does not reﬂect the dynamism in the marketplace and
is unable to deploy technology for enhanced collection, sorting
and processing. The outcome of the current approach is reﬂected
in stagnant recycling rates and lack of incentives for internalizing
externalities and ensuring that end of life considerations are ﬁrmly
embedded in design choices.
As Bulkeley et al. (2007) concluded, asmunicipalwastemanage-
ment hasmigrated from an early emphasis on disposal to diversion
to broader conceptual frameworks as resource conservation, the
number of system actors hasmultiplied thus challenging themode
of governance dominated by local authorities. A particular chal-
lenge facing theprevailingdecentralized systemis the lackof ability
to broadly spur waste prevention and, ultimately, product design
choices by producers (Deutz et al., 2010).
Extended producer responsibility offers a potential pathway,
but not the sole strategy, if the intent of policymakers is to
“rationalize” the current system of locally-managed programs and
consolidate decision-making. This consolidation is necessary to
promote greater uniformity of practices and achieve greater envi-
ronmental outcomes.
5. Private environmental governance
While there is no consensus deﬁnition or ﬁrm typological
categorization of private governance, the maxim of “governance
without government” is often applied to decision-making and
implementation activities assumed by non-state actors (Vogel,
2008). Roberts (2011) offered a typology of private governance
institutions that illustrate many characteristics that are often at
play with producer responsibility.
The framework of private environmental governance builds on
the description of environmental governance as a broad suite of
political, economic and social factors that determine the relation-
ship among actors and the environment (Levy and Newell, 2005).
Private environmental governance recognizes that the state is not
the sole entity responsible or functionally able to address societal
challenges and the imperative to broaden the scope of organiza-
tions engaged in governance (Trubek and Trubek, 2007) and, in
particular, the operative role of non-governmental organizations
(Driessen et al., 2012).
Private environmental governance emerged in tandemwith the
consideration of market-based instruments in 1980s and 1990s
that represent a broad range of strategies such as taxes, subsi-
dies, standards and certiﬁcation tools, tradable credits as well as
voluntaryagreements (Jordanet al., 2003). Support forprivate envi-
ronmental governance has also increased due to ﬁscal pressures
facing traditional governmental actors (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006).
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However, as Cramer (2013) indicated, the transition to governance
from the traditional hierarchical model is less prevalent than often
cited.
Private environmental governance is often reﬂected in environ-
mental standard and certiﬁcations and other private rulemaking
initiatives. In the context of global activities, Vogel (2010) asserts
that a form of private governance, civil regulation or private rule-
making, is established norms that are distinct from traditional
self-regulatory action. However, as Vogel (2010) observed, these
private regulatory measures may be integrated into regulatory
measures. As Falkner (2003) observes, policymaking when applied
to EPR will be increasingly deﬁned by a “public–private nexus.”
Baron and Lyon (2011) recognized that there is a growing role
for corporate partnerships with non-governmental organizations
in environmental governance and for related efforts to support
reputational goals.
The emergence of private environmental governance can be
traced to a range of contributing factors such as CSR as well as
recognition of the failure of government to act or adequately ful-
ﬁll their responsibilities andbroaderdissatisfactionwith regulatory
approaches (Jordan et al., 2003). As Lemos andAgrawal (2006) have
noted, a broadening of the actors executing governance beyond the
state is characterized by a decentralization of environmental gov-
ernance. New governance models have emerged in tandem with
recognitionof complex, interrelated and, oftenglobal, environmen-
tal challenges (Giljum et al., 2005).
Signiﬁcant attention has been devoted to private environmen-
tal governance structures in the international context, particularly
regarding transnational ﬁrms (Pattberg, 2004). More speciﬁcally,
the governance of carbon offsets (Bumpus et al., 2010) and prod-
uct standards and certiﬁcations, with most, an examination of the
certiﬁcations of forest practices (Pattberg, 2005).
In contrast to the voluntary market efforts that rely on indi-
vidual participation by motivated ﬁrms and that operate generally
without legal sanctions, with a few exceptions, EPR functions as
a policy hybrid that is underpinned by regulatory measures that
is built upon features of a market-based instrument with produc-
ers assuming responsibility and thus management for achieving
the goals and objectives. This hybrid, framed by Boons (2008) as
an interaction between self-government and external control, is
embedded within EPR. While the degree of ﬁnancial responsibility
varies according to individual jurisdiction and product or mate-
rial addressed by the EPR regulation, the question of the nexus
between ﬁnancial responsibility and programmatic authority is
increasingly being raised as EPR matures. The analysis of the ques-
tion is being broadened to determine how EPR can more broadly
achieve the environmental goals beyond simply increasing collec-
tion and recycling of certain products and materials.
Several examples of nominally regulated environmental gov-
ernance mechanisms have emerged in the context of EPR. Most
notably is the collaborative nature of voluntary agreements or
covenants as notably demonstrated by the Dutch Packaging
Covenants that implementedproducer responsibility for packaging
waste from 1992 to 2005 (Rouw and Worrell, 2011) or the vol-
untary and co-regulatory measures envisioned under the Product
Stewardship Act in Australia (Lane and Watson, 2012).
6. Intersection of private governance and EPR
The governance of a particular EPR program reﬂects the pol-
icy intent and, speciﬁcally, the allocation of responsibilities among
the various actors embedded in the regulatory mechanism. The
approach to governance is usually determined by the political
context of a particular jurisdiction. By aligning with the conceptu-
alization of governance as a multi-actor approach, EPR functions
within the market as an agent focused instrument (Lemos and
Agrawal, 2006). Despite the emphasis on the role of brand owners
in EPR programs, the role of government and, in particular munic-
ipalities, as market participants varies signiﬁcantly across the
globe and, in some instances, is central to the functioning of the
program (Cahill et al., 2011). In an analysis of environmental gov-
ernance in the Netherlands, Driessen et al. (2012) observed that
EPR can be construed as a public-private partnership. Jacobs and
Subramanian (2012) argue that a sharing of responsibilities might
lead to improved program outcomes.
With the assumption of ﬁnancial responsibility for brand
owners and the corresponding acknowledgement of need for
integration into the business model that is inherent in the EPR
policy model, this internalization of costs requires a ﬂexible,
non-prescriptive set of operational requirements. Further, this
imbedded ﬁnancial obligation naturally leads to brand owners
assuming programmatic responsibility, although the degree of
their responsibility may be circumscribed by regulatory require-
ments that, for example, impose obligations on other parties such
as retailers or engage public authorities as a direct market partic-
ipant in the program as illustrated by several examples in Section
8.
Extended producer responsibility may result in a direct trans-
fer of some speciﬁc roles of government to private entities. This
“blurring of boundaries” either implicitly or as a regulatory require-
ment recognizes that a variety of actors may be better positioned
to perform certain tasks (Solomon, 2010). While this is generally
conceived of solely in terms of ﬁnancing and program delivery,
program analysis and other responsibilities typically reserved for
governments are being assumed by PROs. For example, PROs,while
not carrying the enforcement authority of state actors, do directly
solicit and encourage participation in the organization in an effort
to discourage “free-riders” (Fleckinger and Glachant, 2010). Legis-
lation for products, most speciﬁcally for batteries, in the U.S. has
also been considered that provides for a “private right of action”
that would enable a PRO to take legal action against non-compliant
brandowners to recoup funds for properlymanaging their products
(Nash and Bosso, 2013). Other functions that are typically assumed
by government include program reporting and “soft” tasks such
as education and outreach and program evaluation as well as the
development of recommendations for regulatory changes.
For those EPR regulations that stipulate development of a
program plan, producers are frequently required to conduct a con-
sultation process to receive input from diverse stakeholders as to
how the program should function. Such producer-led stakeholder
engagement efforts are often designed tomirror the administrative
rulemaking function of state actors (Hickle, 2013b).
The assumption of responsibility forwhatwere historically gov-
ernment roles departs from the purely non-regulatory inspired
governance schemes that exist with product standard and certi-
ﬁcation efforts (e.g. FSC, USGBC) and they more closely resembles
other hybrid examples of regulatorymeasures governed bymarket
actors such as the governance of carbon offsets.
The transition of responsibilities from government to produc-
ers is most often considered through the assumption, either fully
or partially, of ﬁnancing of collection and recycling activities.
While the internalization of costs is argued to support enhanced
environmental outcomes throughout the product’s lifecycle, the
consolidation and streamlining of decision-making, and thus of
governance, may support the more effective and efﬁcient achieve-
ment of those environmental objectives of the program.
By shifting the locus of ﬁnancing and program management
from municipalities to producers, it marks the recognition that in
response to the increasingly global scale of the supply chain, prod-
uct design, production and sale requires governance structures that
are reﬂective of that scale. Through the engagement of producers,
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EPR is intended to ensure that enhanced economic efﬁciencies will
result and overall system costs will be lowered compared with the
prevailing locally government ﬁnanced and managed approaches.
Extended producer responsibility, when operationalized through
individual producer responsibility (IPR)models, is predicated upon
the premise that competition will emerge individual producers
(Dempsey et al., 2010).
In summary, under an EPRpolicy regime, the role of government
is often fundamentally shifted from an active market participant
that may provide and ﬁnance collection and recycling activities to
a role of establishing and enforcing rules such as ensuring program
participation and conducting program evaluation.
7. Producer responsibility organizations
Producer responsibility organizations (often referred to as stew-
ardship or third-party organizations) may be either for proﬁt
or non-proﬁt entities are a central feature of implementation
of producer responsibility regimes and serve as the organiza-
tional construct for the transition to private governance. PROs as
commonly understood in producer responsibility programs have
historical roots in the formation of Duales System Deutschland
(DSD) with enactment of the German packaging ordinance in 1991
(Nakajima and Vanderburg, 2006). The principal responsibilities
of the PRO include overall program management that includes
fee setting that is generally assessed on sales of products into a
particular jurisdiction, selection of vendors, public outreach and
education and in some cases, instituting environmentally-sound
management standards (Mayers, 2007).
As Kroepelien (2000) noted, EPR creates a new entity that is
inserted between the individual producer and the government.
While collective compliance organizations are permitted if not, in
some instances, required by the policy instrument, PROs are gener-
ally created voluntarily by the brand owners to fulﬁll the regulatory
obligations and achieve cost efﬁciencies (Fleckinger and Glachant,
2010). This efﬁciency is, in part, attained through migrating from
a system operated locally or regionally to an emphasis on a multi-
regional, national, or in some cases, an international scale (Mayers
and Butler, 2013). It is important to recognize that PROs are often
distinct fromproducer compliance organizations thatmay be oper-
ated by waste management or logistics companies and serve a
functional compliance role on behalf of the producers.
PROs operate on behalf of the designated brand owners when
collaborative activity is most efﬁcient such as collection of dis-
carded products or when individual responsibility models are
inefﬁcient or discouraged (OECD, 2001). In effect, PROs are the
administrative vehicle to move from a largely competitive rela-
tionship to one that requires collaboration. PROs may function
as a monopolistic compliance option or, in some cases, some of
the EPR regulations provide for multiple or competitive PROs.
The role of competitive schemes is often debated with an orga-
nizational monopoly suggested for jurisdictions lacking sufﬁcient
infrastructure and competition encouraged as the system matures
(Antonioli and Massarutto, 2012). In some cases, as noted by Niza
and colleagues (2013), collective approach is viewed as easing
the implementation timeline. However, Toyasaki and colleagues
(2011) argued that competitive approaches leads to lower prices of
products and thus increased proﬁts for manufacturers. It is argued
that multiple PROs, while supporting a competitive landscape
of compliance options, may inhibit the operational efﬁciencies
that can be achieved within one PRO (Atasu and Wassenhove,
2012).
Critical to the construction of EPR programs, at least those
that are premised on a large degree of collective action by pro-
ducers, is the implementation of cooperative measures such as
organizational governance and decision-making. Creating a non-
state responsibility for consolidated decision-making regarding
many aspects of ﬁnancing and service provision is arguably the
most notable feature of EPR that results in the realization of many
of the intended aims of the policy tool. This support for PROs with
recognition that program efﬁciency and interface for consumers
and service providers is critical.
As individual PROs become more entrenched and functioning
acrossmultiple jurisdictions, an example PaintCare that, as of 2013,
implementing unwanted paint management programs in seven
U.S. states, able to accrue authority and responsibility that oth-
erwise has been assumed by public authorities (Hickle, 2013b).
Cross-jurisdictional organizations are particularly prominent in the
European Union such as the European Recycling Platform (ERP)
that addressesWEEE (Atasu andWassenhove, 2012) as well as bat-
teries. However, organizational actors such as the WEEE Forum in
the EU and the Canadian Shares Services Alliance (CSAA) in Canada
serve a coordination, reporting, and support function role for mul-
tiple PROs. As Bury (2013) noted, the producers are steering efforts
to promote program consistency across jurisdictions and operate
programs with a national perspective.
The actual governance mechanism of the organization, such
as the composition of the board of directors or other administra-
tive body, is determined by the obligated brand owners. In some
instances such as the Rechargeable Battery Recycling Corporation
in the United States, two board seats are reserved for independent
directors with no organization afﬁliation with producers of batter-
ies. The Carpet America Recovery Effort (CARE), the organization
executing the brand owner obligations required by the producer
responsibility measure enacted in California in 2010, has repre-
sentation on the board from independent processors of collected
carpet. PROs that have been created for compliance with packag-
ing regulations typically have a diversity of producers, including
those representing different materials, represented in the gover-
nance structure of the organization.
PROs are often formed and initially housed within traditional
industry trade associations. Examples of this pattern of origination
include PaintCare that was created by the American Coatings Asso-
ciation in the U.S. andMulti-Material British Columbia (MMBC), an
entity formed by several trade associations representing retailers
and brand owners in Canada. The genesis and arrangement of PROs
is often diverse, as Hage (2007) states in an analysis of the producer
responsibility system in Sweden, producers initiated four separate
organizations by commodity type.
Despite the emphasis on ﬂexibility for program implementa-
tion within the EPR conceptual framework, certain EPR regulations
require obligations to be executed by a PRO and compel individual
producers to join the organization. For example, the architec-
tural paint producer responsibility law in the State of Connecticut
(Connecticut Legislature, 2012) requires mandatory participation
by producers in a PRO. In some case, such as is the case with
the statute for EPR for carpet in California, the Carpet America
Recovery Effort is explicitly identiﬁed in the statute (California
Legislature, 2010). In some instances, the management organiza-
tionmaybe actually created by the legislation as exempliﬁedby the
Washington Materials Management Authority Washington Mate-
rials Management Authority (WMMA), an organization speciﬁcally
created by the authorizing statute (Gui et al., 2013). The WMMA
performs many of the functions of a traditional PRO with a board
predominantly composed of brand owners but also has the state
regulatory authority serving in an ex ofﬁcio capacity. As of 2012,
no brand owners are operating an independent plan.
While many programs are premised on producer collaboration,
concerns regarding monopolistic behavior have been present with
PROs since their inception. For example, several of the state statutes
in the United States instituting producer responsibility measures
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contain an anti-trust exemption from state competition laws to
facilitate brand owner cooperation (Hickle, 2013a).
8. Responses to changing governance under EPR
While the primacy of private entities in an EPR-based pol-
icy approach is generally welcomed, the several concerns have
arisen. Many of the articulated challenges to producer responsibil-
ityare similar to thosevoiced forprivateenvironmental governance
such as lack of transparency in decision-making, concentrated
authority with limited opportunities for public participation of
more fundamentally that market-based initiatives simply cod-
ify the existing trends of environmental degradation (Lemos and
Agrawal, 2006). Of most consequence is the potential for the
concentration of market inﬂuence by brand owners and their
designated organizations with potential implications for competi-
tion (Heyes, 2009). As Lehmann (2004) notes, antitrust concerns
were voiced soon after the creation of Duales System Deutsch-
land (DSD) in Germany, the PRO created to fulﬁll the producer’s
obligations under the German Packaging Ordinance. It is assumed
that even with multiple PROs operating within a particular juris-
diction, the competitive landscape will be curtailed and lowest
cost service providers will prevail. In essence, it is argued that EPR
may result in “policy generated monopolies” that will reduce the
number and viability of the downstream processors of commodi-
ties.
Much of the criticism directed at the changing governance
inherent in EPR is the concern that local environmental, eco-
nomic and other values will be displaced. With the shifting of
responsibility to the producers from local governments under
EPR, other community values that may be infused within munici-
pal policies and programs such as prevailing wage requirements
and a preference for local end markets for processing materi-
als may be de-emphasized or omitted as a consequence of the
transition. This is often expressed most directly with the poten-
tial for aggregation of commodities and with reduction of locally
owned waste management companies and processors and the dis-
placement of economic development opportunities. Despite the
increasingly globalized nature of recycling commodity markets,
municipal recycling is oftenviewedasanexponentof the “localism”
movement (Hess, 2008).
Other critiques include thepotential for existingpublic recycling
infrastructure to be neglected, referred to as “stranded assets”
and the potential for communities with high performing recycling
efforts to see a decline in service and environmental outcomes.
The need to address the fate of the present infrastructure and the
interests that may be omitted by a transition to EPR is often recog-
nized by policymakers as a critical aspect of program development
(Ontario, 2013).
Another argument often articulated against private governance
is the lack of formal public input in decision-making that often
occurs with traditional legislative and administrative processes.
This perceived lack of transparency and institutionalization of
private rulemaking activities has led to concerns about further pri-
vatizationof servicesanddiminishmentof thecapacityof thepublic
sector.
A recent report on the proposed implementation strategies in
British Columbia for packaging and printed-paper offers the per-
spective ofmunicipalities (Columbia Institute, 2013). In an attempt
to address this and reﬂecting on the transition of a public role
to a private governance structure, many EPR regulations require
a consultation process to solicit input from various stakeholders.
However, government is often positioned as amore neutral arbiter
and can play an important role in dispute resolution and convening
of stakeholders.
9. Examples of governance within EPR
Recognizing the variety of EPR policies and program imple-
mentation scenarios that illustrate the differing apportionment of
responsibilities between public and private actors, the following
section describes several of the prevailing models in the North
American context. The examples are drawn from North America
due to the array of models that demonstrate this diversity but also
that the policy debate regarding the allocation of responsibility is
evolving, particularly in the United States. Table 1 illustrates the
products that are subject to statutory or regulatory requirements
in theUnited States and Canada.While the apportionment of ﬁnan-
cial or operational responsibilities may be speciﬁed in regulatory
instruments, in many cases it may not be articulated and formu-
lated during the program planning and or implementation phase.
While not being an exhaustive list of the allocation of respon-
sibilities between producers and government, the following
categories outline the models that range from producers that
assume full ﬁnancial responsibility and operational authority for
achieving the desired outcomes of the policy to models that stipu-
latedeﬁnedroles forpublic authorities inprogramimplementation.
9.1. Full producer ﬁnancial and management responsibility
The British Columbia Ministry of the Environment issued a
regulation in 2011 that stipulated full ﬁnancial responsibility for
producers of packaging and printed paper with signiﬁcant ﬂexibil-
ity as to how to achieve the outcomes of the program.
In the United States, starting with the State of Oregon in 2009,
seven states have enacted an EPR approach for unwanted architec-
tural paint. While the statutes do not specify that the producers
of architectural paint are to assume the full ﬁnancial responsibility
for the program, there are no deﬁned collection responsibilities or
ﬁnancial obligations imposed on local authorities.
9.2. Full producer ﬁnancial responsibility with public
management responsibility
The second category is illustrative of EPR programswhereby the
functional program responsibilities remainwith themunicipalities
although the producers have the responsibility to fully ﬁnance the
system.
In the EPR regulation issued in 2005 for packing and printed
paper in Quebec, the traditional municipal collection role for
recycling is maintained. Initially a shared ﬁnancial responsibility
model with producers and municipalities assuming 50% of the net
costs for municipal recycling, the regulation was amended in 2011
to increase the share paid by producers. Starting in 2013, the pro-
ducers through the PRO, Éco Entreprises Québec (ÉEQ), will be
responsible for ﬁnancing 100% of themunicipal recycling net costs.
9.3. Shared producer ﬁnancial responsibility with public
management responsibility
Following the model established for residential recycling in
Ontario with passage of the Waste Diversion Act in 2002, whereby
producers of packaging and printed paper are required to fund 50%
of the net municipal costs for recycling, Manitoba enacted a reg-
ulatory measure that increased the producer’s share to 80%. The
regulation for packaging and printed paper regulation adopted in
2010 in Manitoba established a “shared” ﬁnancial responsibility
modelwith the regulated brand owner assuming 80%of the provin-
cial residential recycling costs and the local governments assuming
the remaining 20% (MMSM, 2012). Despite the ﬁnancial obligation
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Table 1
Regulated EPR programs in North America.
Product category U.S. States Product category Canadian Provinces
Anti-freeze (glycol) British Columbia, Manitoba, New
Brunswick Ontario, Prince Edward Island,
Saskatchewan,
Architectural paint California, Colorado, Connecticut, Maine,
Minnesota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont
Architectural paint British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward
Island, Quebec
Automotive batteries British Columbia, Manitoba, Prince Edward
Island
Batteries (rechargeable) Florida, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Iowa,
New York, New Jersey, Vermont (rechargeable
and single-use)
Batteries Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba,
Ontario, Quebec
Carpet California
Electronics Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
North Carolina, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon,
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin
Electronics British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario,
Quebec Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia
Mattresses California, Connecticut, Rhode Island
Medical sharps and syringes Manitoba, Ontario Prince Edward Island
Mercury-containing lamps Maine, Vermont, Washington Mercury-containing lamps and
other mercury-containing products
British Columbia, Manitoba, Quebec, Prince
Edward Island
Mercury auto switches Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Maine,
Maryland, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Utah
Mercury thermostats California, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine,
Montana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Vermont
Mobile phones British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario,
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward
Island, Quebec
Oil, oil containers and ﬁlters British Columbia, Manitoba, New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince
Edward Island, Quebec, Saskatchewan




British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario
Pharmaceuticals British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Prince
Edward Island
Tires British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario
Sources: Nash and Bosso (2013), Hickle (2013a), Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (2014).
Notes: The Table illustrates products for which EPR statues or regulations have been enacted. The Table does include those that are shared ﬁnancial responsibility but does
not include voluntary programs or those that utilize a deposit funding mechanism.
for brand owners, the system essentially retains the centrality of
local governments.
9.4. Producer responsibility with a government compliance
option
The ﬁnal classiﬁcation is an EPR program that offers a com-
pliance option with signiﬁcant public authority management. For
example, the Vermont waste electronics law enacted in 2010
established a government administered “standard” plan whereby
the state regulatory authority, the Vermont Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation, contracts for waste electronics recycling
services (Vermont Legislature, 2009). Although funded by brand
owners according to their market share, the decision-making and
management responsibilities rest with the state regulatory author-
ity.
A provision in the statute authorizes an “opt-out” option for pro-
ducer seeking an alternative to the standard plan. For the ﬁrst time
in the program, the state regulatory authority authorized an “opt-
out” plan to begin operating on October 1, 2013 on behalf of ﬁve
producers (Elliot, 2013).
Table 2 displays the examples of governance common within
EPR programs in North America as identiﬁed above with articu-
lated roles and responsibilities for principal actors as identiﬁed in
Section 3.
10. Evaluation of governance mechanisms of EPR programs
Given the primary policy objectives of EPR programs, the eval-
uation of programs has tended to emphasize the environmental
outcomes such collection and recycling performance and to a lesser
extent, the design for environment activities undertaken as a result
of EPR. In some instances, the economic efﬁciency of the programs
has been measured. However, the structure of program gover-
nance and the allocation of responsibilities within EPR regimes
has received little attention regarding their inﬂuence on the overall
efﬁciency and effectiveness of EPR policies.
Given the breadth of governance models, and speciﬁcally the
balance of responsibilities and functions between producers and
public authorities, with existing EPR programs, an evaluative
framework is critical to the assessment as to the relationship
between program governance and achievement of the desired
outcomes of the program. Speciﬁcally, is the balance of responsi-
bilities allocated between the producers and government actors
at all levels determinative of the environmental and economic
efﬁciency of the program? This question is of particular relevance
for those programs, as deﬁned in Section 9, with a Government
Compliance Option or with Public Management Responsibilities
that broaden the scope of actors engaged in governance of the
program. Addressing the question of whether producer centered
governance models that place greater ﬁnancial and programmatic
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Table 2
Comparison of examples of governance within EPR with roles for speciﬁc actors.
Full producer ﬁnancial and
management responsibility
Full producer ﬁnancial with
public management
responsibility






Producers 1. Finance, develop and operate
program









1. Finance program either fully
or partially
2. Report on program outcomes
Retailers 1. May serve as collection sites
(mandatory or voluntary)
2. May be an obligated as “ﬁrst
importers”
3. Comply with “do not sell”
requirement
1. May serve as collection sites
(mandatory or voluntary)
2. May be an obligated as “ﬁrst
importers”
3. Comply with “do not sell”
requirement
1. May serve as collection sites
(mandatory or voluntary)
2. May be an obligated as “ﬁrst
importers”
3. Comply with “do not sell”
requirement
1. Serve as collection sites
(mandatory or voluntary)
2. May be an obligated as “ﬁrst
importers”
3. Comply with “do not sell”
requirement
Regulatory authority 1. Provide oversight
2. Ensure participation
3. Review and approve plans




3. Review and approve plans




3. Review and approve plans
4. Conduct overall program
evaluation
1. Solicits, plans or bids from
vendors
2. Select eligible vendors
3. Approve rates to be paid by
producers to vendors
Municipalities 1. May serve as vendors for
producers for collection
services
2. May have deﬁned collection
obligations
3. Provide education to
residents
1. Continue as collection
service providers
2. Provide information to
residents on the program
1. Finance a deﬁned portion of
program costs
2. Continue as collection
service providers
3. Provide education to
residents on the program
1. May have deﬁned collection
obligations
2. Provide education to
residents on the program
Consumers 1. Abide by disposal bans if
applicable
2. Participate in the collection
program
1. Abide by disposal bans if
applicable
2. Participate in the collection
program
1. Abide by disposal bans if
applicable
2. Participate in the collection
program
3. Contribute to the program
funding through fees or taxes
1. Abide by disposal bans if
applicable
2. Participate in the collection
program
3. Contribute to the program
funding through fees or taxes
responsibility on producers result in higher program performance
relative to those with mixed governance is essential for the
construction of EPR policy going forward.
It is also important to investigate whether the differing gov-
ernance models are appropriate for different products given that
the attributes of products and methodologies for collection and
processing may vary greatly. The differentiation of governance
models by product is of particular importance for those products
and materials that have an existing collection and recycling infra-
structure as well as entrenched interests that may constrain the
governance models available to policymakers.
Several factorswill need to be addressed to conduct robust eval-
uation of the interplay between the governance regime of the EPR
program and the program outcomes. Of particular importance is,
given the array of existing governance structures, is further reﬁne-
ment of the typologies identiﬁed in this paper and applying those
to existing EPR programs.
An identiﬁcation of the degree of programmatic ﬂexibility allot-
ted to producers for program design. This is particularly signiﬁcant
regarding the autonomy to develop a collection network and solicit
demand for collected material.
It is also essential to isolate the producers’ actual ﬁnancial
responsibility and costs aswell as those costs bornebyother parties
to develop a gauge of economic efﬁciency. Finally, data regarding
the amount or volume of products collected and managed at end
of life as a result of the EPR program will need to be identiﬁed.
These two categories of data can then be applied to the governance
typologies to determine the optimum governance mechanisms.
11. Conclusion and recommendations
The analysis suggests that as EPR matures, the evaluative
measures typically utilized to assess EPR may need to transition
from an emphasis on initial policy designs to an investigation of
governance strategies and other factors that inﬂuence the environ-
mental outcomes of the programs. However, the optimal allocation
among producers and other entities, including regulatory bodies
and local authorities, to achieve an effective program that results
in high performance in an economically efﬁcientmethod is far from
resolved. With the maturation of EPR as a regulatory mechanism
and enters a phase of increasing performance, as demonstrated by
the recastWEEEDirective (Torretta et al., 2013)with aggressive tar-
get and expanded requirements on producers, the interplay with
emphasis on increasingperformancemetrics and thusupongreater
accountability and authority for producers.
As EPR becomes further embedded within the business mod-
els of producers and the need for jurisdictional harmonization
becomes more acute, will producers seek greater program ﬂexi-
bility and authority under EPR programs and in what form? As EPR
policy is further linked to the fulﬁllment of sustainable or “green”
global supply chain objectives such as an overall reduction of envi-
ronmental impacts or securing a stable supply of post-consumer
commodity material and the global context for achieving these
objectives, these question of the optimal role for producers and
public authorities (Vermeulen and Ras, 2006).
Although within the context of EPR policy, producers are
functioning under a regulatory umbrella, the self-organization
and relative operational autonomy is closely aligned with pri-
vate environmental governance structures. The strengthening and
expansion of producer-led program development and autonomy
in EPR policy is arguably necessary to truly fulﬁll the intent of
integration of EPR into the business model of ﬁrms.
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public objectives but for those of producers as well. This blending of public and private benefits 
is not well explored or documented within the research on EPR. The following paper examined 
the role that EPR occupies within the CSR profile of firms. Relying on an analysis of individual 
corporate social responsibility reports, the paper characterizes how firms do or do not embed EPR 
legal requirements or EOL product management activities as a demonstration of reported CSR 
activities. This analysis was designed to identify companies that viewed EPR as an important 
CSR function that demonstrates EOL management activities provide strategic advantages. 
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ABSTRACT
The paper examines how extended producer responsibility (EPR) as an environmental policy
approach and, more broadly, product management strategies are characterized within cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR). The author summarizes the key concepts and arguments
for sustainable product management strategies with an emphasis on the collection of
discarded products at end of life, and identiﬁes primary tools for recognizing and advancing
product management strategies within CSR such as sustainability reporting and product
standard and certiﬁcation programs. The article analyzes 121 CSR reports for references to
EPR and, more broadly, end-of-life management strategies for discarded products. It con-
cludes with recommendations as to how CSR practices can more effectively recognize prod-
uct management strategies as well as how EPR policy can be enhanced to further embed
product end-of-life management strategies and activities within the CSR activities of ﬁrms.
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Introduction
ASCORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) BECOMES AN INCREASINGLY PROMINENT PRACTICE IN THE GLOBAL BUSINESScontext, the boundaries of CSR strategies and initiatives continue to expand. Hahn et al., recognize thatCSR engages ﬁrms to account for environmental, social and economic factors in a ‘new’ way (Hahnet al., 2014). This extension of boundaries is realized in the growing ﬁeld of sustainable supply chain man-
agement (SSCM), including a growing emphasis on responsibility for downstream impacts of a producer’s prod-
ucts. However, little research exists that examines how product end-of-life (EOL) activities and extended producer
responsibility (EPR) regulatory requirements, in particular, are characterized within the CSR activities of individual
companies.
With downstream responsibility becoming more entrenched within ﬁrms as a demonstration of CSR and is an
important business strategy in a materially constrained world, the question of the appropriate approach to product
recovery and management becomes critical. Given the challenges facing an individual ﬁrm with establishing an ef-
fective and economically efﬁcient product recovery system, a regulatory requirement may be sought to require joint
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Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
Business Strategy and the Environment
Bus. Strat. Env. (2015)




industry initiatives and to promote a level playing ﬁeld. Toffel argued that EOL product management activities can
serve as a key market differentiator and serve to support a ﬁrm’s strategic objectives, and Carbone linked SSCM to
EPR (Toffel, 2003; Carbone, 2012).
EPR regulatory mechanisms have been expanded during the past two decades; OECD has reported that there are
now more than 380 EPR policies globally (OECD, 2014). Many producers, particularly with regard to waste electron-
ics and packaging, are subject to regulations imposing EPR obligations that stipulate producer ﬁnancing of the man-
agement of unwanted products at EOL, thereby providing an incentive to reduce the environmental impacts
throughout the product’s life-cycle.
Despite the increasing visibility of SSCM as a strategy for CSR, there is minimal literature focused on a ﬁrm’s or
industry sector’s establishment of downstream product collection systems for unwanted products as a manifestation
of CSR.
This article evaluated how product recovery efforts are characterized within an individual ﬁrm’s CSR activities
through examination of the prevailing sustainability tools, including product standards and certiﬁcations, as well
as through their sustainability or CSR reporting. This is of particular relevance as EPR matures as an environmental
policy approach and, in some instances, is a principal strategy for achieving a ﬁrm’s CSR goals and objectives. Given
this dynamism, a key question is how EPR regulatory tools might be bolstered to foster the further embedding of
EPR within CSR.
The author of this research utilized the Newsweek Green Rankings of companies with commitment to CSR to
analyze how EPR is reﬂected in publically available CSR and corporate sustainability reports. The paper concludes
with a discussion of how existing CSR strategies can be more fully used to guide EOL management strategies for
products as well as how EPR policy development can be more aligned with CSR approaches and tools.
Overview of CSR
While there is not a consensus deﬁnition of CSR, it is generally understood to represent a broad range of themes
from a ﬁrm’s environmental and labor practices to its philanthropic activities (Wan-Jan, 2006). However, Lozano
asserted that, while CSR could signiﬁcantly advance sustainability, the lack of clarity regarding its deﬁnitions limits
its inﬂuence (Lozano, 2012).
CSR overlaps with other concepts, including corporate citizenship and corporate sustainability, and more re-
cently with ‘shared value’ (Porter and Kramer, 2011). Eberhard-Harribey asserted that CSR can be characterized
as ‘beyond compliance’ behavior that transcends legal requirements (Eberhard-Harribey 2006). Laudal stated that
CSR activities, either voluntary or as a result of regulatory action, internalize and institutionalize externalities
(Laudal, 2012).
CSR has emerged as a core activity of businesses, and Horrigan observed that there is acceleration in the evolu-
tion of CSR as ﬁrms grapple with how to implement CSR practices rather than debate why to do so (Horrigan,
2007). A core feature within CSR is an emphasis on stakeholder engagement with, in particular, non-governmental
organizations (Lyon and Maxwell, 2008).
Scherer et al. suggested that CSR, in part due to globalization, frames the contribution to the achievement of
‘public goods’ by ﬁrms (Scherer et al., 2014). Porter and Kramer identiﬁed the competitive advantage of embracing
CSR throughout the value chain (Porter and Kramer, 2006). Phillips and Caldwell observed the broadening of re-
sponsibility as ﬁrms are increasingly required to address both the upstream and downstream activities of their value
chain, including how the products are used and their ultimate fate (Phillips and Caldwell, 2005).
CSR and Public Policy
To interpret the relationship between EPR and CSR, the treatment of policy and regulatory activity within CSR is
helpful. CSR is frequently characterized as a form of self-regulation and is of often embraced as a strategy to pre-
empt regulatory threats (Lyon and Maxwell, 2008). Other authors observed that an essential impact of CSR is its
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inﬂuence on incentivizing and shaping governmental regulatory activities (Moon and Vogel, 2008; Knudsen and
Brown, 2015).
Gond et al. argued that CSR and related regulations are actually intertwined (Gond et al., 2011). In some jurisdic-
tions, most notably in the European Union (EU), the promotion of CSR through regulatory measures as well as rec-
ognition and technical assistance activities are emerging (Matten and Moon, 2008). Midttun furthered argued that,
in the context of a globalized economic structure, CSR implements ‘partnered governance’ that incentivizes CSR
through tools such as procurement policy and recognition programs (Midttun, 2008).
However, in an examination of the shortcomings of CSR, Sjafel argued that CSR alone cannot result in the inter-
nalization of environmental externalities (Sjåfjell, 2008). Furthermore, Garriga and Melé argued that broader social
objectives could only be achieved through legal requirements imposed by formal government action (Garriga and
Melé, 2004). CSR is also challenged due to its emphasis on ﬁrm-speciﬁc activities rather than broader industry ini-
tiatives, thus not adequately addressing the problem of ‘free-riders’ and the subsequent uneven playing ﬁeld.
Sustainable Supply Chain Management
An increasingly prominent element of CSR is SSCM (Carter and Easton, 2011; Amaeshi et al., 2008). Gupta and
Palsule-Desai emphasized that SSCM encompasses a broad range of decisions that impact the life-cycle of the prod-
uct and offers an integrative framework (Gupta and Palsule-Desai, 2011). The application of SSCM has accelerated
due to the fact that globalization has necessarily expanded the boundaries of the ﬁrm (Boström et al., 2014). Sustain-
able supply chain management broadens the system boundaries for the ﬁrm to engage suppliers along the supply
chain to address a broad array of environmental and, increasingly, social impacts (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen,
2009; Cramer, 2008; Vermulean, 2013).
van Bommel identiﬁed three factors that are central to the motivation of companies to develop SSCM strategies;
(1) external demands from stakeholders, (2) threats posed by suppliers and (3) opportunities to create new products
(van Bommel, 2011).
Embedded within a framework of sustainability, SSCM fosters an emphasis on long-term value and identifying
and managing global risks (Closs et al., 2011). Carter and Rogers argued that SSCM encourages companies to im-
plement comprehensive strategies to improve environmental, social and economic performance and to mitigate
risks (Carter and Rogers, 2008). SSCM encompasses a wide range of activities, such as the transition from goods
to services or reverse logistics. By fostering collaboration among companies, SCCM also spurs ﬁrms to address
other supply chain objectives (Fiksel, 2013).
Despite the emergence of the sustainable supply chain concept, Pagell et al. asserted that many supply chains do
not implement features of sustainability as they are perceived as not being ﬁnancially beneﬁcial (Pagell et al., 2007).
For example, EOL management activities are perceived by corporate managers ﬁrms as a cost to be minimized, and
consequently they subsequently contract with the lowest cost service provider. Furthermore, Pagell et al., in their
consideration of four options for implementing EOL management responsibilities, asserted that active engagement
in the development and operation of EOL product management activities may lead to strategic opportunities for
ﬁrms and methods of competition (Pagell et al., 2007).
Closed Loop Supply Chains
A growing strategy within SSCM is the implementation of closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs), which emphasizes
product management following use by the consumer (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009). With increasing focus
on producers’ responsibilities for their products, including the use phase, ﬁrms’ downstream SSCM activities are
receiving increased scrutiny (Phillips and Caldwell, 2005). Defee et al. observed that ﬁrms are realigning their sup-
ply chains not only to embrace sustainability but also to demonstrate CLSC practices (Defee et al., 2009). CLSCs
extend the boundary of sustainable supply chains to include the consumer or end user of the product. CLSCs offer
an avenue to promote differentiation among ﬁrms in the marketplace (Defee et al., 2009). However, as noted by
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Quariguasi Frota Neto et al., EPR regulatory requirements have prompted the enhanced emphasis on CLSC
(Quariguasi Frota Neto et al., 2010).
Sarkis et al. suggested that reverse logistics not only supports economic and environmental objectives but also
results in social beneﬁts such as employment stability and capacity development for ﬁrms (Sarkis et al., 2010).
Downstream Collection Activities
Within the broad context of SSCM, the downstream collection of EOL management is arguably the most compli-
cated aspect of supply chain management but may offer value to ﬁrms if these activities are integrated within their
CSR objectives.
Toffel outlined many of the strategic beneﬁts associated with product recovery activities, including elevating cus-
tomer goodwill, increasing brand identity, customer retention and enhancing the responsibility of the ﬁrm (Toffel,
2004). Product recovery initiatives may also result in indirectly beneﬁting the ﬁrm through an increase in the avail-
ability of commodity materials, and by reducing costs through use of reusable and refurbished components. In the
case of retail-based collection efforts, an increase in store trafﬁc may result. While retailers are not generally obli-
gated to offer collection of post-consumer products, the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Direc-
tive in the EU is a notable exception due to a provision that requires retailers to accept unwanted products when
a new product is sold (Ylä-Mella et al., 2014).
The expansion of EOL product collection opportunities through retail locations is often implemented as part of a
broader sustainability strategy (Dauvergne and Lister, 2012). Kant Hvass’s study of post-consumer collection of tex-
tiles by clothing companies documented that companies directly linked the collection activities to their CSR strategy,
which provides opportunities for these ﬁrms to develop new business models and to deepen customer loyalty (Kant
Hvass, 2014). Wagner et al. asserted that collection of products at retail locations offers several beneﬁts, including
expanding the number of collection opportunities available to consumers as well as economic beneﬁts that result
from increased store trafﬁc (Wagner et al., 2013).
Several companies have implemented individual ﬁrm level initiatives to collect and recycle post-consumer prod-
ucts. These include the Nike ‘Reuse a Shoe’ program, whereby Nike retail stores offer collection opportunities for
discarded athletic shoes (Sharma et al., 2012). Patagonia’s ‘Common Threads Initiative’ provides consumers with
several avenues for extending the life of clothing or recycling by offering collection opportunities at their retail stores
(Hoffman, 2012). H&M also offers in-store collection opportunities for unwanted textiles (Ho, 2014). While the
aforementioned examples were premised on ﬁrms with a retail footprint to facilitate collection initiatives, several
manufacturers without an integrated retail infrastructure rely on retail partners to provide recovery options.
Interface, a manufacturer of modular carpet tiles, is well recognized for its sustainability initiatives, one of which
is a program to recycle post-consumer modular carpet (Lampikoski, 2012). Mobile phone collection activities oper-
ated by manufacturers, as well as by others along the product chain, also illustrate such voluntary EOL management
programs (Ongondo and Williams, 2011).
Challenges Facing Collection of Products
As underscored by Boons, the collection and recycling of products is often a very challenging activity (Boons, 2002).
Product recovery is often predicated on the direct engagement of the ﬁnal user, and in the case of consumer prod-
ucts is dependent upon the nature of the consumer’s purchasing, use and disposal habits.
A key dynamic that inﬂuences the collection of products is the high degree of variability that, depending upon the
speciﬁc product category or material, may exist for each stage of collection activity. For example, given the numerous
factors that contribute to EOL product management behaviors, signiﬁcant uncertainty exists regarding the timing
and quantity of products that may be available for recovery (see, e.g., Toffel, 2004; Wright et al., 2011). Sarkis ob-
served that, while waste ﬂows may stimulate reverse logistics and other strategies to reduce disposal, many variables
and actors along the product chain participate in decisionmaking, often complicating the process (Sarkis, 2012).
These factors contribute to the perception that the costs of implementing ﬁrm based product recovery initiatives
are high (Fleckinger and Glachant, 2010).
Of course, other factors may serve as disincentives to collection, including regulatory requirements, particularly
for those products that may contain toxic or hazardous constituents that may restrict how products may be collected
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or impose paperwork requirements. Also, while retailers can provide essential infrastructure for products, retailers
may lack adequate space to collect and store products at EOL.
Overview of EPR as a Policy Approach
EPR is a policy approach generally implemented through regulatory instruments that extends up and down the
product chain for speciﬁc products or product categories, most prominently for WEEE, packaging and those prod-
ucts considered to be household hazardous waste (HHW). Despite the emphasis on product producers in the con-
struct of EPR, as Kalimo et al. noted, other entities such as local governments, waste management ﬁrms and others
often assume prominent roles in implementing EPR programs (Kalimo et al., 2015).
Through the producer’s assumption of ﬁnancial responsibility to manage products at the EOL, the presumption
is that producers are then incentivized to implement Design for the Environment (DfE) strategies that facilitate re-
use and recycling (Albino et al., 2009). Furthermore, Opoku suggested that EPR results in waste reduction and pre-
vention beneﬁts during the production phase by tying together the stages of the product’s life-cycle and facilitating
actions for product optimization (Opoku, 2004).
To what extent EPR has resulted in the projected outcomes, particularly in its role in incentivizing product DfE
practices, is debated. However, the relationship between EPR and DfE activities may be signiﬁcantly predicated on
EPR policy design (Mayers et al., 2013). For example, producer responsibility organizations (PROs), which operate
on behalf of producers to collectively fulﬁll their compliance obligations, may contribute to the lack of incentives for
individual companies to engage in DfE activities, given that these actions are not perceived to accrue to the beneﬁt of
the ﬁrm (Kalimo et al., 2015).
Deﬁning EPR within CSR
While CSR is generally portrayed as dominated by voluntary initiatives, policy measures are often integral to the
achievement of CLSC objectives.
A fundamental argument for EPR is the extension of a regulatory framework across all ﬁrms to provide a level
playing ﬁeld that then enables ﬁrms to implement sustainability activities in more proactive fashion (Moon and
Vogel, 2008). A primary objective of EPR is to promote the internalization of environmental externalities. A conse-
quence of this internalization is that, as argued by Massarutto, EPR results in a more structured market with a re-
duction in transaction costs and achieves greater consistency (Massarutto, 2014). Rizzi et al. found that the success
of EPR is dependent not only upon intra- but also inter-company innovation (Rizzi et al., 2013).
EPR policies that require sharing may result in increased proﬁts for all parties along the supply chain (Souza,
2013). As Sarkis observed, the expansion of EPR regulations globally is anticipated to incentivize the development
of reverse logistics (Sarkis et al., 2010). Furthermore, Fiksel credited EPR as prompting changes throughout
the product development process and engaging the actors along the supply chain in adopting life-cycle consider-
ations (Fiksel, 2013).
EPR was found to stimulate the ﬂow of information among actors along the product chain and to support collab-
oration to achieve sustainable supply chain objectives (Hoffman et al., 2014).
Lozano and Huisingh among others, have identiﬁed EPR as a ‘support tool’ to stimulate social responsibility
(Lozano and Huisingh, 2011). Massarutto stated that EPR is a strategy to implement CLSCs and support strate-
gies such as reverse logistics (Massarutto, 2014). Furthermore, Defee et al. suggested that EPR supports CLSC
management strategies that reinforce CSR objectives (Defee et al., 2009).
As noted by Bush et al., EPR is an example of CSR-oriented policymaking that enhances legitimacy but, as result
of its regulatory nature, may also inhibit innovation by ﬁrms by restricting ﬂexibility (Bush et al., 2014). Further-
more, due to the increasing globalization of product supply chains, regulatory measures such as EPR that are pre-
mised on private actors but implemented in individual jurisdictions are unlikely to be sufﬁcient for stimulating truly
sustainable supply chain management (Boons et al., 2012).
However, the policy choices underpinning an EPR program and the subsequent implementation strategy may
have implications for how individual producers establish product management scenarios and spur characterization
of the scenarios within the corporate sustainability proﬁle.
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The Corporate Characterization of EPR
While many ﬁrms prominently build upon EPR within their broader CSR initiatives, there is no cross-industry re-
search that offers a corporate perspective on EPR. Most examination of EPR from the corporate view has investi-
gated individual ﬁrms or industry sectors implementing EPR in response to regulations in a particular
jurisdiction (Yu et al., 2008; Gerrard and Kandlikar, 2007; Wilson et al., 2011; Gui et al., 2013).
Given the absence of a comprehensive assessment, publically available CSR reports and public policy statements
provide some insight into how EPR is positioned within the broader CSR agenda. For example, Electrolux and Nestle
Waters North America (NWNA) directly linked regulated EPR to their CSR objectives. Both companies have engaged
in leadership on public policy for EPR. Electrolux supported individual producer responsibility (IPR) in the develop-
ment of the WEEE Directive in the EU and is one of the founding companies of the European Recycling Platform,
a PRO (Mayers and Butler, 2013). NWNA has taken a leadership role in advocating for EPR for packaging in the
United States through supporting the creation of a new organization devoted to this effort (Jeffery et al., 2014).
Several companies have instituted EOL collection programs for consumers that are linked to broader CSR objectives.
For example, Best Buy, the large retailer of electronic items and appliances, instituted a retail collection for waste elec-
tronics in 2008 and articulated speciﬁc numerical goals for product collected at its store locations (Zentes et al.,
2012). In 2014, Best Buy reported meeting a goal of collecting one billion pounds of unwanted products for recycling
by one of its contracted vendors during the six years of the program, and established a goal for a subsequent two billion
pounds of collection by 2020. The company does not charge consumers to recycle old products, with the assumption that
the service increases customer trafﬁc.
Tools to Implement CSR
While numerous broad sustainability frameworks such as the Natural Step or Cradle to Cradle exist to guide
corporate engagement on sustainability, CSR in the context of product management is often implemented
through the use of product standards and certiﬁcations and documented and evaluated through the use of annual
CSR reporting.
Product Standards and Certiﬁcations
Sustainable product standards and certiﬁcations are becoming increasingly common in the marketplace with over
400 eco-labels that apply to products or food categories and are illustrative of the enlargement of CSR (Castka
and Corbett, 2014). Often referred to broadly as eco-labels, these evaluative tools typically establish a ratings system
that is focused on one or more product attributes and is designed to transmit information to the purchaser on the
sustainability proﬁle on the product. Product standards and certiﬁcations are cited as important tools to help con-
sumers to differentiate among products in the marketplace, thereby encouraging sustainable product investment
and development (Darnall and Aragón-Correa, 2014).
Several of the product standards, certiﬁcations and eco-labels are focused upon improving EOL management ac-
tivities. For example, the Electronic Product Environmental Assessment Tool (EPEAT) standard has a category on
take-back service. However, Lee and Nasr suggested that the requirements in the EPEAT tool are not sufﬁciently ro-
bust to enhance the effectiveness of EOL management (Lee and Nasr, 2010).
Other standards, such as the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Green Building Rating
System version 4, contain an explicit reference to EPR in the context of sourcing of raw materials (Rajagopalan
et al., 2012). The Sustainable Apparel Coalition’s Higg Index 2.0 also has a category for EOL management activities
for apparel (Radhakrishnan, 2015).
The Sustainable Assessment for Carpet (NSF-140) contains a category for post-consumer reclamation and EOL
management, but does not require the producer to take back or directly arrange for the collection and recycling
of discarded carpets (NSF, 2006).
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The most recent version of the Cradle to Cradle Certiﬁed Product Standard includes an externally managed com-
ponents (EMCs) section that introduces the requirement for components to be returned to suppliers for recycling,
but does not speciﬁcally require the producers to facilitate this activity.
While EOL management activities are being recognized within product standard and certiﬁcation programs, few
explicitly distinguish between overall recovery efforts and those that are directly facilitated by manufacturers either
through regulated EPR efforts or through voluntary initiatives.
Critical to the evaluation of the corporate response to EPR and the embrace of CSR more broadly is the use of
standardized reporting tools such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). CSR reporting is almost universally em-
braced among the largest global ﬁrms, with 93 percent of the largest 250 companies engaging in the practice in 2013
(KPMG, 2013). However, as noted by Tate et al., there is little research that directly addresses how CSR reports spe-
ciﬁcally address SSCM activities (Tate et al., 2010).
The GRI reporting framework is generally considered to be the de facto framework for CSR reporting
(Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014). As supply chain management is receiving greater attention in CSR activities, the GRI
reporting framework is incorporating EPR into the guidelines. For example, the GRI subcategory on product responsi-
bility (G4-E28) is structured for reporting on the percentage of products sold by the ﬁrm that are reclaimed either by the
ﬁrm itself or by actors on behalf of the ﬁrm such as PROs. Moreover, this subcategory acknowledges that, for those
ﬁrms facing legal requirements, this disclosure offer opportunities for market differentiation (GRI, 2013).
Research Methodology for Assessing EPR within CSR Reporting
In order to more fully characterize how EPR speciﬁcally, and EOL management of a company’s products more
broadly, was integrated within a company’s CSR proﬁle, it was essential to understand the ﬁrm’s overall CSR proﬁle.
Several researchers have examined the interface between CSR reporting and green product development. For ex-
ample, Albino et al. utilized the Dow Jones Sustainability Index as the data set for screening companies for green
supply chain activities; however, they did not speciﬁcally address EOL management activities for products (Albino
et al., 2009).
The 2014 Newsweek Green Ranking of the largest publically traded global companies was chosen as the data set
for this thesis author’s in-depth analysis. These rankings were selected due to the fact that they are (a) international
in scope and (b) categorized by industrial sectors and (c) the rankings have been analyzed by researchers such as
Lyon and Shimshack (2012) and Wang and Sarkis (2013).
The Newsweek Green Ranking evaluated 500 companies in eight categories including a combined waste and pro-
ductivity score, but this category does not explicitly address EOL activities for products. The companies were ranked
among industry peers in the Global Industry Classiﬁcation Standard (GICS) to permit comparisons among ﬁrms in
the same category.
Given that all of the companies in the Newsweek analysis were not subject to an EPR obligation, companies iden-
tiﬁed as producing a product or utilizing packaging were screened for likelihood of an EPR obligation. The evidence
of EPR requirements was determined by analysis of publically available lists of members of EPR organizations and
from lists of obligated or registered companies on public authority websites. This resulted in selection of 121 com-
panies for further study.
It is important to note that several companies are subject to EPR requirements for multiple products, for example
companies that are required to comply with both the WEEE and Packaging Directives in the EU (Table 1).
Following the identiﬁcation of companies subject to legal obligations for EPR, the sustainability or CSR reports,
published in either 2013 or 2014, as well as information on company websites was screened for statements regard-
ing EPR or EOL management activities.
The reports were analyzed for evidence of the following.
1. Statement of a preferred policy approach for EPR: for example, a preference for EPR whereby a producer is respon-
sible for the collection and recycling of its own or similar products placed on the market as opposed to a collective
approach with manufacturers fulﬁlling EPR obligations through a representative organization.
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2. Reference to a speciﬁc goal for EOL management of products: a quantitative goal to EOL management, which pro-
vided metrics and targets that illustrate a ﬁrm’s commitment to product recovery strategies.
3. Quantitative assessment of products or materials managed: a quantitative accounting of EOL management activities,
which illustrates that a mechanism was established to measure progress.
4. Reference to an EOL product collection program such as collection at retail locations: the institution of EOL collection
programs by individual manufacturers is highly individualistic and favors those with a physical infrastructure
footprint, such as retail locations.
5. Design for environment considerations incorporated into the company’s product design: DfE practices are an important
metric to indicate that producers acknowledge and are working to minimize downstream impacts of their products.
Results of the Data Analyses
The results of the review of 121 ﬁrms that published CSR reports are summarized in Table 2.
The WEEE Directive in the EU was the most commonly cited EPR regulatory instrument, with eight ﬁrms spe-
ciﬁcally referencing the directive. The EU’s Directive on End of Life Vehicles was cited in four reports. In two cases,
ﬁrms reported on the total amount of fees paid to a PRO to comply with an EPR regulation.
Only 14 of the companies identiﬁed speciﬁc goals for recovery and recycling of products. The goals were
expressed using several different methodologies, with numerical targets for products to be recovered based on prod-
ucts placed on the market. In addition to those companies that identiﬁed a speciﬁc product recovery goal, two ﬁrms
stated goals for increasing access to recycling opportunities at their ﬁrm’s locations.
Of the 121 ﬁrms analyzed, 25 reported on weight managed through collection activities. The results documented
that 35 ﬁrms directly facilitated and operated collection programs for their own or similar products. The collection
pathways were either through mail-back programs or through retail collection options.
Analysis by Global Industry Classiﬁcation Standard (GICS) Sector
The GICS sector of information technology, which includes companies in the hardware and equipment, software






























121 25 5 14 25 35 62
Table 2. Summary of review of CSR reports to identify EOL management activities
Product category Source for identiﬁcation of regulated ﬁrms
WEEE WEEE Registry (UK)
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
Pharmaceuticals and medical sharps HealthStewards (Canada)
Packaging Fost Plus (Belgium)
Éco Entreprises Québec (ÉEQ) (Canada)
Packaging and printed paper Multi-material Stewardship Manitoba (Canada)
Automobiles BIL Sweden
Textiles Eco TLC (France)
Household hazardous waste Product Care (Canada)
Table 1. The product category and sources consulted to identify if the ﬁrms were subject to EPR regulatory requirements
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activities in their reports to a greater extent than other industry groups. Of the companies in this sector, 17 were
subject to EPR requirements for WEEE. However, it is important to note that ﬁrms in other GICS sectors, such
as industrial or telecommunication services, are also subject to the WEEE requirements.
Of the company reports screened, 62 reports contained a reference to DfE activities as part of their product man-
agement activities.
Discussion of the Results of the Data Analysis
The study identiﬁed that, of the 500 largest global ﬁrms, more than 20 percent were subject to EPR regulations in at
least one jurisdiction. This is particularly notable given that several GICS sectors such as ﬁnancial services and en-
ergy that populate the 500 were not engaged in the manufacturing of products or packaging.
However, despite its pervasiveness as an environmental policy tool, EPR is frequently viewed as a legal compli-
ance activity rather than a supply chain management strategy that is designed to help secure commodity supply
or as an opportunity to develop customer relationships. The lack of prominence of EOL activities for products within
CSR reports may also be representative of the higher priority devoted to other environmental matters, such as cli-
mate change, water conservation or internal waste reduction measures.
While CSR reporting by companies has expanded dramatically over the past decade, with 93 percent of the largest
250 global companies publishing such reports, fewer than 50 percent of these reporters provided speciﬁc goals or
reported on any aspects of supply chain management (KPMG, 2013).
Over half of the companies stated that DfE considerations such as design for recycling energy efﬁciency or a re-
duction in packaging use were taken into account when designing products and packaging. This showed that pollu-
tion prevention activities are widespread within companies that issue CSR or sustainability reports, and revealed a
greater emphasis or competency with intra-ﬁrm activities rather than inter-company activities, such as managing
products at the EOL.
The lack of acknowledgement of EPR within CSR reporting may be, in many cases, due to a fundamental discom-
fort with the discourse of regulatory measures within CSR.
Limitations of the Research
The study may not have fully identiﬁed all of the those ﬁrms in the Newsweek Green Rankings subject to EPR re-
quirements, given that evidence of compliance with an EPR policy may not be readily apparent if the public author-
ity or PRO does not maintain publically available lists of members or registered ﬁrms.
Publically available documents may not reﬂect a particular company’s stance on an EPR policy measure in a par-
ticular jurisdiction. Also, several companies included in the Newsweek Green Rankings did not publish a sustain-
ability report. Finally, the scope of companies subject to an EPR regulatory requirement is, of course, much
broader than those companies included in the Newsweek rankings. Companies that are not in the largest 500 com-
panies or are privately held are excluded, which then precludes several ﬁrms that are considered leaders in sustain-
ability from inclusion in the rankings. For example, Interface, Best Buy and Patagonia, ﬁrms with demonstrated
leadership position in offering EOL collection programs for their products, are not included in the Newsweek
rankings.
Recommendations
Supporting the concept of shared value, Porter and Kramer argued that regulatory efforts that stimulate innovation
and robust reporting on performance, both of which are objectives of EPR policy, could support a ﬁrm’s CSR activ-
ities (Porter and Kramer, 2011). However, as demonstrated by the data in Table 2, EPR or voluntary product man-
agement strategies have yet to be recognized as a core CSR activity by many ﬁrms. Many factors contribute to
this situation, including the practical and ﬁnancial challenges associated with product recovery, the perception of
products as wastes that remain beyond the boundaries of direct control of the ﬁrm, and the higher prioritization
of other CSR strategies for issues such as energy and water management and climate change impacts.
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EPR and the Practice of CSR
While the assumption of responsibility for products at the EOL is not yet recognized as a core CSR activity by many
ﬁrms, opportunities for strengthening the ﬁrm–customer relationship exist, and ensuring and maintaining supply
chain objectives are additional incentives for ﬁrms to be engaged in such activities. These drivers provide opportunities
for them to design and implement tools for supporting EOL activities that fall within the broader context of CSR. CSR
reporting frameworks such as GRI, for example, are well positioned to assist ﬁrms to recognize and quantify EOLman-
agement activities, either for those that are imposed by a regulatory mechanism or for those adopted voluntarily.
Product standard and certiﬁcation programs also present a path for incentivizing and institutionalizing the devel-
opment of product EOL management initiatives, and in particular those efforts that are implemented by individual
ﬁrms to reclaim their own products.
EPR Policy Enhancements
Within the EPR policy dialogue, several opportunities exist to optimize the policy choices tomore closely align EPRwith
CSR incentives, motivations and frameworks. EPR, as often implemented, has yet to broadly achieve the actualization
of private beneﬁt accruing to individual ﬁrms or effectively incentivize individual ﬁrm level collection and recycling
activities for their products at EOL. It is often suggested that the prevalence of collectivemodels of EPR implementation,
while clearly facilitating compliance and offering operational efﬁciencies, not only fails to result in sufﬁcient ﬁnancial
inducements for ﬁrm level DFE activities but also does not not spur broader product management approaches such as
product service systems or reverse logistics initiatives that more fully integrate EOL activities into a ﬁrm’s business
model.
EPR regulatory mechanisms that stipulate or encourage IPR measures supporting brand speciﬁc collection pro-
grams could be strengthened and be more broadly applied. By authorizing and, in some cases, incentivizing IPR,
ﬁrms may have much greater motivation to integrate EPR within their CSR identity and capture the potential ben-
eﬁts of reverse logistics and collection programs for EOL products. IPR is generally assumed to increase EPR pro-
gram compliance costs due to the implementation of brand identiﬁcation and segregation activities, or perceived to
be more feasible, for example, for those producers that also operate retail locations that can serve as locations for the
collection of products (Atasu and Subramanian, 2012). However, several models of the implementation of IPR exist.
As van Rossem noted, however, IPR may be implemented in conjunction with a collective organizations to more
effectively align ﬁnancial incentives with product decisions, but also facilitating collection and other activities that
may be more accomplished more effectively when addressed in a collective fashion (van Rossem, 2008).
EPR policy can also incorporate the growing emphasis on the reuse and refurbishment for some product catego-
ries, as a strategy to not only achieve greater environmental beneﬁts, but also support individual ﬁrm level CSR ob-
jectives. Regulatory efforts are demonstrated by the reuse targets contained in the EPR program for textiles in
France (Palm et al., 2014) or in the case of the EU’s End of Life Vehicle Directive (Gerrard and Kandlikar, 2007).
Conclusion
As the concept of the circular economy, as articulated in the EU and in China, becomes more prominent as an op-
erational construct for a ﬁrm’s product management strategies, EPR offers a pathway for both policymakers and in-
dividual ﬁrms to implement the concept (Hill, 2014). The EU envisions EPR as a central policy strategy to promote
the circular economy concept and may play an increasing role in helping to expand and institutionalize EPR not only
in the EU but globally (EC, 2014). If EPR is to fulﬁll the expectations assigned to it as a strategy that supports SSCM,
rather than simply a ﬁnancing mechanism for municipal waste management, strategies that embed EPR within the
broader context of CSR as well as policy approaches that truly promote closed-loop product cycles and economic
value need to be elevated within the EPR dialogue.
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Chapter 9: Conclusions, Recommendations, and Topics for Further
Research
9.1 Introduction
The inquiry as to how environmental policy, and in the case of this thesis, EPR in particular, can
be shaped to effectively and substantively respond to the global challenges of resource
constraints, increasing consumption, economic development and social equity is a perpetual
necessity. Extended Producer Responsibility or any single policy approach cannot be expected to
achieve the desired outcomes of sustainability but can be viewed as a brick in the path towards
that goal. The implementation of EPR in the marketplace continues to evolve as an environmental
policy tool that must be responsive to changes in product design, sales and use patterns while also
recognizing the changes in the technology and processes to manage products at EOL. The state of
constant change and innovation that is inherent with the life-cycle of products and the subsequent
appropriate and flexible public policy responses is what renders EPR policy mechanisms,
implementation, and results as an engaging topic for examination, and research.
9.2 Contributions of this Thesis
The thesis contributed to the limited but emerging field of research on the application of EPR in
the United States. This examination of EPR was important for evaluative purposes that may assist
and optimize future EPR developments in the U.S. With the context of the expanding scope of
products and producers which are subject to EPR regulatory requirements in the U.S., the analysis
may also prove useful for policymakers in other jurisdictions that may be interested in exploring
EPR for those products with a record of policy and practice in the U.S.
Building on the evaluative framework employed in Chapter 5 that described the prevailing policy
choices and implementation scenarios for EPR in the U.S., Chapter 6 analyzed three strategies to
promote the consistency of EPR across states in the U.S. The lack of consistency among
jurisdictions is not solely a hallmark of EPR in the U.S., but is also an ongoing challenge in the
European Union and Canada as well. The experience in the U.S. and Canada illustrated that EPR
policy instruments constructed to support significant engagement of producers in the program
design are more likely to exhibit greater consistency across jurisdictions.
The thesis also offered the first attempt at research to characterize the governance of EPR with a
particular emphasis on the allocation of responsibilities between producers and governments. This
allocation of responsibilities is a prominent, and debated, characteristic of the policy dialogue for
the majority of products currently subject to or under consideration for EPR.
With the emergence of sustainable supply chain management of EOL product management
strategies within the rubric of CSR objectives, the thesis author addressed to what extent EPR is
integrated into the CSR profile of firms. This research not only contributed to a greater
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The thesis contributed to the limited but emerging field of research on the application of EPR in 
the United States. This examination of EPR was important for evaluative purposes that may assist 
and optimize future EPR developments in the U.S. With the context of the expanding scope of 
products and producers which are subject to EPR regulatory requirements in the U.S., the analysis 
may also prove useful for policymakers in other jurisdictions that may be interested in exploring 
EPR for those products with a record of policy and practice in the U.S.  
Building on the evaluative framework employed in Chapter 5 that described the prevailing policy 
choices and implementation scenarios for EPR in the U.S., Chapter 6 analyzed three strategies to 
promote the consistency of EPR across states in the U.S. The lack of consistency among 
jurisdictions is not solely a hallmark of EPR in the U.S., but is also an ongoing challenge in the 
European Union and Canada as well. The experience in the U.S. and Canada illustrated that EPR 
policy instruments constructed to support significant engagement of producers in the program 
design are more likely to exhibit greater consistency across jurisdictions.  
The thesis also offered the first attempt at research to characterize the governance of EPR with a 
particular emphasis on the allocation of responsibilities between producers and governments. This 
allocation of responsibilities is a prominent, and debated, characteristic of the policy dialogue for 
the majority of products currently subject to or under consideration for EPR.  
With the emergence of sustainable supply chain management of EOL product management 
strategies within the rubric of CSR objectives, the thesis author addressed to what extent EPR is 
integrated into the CSR profile of firms. This research not only contributed to a greater 
understanding of the alignment between EPR and CSR but also underscored that the tools of CSR 
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can be fine-tuned to expand the recognition and institutionalization of product management 
activities.  
The thesis author deepened the contextualization of EPR within the theoretical framework of 
ecological modernization. While EM is most often associated with Europe, the adoption of EPR 
in the U.S. offers a rich context for examining the application of the theory of EM. For some 
product categories addressed by EPR in the U.S., most notably WEEE, the degree of 
implementation flexibility accorded to producers presents a regulatory approach that is in 
alignment with the framework of EM.  
The research findings also suggested that EM could be further strengthened through recognition 
of the differing roles and motivations of governmental actors at the national, subnational and 
municipal levels. Existing power structures and interests among state actors may inhibit the 
embrace of policy and programmatic measures that are demonstrative of EM. As examined in 
Chapter 7, the effectiveness of EPR is predicated, at least in part, on the governance arrangement 
of a particular program. However, the allocation of responsibilities between governments and 
producers varies greatly depending upon the jurisdiction and product category. The roles of 
municipalities as principal actors in an EPR program in some cases diverge from the intent and 
stimulus for EPR held by national or subnational government entities and may interfere with EPR 
achieving the loftier expectations associated with it. Another challenge for deepening EM as a 
theoretical framework underpinning market-based policy instruments, such as EPR, is an 
expanded articulation of responsibility for private sector actors.  
For EPR, this challenge is particularly relevant within the context of, in some cases, rapid 
technological advancement of products and materials. Due to technological innovation and 
intentionality of design, there are clear trends in the marketplace for some products and materials 
with an environmental footprint that is superior to their predecessors but the collection and 
processing infrastructure for these materials is sometimes lacking and piecemeal. This signals that 
opportunity exists for elaboration of EM in the context of technological advancement for new 
products while simultaneously developing the business models and product recovery 
infrastructure to accept both the legacy and newer products. This is of particular relevance within 
the discourse of the circular economy.  
9.3 Recommendations 
Extended producer responsibility, as an environmental policy approach continues to evolve as it 
is applied to rapidly changing product designs, emerging new sales channels and expanded 
product types and to a greater number of jurisdictions. Given this ongoing progression, this thesis 
researcher developed several recommendations of topics for consideration in the ongoing EPR 
policy dialogue. 
The contextualization of EPR within the concepts of sustainable materials management and the 
circular economy will enable its further consideration within a broader framework that 
underscores how materials can be utilized and circulated more productively and sustainably. This 
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framework will facilitate an increased emphasis on the how collected materials are managed at 
EOL to ensure the environmentally sound management of those materials such as the reuse and 
refurbishment of products. As characterized by Ghisellini et al., the conceptualization and 
definitions of the circular economy are diverse but many emphasize the reduction of externalities, 
the promotion of eco design for products and achieving greater efficiency of materials, all of 
which align with EPR (Ghisellini et al. 2015). The consideration of EPR within the dialogue on 
the circular economy that is underway in the European Union, China and elsewhere, established a 
foundation for this work and set a precedent for other countries to follow. As noted by Hill, the 
concept of the circular economy is being manifested in several EU initiatives, most notably a 
package of policy measures introduced by the European Commission (Hill 2015). Of these policy 
measures, the Commission intends to further strengthen and clarify EPR as it is implemented 
under the Directives for certain product categories. 
As identified in Chapter 5, the lack of consistency across jurisdictions continues to be a challenge 
of complexity for producers and regulatory entities and, as documented, may inhibit EPR policy 
from conveying cohesive and consistent signals for DfE and other sustainable supply chain 
optimization measures. This challenge is particularly acute in jurisdictions, such as the U.S. 
wherein EPR policy adoption is relegated to the subnational level. Despite the jurisdictional 
challenges, several product sectors have demonstrated that national regulatory consistency is 
possible. For EPR consideration in the future, policymakers will benefit from research and 
analyses that assess the economic and implementation benefits of greater policy consistency as 
well as the identification and characterization of the elements of an EPR regulatory measure that 
are of upmost importance for consistent application. 
To address the theme of regulatory consistency, the consideration of cooperative regional policy 
dialogues will be a step towards identifying opportunities to promote consistency of policy 
measures. For example, building on ongoing cooperative measures on the environment between 
the U.S., Canada and Mexico could promote strategies for greater consistency of the application 
of EPR and simultaneously serve the interests of greater North American material recycling 
infrastructure development and environmentally sound management practices. 
9.4 Topics for Further Research 
While this thesis author explored several topics within the study of EPR, each is worthy of 
additional research to further expand the knowledge base for EPR policy design and program 
implementation. This further research is of particular importance globally as application of EPR 
continues to expand as an environmental policy tool. 
The following topics proposed by this thesis author for further exploration represent both 
augmenting research based on the foundational research questions addressed in this thesis as well 
as additional research on the fundamental conceptual underpinnings of EPR. 
1) It is of paramount importance that additional research and data analyses should be conducted 
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Specifically, a robust economic assessment of the application of EPR will strengthen the 
comparison with other policy prescriptions and programs that address the environmental impacts 
of products. As noted by Lifset et al., inadequate data exists regarding the economic efficiency of 
EPR (Lifset et al. 2013). Such an analysis will contribute to a fuller understanding of how policy 
choices impact program performance. In particular, assessing the relationship between the 
outcomes of EPR programs and the various governance structures will enhance the EPR policy 
dialogue in the U.S. as well as contribute to EPR policy construction in other nations.  
2) A research imperative from a broader evaluative perspective is the further investigation and
definition of the relationship between EPR and producers’ DfE activities.  A more thorough
definition of the activities associated with the design of products is necessary for a robust
understanding of the relationship between EPR and design signals and incentives. For example,
dematerialization and the use of post-consumer recycled content are variables that are germane
for this analysis. Analyses that employ multi-product approaches and multiple jurisdictions will
facilitate a more thorough understanding of which policy approaches provide more effective
signals for DfE. As noted in a study of the existing EPR programs in the EU, very few
quantifiable targets or indicators regarding eco-design have been developed (BIO by Deloitte
2014).
3) A structured case study research program on firm-level, product management activities, will
further the identification and characterization of whether and under what circumstances EPR is
influencing supply chain management and customer relationship initiatives to address the EOL
management of products. This assessment can augment and further the research on how EOL
product management should be strengthened within the discourse and practice of CSR. Such
research should be aligned with the emergence of the circular economy framework and the
consideration of which policy instruments may be appropriate to implement that broader
framework.
4) While the term ‘circular economy’ embodies a breadth of definitions and actions, these center
on a system centered on a cyclical loop approach (Murray et al. 2015). Within the European
Union’s circular economy policy package introduced in 2015, which recognized the conceptual
framework of the circular economy and its linkage with EPR as a supportive policy mechanism,
there exist significant opportunities to expand and deepen the research on the interrelationships
between the circular economy and EPR as an implementing policy strategy. In particular, this
extends to the identification of existing and potential materials loops and the opportunity for
reuse, remanufacture and use in the production cycle of products as well as how EPR policy can
be structured to promote this reframing of the use of materials.
9.5 Concluding Remarks 
Despite its presence on the public policy landscape for more than two decades, EPR is still 
evolving and maturing as an environmental policy approach. Given EPR’s role as a market-based 
tool that is applied to products and materials that are rapidly changing to meet consumer demands 
or business imperatives, such evolution is not unexpected. While EPR has resulted in significant 
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positive environmental outcomes resulting from the collection and management of products at
EOL, the conceptualization of EPR as transformational for product design and delivery has yet to
be achieved. This is, due in part, to the policy choices underpinning many of the current EPR
programs. However, as broader policy constructs such as the circular economy gain credence, the
limits of the global commodity supply and their volatility are recognized and the market for
environmentally preferable products expands, the opportunity exists for EPR to serve as an
operative tool to extend product lifetime to promote reuse and other strategies to dramatically
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